FEBRUARY 1964

Commentary

VOLUME THIRTY-SEVEN, NUMBER TWO

PIUS XII, THE JEWS & THE GERMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

A Documented Account

GUENTER LEWY

Two Stories by Isaac Babel

THE MEANING OF NEGRO STRATEGY: David Danzig

THE "NEW STATESMAN" & THE ENGLISH LEFT: John Mander

SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: Oscar Gass

NEW YORK POLITICS & THE LIBERAL PARTY: Bernard Rosenberg

REMEMBERING JEWISH HISTORY: Alfred Kazin

FREE WILL (AGAIN): Henry David Aiken

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Lewis A. Coser — George P. Elliott — Ben B. Seligman
Midge Decter — John Maddox — Keith Botsford — J. G. Weightman

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 75 CENTS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tested and proved effective through many severe winters, DE-ICER — the real thing — now comes East to prevent gas line freeze.



It's now in <u>both</u> AMERICAN® Regular and Certified Lead-Free AMOCO® Gasolines *at no extra cost!*

You <u>expect</u> more from AMERICAN *and you <u>get</u> it!*

© 1963, THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, CHICAGO, ILL.

"DE-ICER" is the trademark for American Oil Company's gas line anti-freeze additive.

LICENSED TO GNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



A distinguished edition of

Confessions of an English Opium-Eater

Free with membership in The Folio Society of London

For the first time, Britain's most sophisticated book society is offering free with membership a handsome editon of De Quincey's *Opium-Eater*. This is demy octavo in size, has full cloth binding blocked in gold and is illustrated with wood engravings by Blair Hughes-Stanton. A truly fine edition to be treasured by book-lovers on both continents.

The coupon below when posted promptly will bring you an intriguing 24-page illustrated prospectus which gives you full details. Listed and described in the prospectus are more than 70 titles available now and in the coming year.

The Folio Society offers the opportunity to acquire, at extremely reasonable prices, individually designed and attractively bound editions of enduring books which are not on sale to the general public. They are sent to American members directly from England's fine binderies.

The books selected by The Folio Society for publication are those works which have lasted – and will last. Shakespeare, of course. Jane Austen's novels. The Life of Christopher Columbus by his son Ferdinand. Fanny Burney's Diary. The Sonnets of Michelangelo illustrated with his own drawings – and many more. None of these de luxe editions is available from American publishers. All are custom designed, beautifully illustrated.

The prospectus gives the full story – including details of how you may obtain De Quincey's *Opium-Eater* free. Why not fill in the coupon now while it is at hand? Naturally, there is no obligation.

To: The Folio Society of London
U.S. Office, 59 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y./10003

Please send me without obligation your 1964 Prospectus.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____

Code_____ N-2

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A STATEMENT OF AIMS

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, *the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture.*

The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY'S *contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of* COMMENTARY *by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.*

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
A. M. SONNABEND, *President*

THE COMMENTARY PUBLICATION COMMITTEE
RALPH E. SAMUEL, *Chairman*

FRANK ALTSCHUL	ELI M. BLACK	CHARLES D. BREITEL
RICHARD C. ERNST	MAURICE GLINERT	SYDNEY M. KAYE
LEWIS J. LAVENTHOL	HAROLD MANHEIM	ARTHUR L. MAYER
DAVID SHER	ROGER SONNABEND	HARRY STEINER
ALAN M. STROOCK	LAURENCE A. TISCH	BEN TOUSTER

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Out of the thousands of books available to the reading public, only a handful are chosen for the TIME READING PROGRAM.

The editors of TIME know your reading time is important.

Learn how you can get their selections for $1.00 a book.

FROM TENS of thousands of contemporary books, the editors of TIME choose only those that stand out and remain notable for their thought-provoking ideas, their relevancy to the present and their excellence of writing. Books that have this stamp of greatness become part of the TIME READING PROGRAM. They are the pick of the literary crop, selected from a vast number of works in a very broad range of subjects. In a special preface, TIME editors discuss the impact each book had when it was published—and why it is important today.

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU JOIN THE TIME READING PROGRAM? Every two months, editors of the TIME READING PROGRAM send you four books. Books include works of fiction, science, history, the arts, philosophy, politics and economics. They are all worth your serious attention.

WHAT WILL IT COST? The books cost about a dollar a volume, four for $3.95. Hard cover editions of these very same books would cost you from $3 to $7 each. Here is an ideal way to build or expand your library—very inexpensively—with soft-bound editions you will be pleased to own, proud to lend.

PHYSICAL QUALITIES OF THESE HANDSOME EDITIONS. Books are library size—5¼" x 8"—with type face clear, large and legible. Margins are ample for jotting down notes. All books are printed on Time Reading Text, an opaque white paper of excellent quality. Covers are plastic-impregnated, flexible and durable—and beautifully printed in color.

WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU DONT WANT A BOOK? If you decide that you don't want to keep a book, you simply send it back to the editors of the TIME READING PROGRAM. You pay only for the books you keep.

HOW DO YOU BECOME A SUBSCRIBER? Fill out the no-obligation coupon. We'll be happy to send you the first four books on a free examination basis. No minimum purchase is ever required. You may keep all four books for $3.95 or return them and pay nothing. If you send in the coupon today, here are the four books you will receive:

The American Presidency by Clinton Rossiter (340 pages). TIMELY...REQUIRED READING FOR '64 ELECTIONS...enriches your discussions of what a President should do or be. Rossiter writes about the paradox of Presidential powers and limitations...fashions a fascinating study of the evolution of an office which has become the most difficult political job in the world.

The Lost Weekend by Charles Jackson (296 pages). THE MODERN CLASSIC ON ALCOHOLISM..."The Lost Weekend is one of those literary rarities: a novel which has exerted a profound influence on the field with which it deals. Its very title has become a synonym for the condition it describes." S. D. Bacon, Rutgers University.

A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich by Alexander Solzhenitsyn (202 pages). A BRILLIANT EXPOSE BY A SOVIET WRITER ...one of the most realistic novels ever to emerge from the U.S.S.R. Its very publication has been a political event, for it deals frankly with a formerly taboo subject in Russia—prisoners in Soviet forced labor camps during the Stalin regime.

The Devil in Massachusetts by Marion L. Starkey (376 pages). THE BEGINNINGS OF WITCH HUNTING IN AMERICA...the Salem witch trials form a kind of bridge between witch hunting in 1692 and what might be called modern witch hunting—those waves of irrational behavior that sweep through otherwise rational-seeming societies.

Time-Life Books
Time & Life Building, Dept. C-1
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Please send me the introductory 4-book set of the TIME READING PROGRAM. I understand that I may examine these books for ten days and then may either return them—or keep them and send you $3.95 (plus shipping and handling). If I keep them, you will confirm my reservation to receive additional sets every second month at the same price of $3.95 with the same 10-day examination privilege. I am not obligated to take any minimum number of sets of books, I may return any I wish and may cancel my subscription at any time.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____

Zip Code_____

H

Offer confined to U.S.A. only.

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

FEBRUARY 1964
NUMBER 2
VOLUME 37

Pius XII, the Jews, and the German Catholic Church 23 GUENTER LEWY

Two Stories 36 ISAAC BABEL

The Meaning of Negro Strategy 41 DAVID DANZIG

The *New Statesman* & the English Left 47 JOHN MANDER

Soviet Economic Developments 54 OSCAR GASS

New York Politics & the Liberal Party 69 BERNARD ROSENBERG

Observations

Remembering Jewish History 76 ALFRED KAZIN

Free Will (Again) 79 HENRY DAVID AIKEN

Letters from Readers 6

Books in Review

The Presidential Papers, by Norman Mailer 83 MIDGE DECTER

Invisible Latin America, by Samuel Shapiro 85 KEITH BOTSFORD

The State of the Unions, by Paul Jacobs 86 LEWIS A. COSER

The Scientific Intellectual, by Lewis S. Feuer 88 JOHN MADDOX

The Trial of Charles de Gaulle, by Alfred Fabre-Luce; and A Modern French Republic, by Pierre Mendès-France 89 J. G. WEIGHTMAN

Challenge to Affluence, by Gunnar Myrdal 91 BEN B. SELIGMAN

Time of Arrival and Other Essays, by Dan Jacobson 92 GEORGE P. ELLIOTT

Editor: NORMAN PODHORETZ

Managing Editor
SHERRY ABEL (*on leave*)

Associate Editor
THEODORE SOLOTAROFF

Assistant Editor
MARION MAGID

Contributing Editors
MILTON HIMMELFARB
GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Editorial Assistant
RHOMA MOSTEL

Business Manager
MARTIN EDELSTON

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee • Single copy 75¢; $7 a year; 2 years $12; 3 years $17 • No extra Canadian or foreign postage charge • Editorial & Business offices: 165 East 56th Street, New York 22 • Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices • © Copyright 1964 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions • Indexed in Readers' Guide & Public Affairs Information Service • Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by return postage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Life mask taken 60 days before Lincoln's death. The hand was cast in 1860. From the collection of Clarence Hay



The pain and exaltation . . . the wit and wisdom . . . the doubts and the monumental courage—every important word he ever wrote or uttered . . .

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

NINE VOLUMES (PUBLISHER'S LIST PRICE $115.00) YOURS FOR $5.95

WITH TRIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE HISTORY BOOK CLUB

ONLY OFFERING THIS YEAR—in observance of LINCOLN'S BIRTHDAY

TODAY nearly a century of legend tends to blur our image of Lincoln, the *man*. This human Lincoln—who was not born to greatness but *grew* to it in times as troubled as our own—now speaks to us clearly in *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*.

In these nine volumes—the most complete collection of his writings and utterances ever published—we meet the *real* Lincoln. We witness the drama of his growth in 6,870 private as well as public papers—half of them never printed before. We discover the inner reservoirs of strength that enabled him to transcend the mounting crises of his life.

This extraordinary human testament has been collected, indexed and richly annotated by a team of our foremost Lincoln scholars, headed by Dr. Roy P. Basler of The Library of Congress. The product of 26 years of research, the set carries a Publisher's List Price of $115. But now, in observance of Lincoln's Birthday, we are pleased to offer it at just *5% of its retail value*, with trial membership in The History Book Club.

A service for readers who value their links with the eternal human drama, The History Book Club offers fine permanent editions of the most important and readable works of history and world affairs—at average savings (with bonuses) of 40%, and often more. By joining now, you receive the 9-volume Lincoln set for *$5.95—with* your choice of a first selection from the titles listed below at money-saving Member's Prices. (First price is Publisher's List; **boldface** shows Member's Price.)

- 9 volumes
- 4924 pages
- 6870 documents
- 43 Lincoln photographs, engravings and manuscript facsimiles

368. TASTE OF COURAGE, ed. by Flower & Reeves. World War II, as seen and felt by those who endured it. 1136 pp. $10.00/**$7.50**

101. HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, by Walter Goerlitz. Story of the feared war machine, 1657 to 1945. $7.50/**$5.95**

263. GODS AND MEN, by Henry Bamford Parkes. Ancient myths and ideals that have shaped our way of life. $7.50/**$5.95**

371. CIVIL WAR DICTIONARY, by M. M. Boatner III. Over 4000 entries—battles, persons, events, issues, etc. $15.00/**$8.95**

128. HISTORY OF FRANCE, by Andre Maurois. Perigord cave-painters to 5th Republic—a sweeping panorama. $8.50/**$6.95**

445. RISE OF THE WEST, by Wm. H. McNeill. Dazzling new history of the human community since 6000 B.C. $12.50/**$9.50**

110. JOURNALS OF LEWIS & CLARK, ed. by Bernard DeVoto. First expedition to penetrate the virgin Northwest. $6.50/**$4.95**

392. HISTORY OF RUSSIA, by Jesse D. Clarkson. Ten turbulent centuries of political and social history. $10.00/**$7.95**

265. MEMOIRS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by Winston S. Churchill. 1086-page edition of his epic narrative. $9.00/**$6.95**

395. THE GREAT SIEGE, by Ernle Bradford. How knights of Malta stopped the Turks' advance on Europe, 1565. $6.50/**$5.50**

You must be delighted with the books, or return them within ten days and owe nothing. That automatically cancels your membership. If, however, you remain, all benefits of membership are yours—savings, bonuses, wide choice of books, minimal obligation. But remember—this special $5.95 offer of the *Collected Lincoln* will not be repeated for *at least a year*. Mail the coupon today.

THE HISTORY BOOK CLUB, Stamford, Conn. MY 0291

Please open my Trial Membership and send my 9-volume *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, along with the first selection indicated below. Bill my *Lincoln* at just $5.95 and my selection at the money-saving Member's Price, plus postage and handling. If not delighted, I may return the books within 10 days and owe nothing, thus canceling my Trial Membership. Otherwise, to complete my Trial Membership, I agree to purchase 4 more books at the money-saving Member's Price during the next 12 months, from the 100 or more that are always available to me. (All selections are described in your monthly *Review*, and a convenient form is always provided with which I may order or reject selections.) I will receive a valuable Bonus Book of my choice with every 4th selection I take after completing Trial Membership.

SELECTION Name _____
(fill in number)

Address _____

City _____ **State** _____ **Zip Code** _____

In Canada, same savings. Books shipped from Toronto duty free. Bonus plan differs slightly. Mail to 2847 Danforth Ave., Toronto 13, Ont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOT SO FAST, DAISY BUCHANAN!

"The room was large and stifling . . . opening the windows admitted only a gust of hot shrubbery from the Park. Daisy went to the mirror and stood with her back to us, fixing her hair.

"'It's a swell suite,' whispered Jordan respectfully . . .

"'Open another window,' commanded Daisy . . .

"'There aren't any more.'

"'Well, we'd better telephone for an axe—'"

F. SCOTT FITZGERALD
*The Great Gatsby**

The affair between F. Scott Fitzgerald and The Plaza was as true as it was published. He loved us. And brought his friends and characters to meet us. Anson Hunter and Paula Legendre. Jay Gatsby. And Daisy.

But what about the axe that Daisy wanted? If she had phoned, we probably would have sent one up. But she didn't. In the Twenties, hot summer days were tolerated . . . even at The Plaza.

Today it isn't necessary. The Plaza is air conditioned. And the rooms have been beautifully redecorated. The atmosphere still makes people whisper "swell." And authors are still staying here and writing us into their Great American Novels. Are you?

*Copyright 1925 Charles Scribner's Sons; renewal copyright 1953 Frances Scott Fitzgerald Lanahan. Used by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

THE PLAZA

HOTEL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

A. M. Sonnabend,
Chairman of the Board

LETTERS FROM READERS

Arendt on Eichmann

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Norman Podhoretz is to be congratulated for having written the first critique of Hannah Arendt's book on Eichmann worthy of any serious attention ["Hannah Arendt on Eichmann," September 1963]. It is disturbing to have to add that he drives his case so far that it ends in absurdity. Despite his own strictures, eloquence ran away with him. But then we are all reasonably decent men standing half-mute before the pit of hell. In that spirit I make the following remarks.

Podhoretz has made, in my opinion, his strongest case in criticizing Arendt's treatment of the issue of Jewish resistance. It *is* difficult to understand why she made such a point of this, and Podhoretz's analysis of the roots of Jewish "appeasement" policy is reasonable and convincing. . . .

Podhoretz should have let it go at that. For later in the article the rising intensity of his emotion leads him into statements which are dangerously misleading. It is one thing to criticize Hannah Arendt's attitude toward the Jews, quite another to jettison her most significant contributions to the study of totalitarianism because it violates what Podhoretz thinks we know about the Nature of Man.

(1) The point he makes about the totalitarian closure of Germany and the Soviet Union is not relevant because Arendt, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* was not arguing that they were completely closed. Rather she was drawing a model of what such a society, if completely closed, would look like. This has been an acceptable procedure in social science ever since Max Weber perfected it via his ideal-type methodology. Her model is legitimately static because she attempted to freeze a situation to show its limiting tendencies.

(2) Even so, Germany was considerably more closed than Podhoretz seems to assume. Arendt, in the *Origins,* made this very clear in her useful onion analogy with which she showed how various concentric layers of ideology, psychology, and party organization separated the inner core of the Nazi movement, on the one hand, from the ordinary population on the other. How closed a society has to be to produce Eichmanns is properly an empirical question of which we still know very little. Personally I am rather impressed with the number of potential Eichmanns who keep cropping up in our society whose "openness" we like to celebrate so much.

(3) It is true, in my opinion, that Arendt in the *Origins* did not show an understanding of Communism equal to her grasp of Nazism. In this sense she attempted too much in equating Communist totalitarianism with the Nazi version to the degree she did without adequate qualifications. However, in my opinion Podhoretz is certainly wrong in linking her analysis with current propensities to underrate the degree of liberalization in the Soviet Union. It is not her basic theory, but rather her failure to distinguish adequately between Nazi and Communist ideology which has led to this. Communist theory, because of its roots in Marx, has always been closer to the Enlightenment tradition than Nazism ever was. Communist ideology, because of its central values, has carried within it the theoretical seeds for a liberalizing critique of its totalitarian tendencies in a way Nazi ideology never did. Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of Nazism is its seeming unrelatedness to recognizable Western ideological tradition, an unrelatedness so extreme that many, including Podhoretz, have felt impelled to use the word "insanity"—a wholly useless resolution of the problem, one might add, in comparison with Arendt's profound attempt at comprehension.

(4) In throwing out the baby with the bath water, Podhoretz—on an infinitely more sophisticated level than some reviewers, it is true—places himself among those who defend the current state of our knowledge about Man against the horrifying implications of recent history. If her theory, as he says, ". . . finally violates everything we know about the Nature of Man," then it is because we know very little of this Nature.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sylvia Miles, Nancy Marchand, Salome Jens, Betty Miller (l. to r.) in the roles they created for the original American production of "The Balcony," 1960. See "Seven Plays of the Modern Theater," below.

"You're so kind, Madame... The thing to be said for your House is that it brings consolation..."



Scene 5, The Balcony, by Jean Genet

(Circle in the Square–Lucille Lortel production; photo by Martha Swope)

"JEAN GENET is a genius of criminality and revolt." So writes critic Robert Brustein of the remarkable author of *Our Lady of the Flowers* and *The Balcony* (one of the *Seven Plays of the Modern Theater*, below).

In creating the "visceral and glandular world" which is the setting of his works, Genet draws upon his firsthand acquaintance with the demimonde of crime, violence, and perversion, *not* to shock us, but to confront us with the shadowy land of repressed impulses and threatening dreams which often lies beneath our consciousness.

Clearly, the works of Jean Genet are not for the ordinary reader. Nor are all of the other selections described below. But for those who choose their reading for its artistic integrity and intellectual impact, the titles shown here offer rich and varied fare. They are typical of the books and recordings presented month after month–at substantial savings–to members of The Readers' Subscription. If this is the kind of literary diet on which *you* thrive, may we suggest a trial membership on the terms outlined in the coupon below?

THE READERS' SUBSCRIPTION invites you to choose **ANY 3** of these outstanding works of the creative imagination **FOR ONLY $1 EACH**

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG. *Ed. by* **Wentworth and Flexner.** "Vulgar, disreputable, bawdy, profane, blasphemous, but it is *alive.*" *The New York Times Book Review.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $7.50

EDMUND WILSON: PATRIOTIC GORE. A fresh look at the literature of the Civil War. "The greatest single work of Wilson's unique career." *Alfred Kazin.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $8.50

OUR LADY OF THE FLOWERS, *by* **Jean Genet.** At last available in this country after more than 20 years. "The greatest novel Genet or probably anyone else has produced in that time." *Alfred Kazin.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.50

T. S. ELIOT READING POEMS AND CHORUSES. *Ash Wednesday, J. Alfred Prufrock,* choruses from *Murder in the Cathedral* and *Family Reunion,* many others. *One 12" LP.*
LIST PRICE $5.95

THE DYER'S HAND, *by* **W. H. Auden.** Full of wit and wisdom, essays ranging from the metaphysics of the detective story to the politics of Shakespeare.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $7.50

LETTERS OF DOSTOEVSKY, *translated by* **Ethel Colburn Mayne.** Details of his adolescence, tragic imprisonment, exile, courtships and marriages, and the development of his masterpieces.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.00

SEVEN PLAYS OF THE MODERN THEATER. Genet's *The Balcony* (see picture above), plus Beckett, Ionesco, Pinter, Behan, Gelber Shelagh Delaney. Introduction by Harold Clurman.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $8.50

PARODIES. *Compiled with introduction and notes by* **Dwight Macdonald.** Chaucer to Beerbohm, Shakespeare to Mencken, Jane Austen to Perelman.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $7.50

LORD BYRON'S WIFE, *by* **Malcolm Erwin.** Never before told–story of one of the most disastrous marriages in English letters.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $8.50

COLLECTED POEMS OF W. B. YEATS. *The* definitive one-volume edition.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.50

EXISTENCE, *ed. by* **Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger.** Guide to the new psychotherapeutic approach which "seeks to understand mental illness as the disruption of the . . . *condition humaine.*"
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $7.50

FINNEGANS WAKE, *by* **James Joyce.** "One of the few great intellectual and esthetic treats that these years have yielded." *Edmund Wilson.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $7.50

ENCOUNTERS, *ed. by* **Spender & Lasky.** Mary McCarthy, Kenneth Tynan, Edmund Wilson, 50 others, in the best of 10 years of *Encounter Magazine.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $8.50

BAUDELAIRE: THE FLOWERS OF EVIL. As exciting, as turbulent as when first suppressed by French authorities.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.50

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE, *by* **Richard Hofstader.** Portrays the scorners of intellect in American life and defines intellectualism and its strength.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.95

MARTYN GREEN'S TREASURY OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN. A lavish and loving edition. Complete librettos of 11 famous works. Voice and piano arrangements for 102 favorites.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $15.00

THE NAKED LUNCH, *by* **William Burroughs.** The controversial work of beauty and maniacally exquisite insight.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.00

THE PRENTICE-HALL WORLD ATLAS. "A gem . . . mature, well-balanced, Old World cartography . . . exceptional even by European standards." *Saturday Review. 158 maps.*
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $9.00

WILLIAM FAULKNER: COLLECTED STORIES. 42 masterful stories by the late Nobel Prizewinner. To read them is to experience the thrill of discovery that happens when one enters a world created by a great writer.
PUBLISHER'S PRICE $6.50

AN EXTRA GIFT

—if you choose to enclose payment when returning this coupon.

By eliminating our paperwork in billing, you receive, as an *additional* gift . . . without extra cost, Hannah Arendt's classic analysis of the modern age, ON REVOLUTION, published at $6.50.

☐ Payment of $3.00 enclosed. Send extra gift. (NYC residents, please add 4% sales tax. If payment not in U.S. funds, please add 50¢ for conversion fees. Recordings only subject to duty on shipments to Canada.)

Up to $39.00 worth of books for only $3

The Readers' Subscription Dept. 64-04
404 PARK AVE. SOUTH, NEW YORK 16

Please enroll me as a member, open my free subscription to *The Griffin,* and send me at once the three Selections indicated below, for which you will bill me only $3.00 (plus postage). I agree to purchase four more Selections at reduced Member's Prices during the coming year from the more than 75 available. I will receive a free bonus book of my own choosing after every fourth Selection.

SELECTIONS_____

_____

_____

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP CODE_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The assertion that we do leads to absurdities such as Podhoretz's statement that ". . . no person could have joined the Nazi party, let alone the SS, who was not at the very least a vicious anti-Semite." This is simply not true. It is by now common knowledge that everyone had eventually to join the party in Germany after 1933 if they wanted to hold on to any kind of significant employment. Even in the case of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, which is highly selective in its admission policy, people join for varying reasons, just as they do the Catholic Church and the Democratic party. True, the latter examples cannot be equated with the former; but only someone who utterly ignores the history of Germany between the two World Wars can single out anti-Semitism as the single most important motive for joining the Nazi party. And to state that ". . . no banality of a man could have done so hugely evil a job so well" may support what Podhoretz wishes we knew about "conscience," but it does violate what we know of what the conditions of modern existence have done to man's ability to rationalize virtually any act he commits. It is to Hannah Arendt's (and Raul Hilberg's) everlasting credit that they have ventured into this problem so fearlessly as to have uncovered many of the precise mechanisms of language and thought by which a banal man is able to commit monstrous deeds. This banality, indeed, is one of the most fateful discoveries of our age. Podhoretz does not even mention these aspects of her work. It almost seems he cannot bring himself to cope with how little we know of the potentialities of human evil, unlike Bruno Bettelheim in his recent contribution to this debate in the *New Republic*. Podhoretz is right to urge that we leave the dead alone, but "in the name of all that is humane" we, the remnant—whatever our faith and nationality—can never dare to "let up" on ourselves with regard to the larger issues which Hannah Arendt and others have done so much to bring to our attention.

MANFRED STANLEY
Department of Sociology
Wagner College
Staten Island, N.Y.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

To one who has both admiration and respect for Norman Podhoretz's writings, his piece on Hannah Arendt was grossly disappointing. Like so many of her critics, he refuses to see her work as an attempt to show what Bruno Bettelheim so aptly described ". . . as our inability to comprehend how modern technology and social organization, when made use of by totalitarianism, can empower a normal, rather mediocre person to play so crucial a role in the extermination of millions."

For verification of this thesis, one need not go to Nazi Germany, for here in these United States, the citadel of tolerance and civil liberties, under limited emergency conditions, thousands of Japanese-Americans were forcibly removed from their West Coast homes for reasons best expressed by one General J. L. De Witt of the Western Defense Command in 1942. He said:

> In the war in which we are now engaged, racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second- and third-generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. . . . The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.

Except for the final results, is there a vast difference between advocacy and implementation of this policy with that embodied in the Nuremberg decrees? Certainly the principle involved is frighteningly similar, and this under an administration and a Supreme Court generally considered to be among the most liberal in the history of the Republic.

Finally, however therapeutic it may be to dismiss ". . . . Hitler and his cohorts" (Globke?) as "madmen on the Jewish question, . . ." this is a tremendous over-simplification: even were one to grant that the upper echelon of Nazi Germany was psychotic, this does not explain away the countless thousands in the bureaucracy and army, without whom the Final Solution could never have been carried out. And it is here that Miss Arendt is at her very best, by showing the weaknesses inherent in human, rather than German, nature, which under favorable circumstances—e.g., totalitarianism, emergency crisis, and hysteria—very much dominate our most noble instincts.

WERNER M. FEIG
Park Forest, Illinois

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I'm not normally a letters-to-the-editor-writer, but Norman Podhoretz's piece on Hannah Arendt was so magnificent that I have to break my usual silence. "Congratulations" sounds too weak; it was a perfect job, and I'm lost in admiration for both the analysis and the writing.

CHARLES E. SILBERMAN
Board of Editors
Fortune Magazine
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Norman Podhoretz's article, "Hannah Arendt on Eichmann," demonstrates a rare combination: originality, independence, creativity, logic, and great humanity.

(MRS.) PHYLLIS W. BECK
Wynnewood, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Podhoretz's essay articulates brilliantly the reasons why Hannah Arendt's book struck many of us as irresponsible and in the worst of taste. But there was one point in his discussion that left me dissatisfied, and I should like him to clear it up for me, since it seems to plunge us all into a dilemma of moral judgment. Mr. Podhoretz criticizes Miss Arendt for trying to find a rational explanation of Eichmann's behavior while perversely assuming the behavior of the Jewish leadership in Europe to have been irrational. Her efforts, he argues, are misdirected because the Nazis, including Eichmann, were "literally insane . . . this is pathological anti-Semitism bounded by no rational limits."

Now I can certainly understand Mr. Podhoretz saying this, and, like everyone else, I have often felt tempted to say the same sort of thing: The Nazis were inhuman, beastly, monstrous, or, as the Russians preferred to put it, "mad dogs." The trouble with these particular expressions of our horror at Nazi cruelty is that they sound inconsistent with our holding the Nazis morally and legally responsible for their crimes. I want very much to agree with Mr. Podhoretz when he writes of Eichmann: "No banality of a man could have done so hugely evil a job so well; to believe otherwise is to learn nothing about the nature of evil." But what *have* we learned about the nature of evil? I believe Miss Arendt is profoundly wrong in attributing the evil of Nazism to the totalitarian *state*, and that Mr. Podhoretz is profoundly right in attributing the evil to *men*, including Eich-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

















ANY 3 BOOKS FREE

WITH YOUR FIRST SELECTION / RETAIL VALUES TO $42.85





SELECTIONS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE – Here are some of the selections that the Book Find Club has offered its members at substantial savings. The selections of the Book Find Club are different. You will recognize them as works of current interest and lasting value – solid, readable books that range from social science to the fine arts. These are only a few from the outstanding list of more than 100 books and records that the Book Find Club will make available to you as a member if you join now. As an introductory offer, to acquaint you with the benefits of membership, we invite you to choose any three of the selections pictured above **free** with your first selection. Since several are dual selections*, you may acquire as many as **7** books in this way. ■ **CONVENIENCE.** Membership in the Book Find Club makes it possible for you to shop for the books you want in the comfort of your own home – enabling you to build your library conveniently and inexpensively. Each month you will receive The Book Find News, containing an authoritative review of the forthcoming selection and descriptions of the many other books available at special member's prices. You need choose **only** the books you want. ■ **AVERAGE SAVINGS OF 40%.** As a member you will regularly enjoy savings of 40% on the books you take. Furthermore, on certain choices your savings will reach and even exceed 50%. Compare the prices of the books shown here. Your savings on this introductory offer alone can amount to **as much as $42.85** ■ **BONUS BOOKS.** When your introductory agreement has been completed, you will be entitled to a free bonus book of your own choosing after every third selection that you take.

Saint Genet: *Actor and Martyr,* Jean-Paul Sartre. Retail $8.50. Member's price $5.95
The Vital Balance: *The Life Process in Mental Health and Illness.* Karl Menninger. Retail $10.00. ..... Member's price $6.95
***Cat and Mouse,** Günter Grass; *and* **Challenge to Affluence,** Gunnar Myrdal. Combined retail price $7.90. ..... Member's price $5.95
***The American Way of Death,** Jessica Mitford; *and* **The Feminine Mystique,** Betty Friedan. Combined retail price $10.90 ..... Member's price $8.90
This Kind of War, T. R. Fehrenbach. *The Brutal Lesson of Korea.* Retail $10.00. ..... Member's price $6.50
***Eichmann in Jerusalem:** *A Report on the Banality of Evil,* Hannah Arendt; *and* **Love Declared:** *Essays on the Myths of Love.* Denis de Rougemont. Combined retail price $10.00. .....Member's price (for both books) $5.95
The City in History, Lewis Mumford .....Retail $11.50. Member's price $6.95
Memories, Dreams, Reflections, C. G. Jung. ...Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.95
The Tin Drum, Günter Grass. .....Retail $6.95. Member's price $5.75
The Essential Walter Lippmann: *A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy.* Editors: Clinton Rossiter & James Lare. .....Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.50
Culture Against Man, Jules Henry. Retail $7.95. ..... Member's price $5.50
Sex, Culture and Myth, Bronislaw Malinowski. Retail $6.95. Member's price $5.50
The Children of Sanchez, Oscar Lewis .....Retail $7.50. Member's price $5.50
The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell .....Retail $10.00. Member's price $5.95
Identity and Anxiety: *Survival of the Person in Mass Society.* A massive compendium of studies by Mead, May, Orwell, Rosenberg, Richards, Gorer, Howe, Jaspers, Mills, and more. .....Retail $7.50. Member's price $4.95
Privacy: *The Right to Be Let Alone,* Morris L. Ernst and Alan U. Schwartz. Retail $6.00. ..... Member's price $4.50
The Masks of God: *Oriental Mythology,* Joseph Campbell. Retail $7.50. ..... Member's price $5.50

***TWO BOOKS COUNTING AS ONE SELECTION**

THE BOOK FIND CLUB, Inc.

215 Park Avenue South. New York. N. Y. 10003

You may enroll and send me the 3 free books of my choice, with my first selection at the special member's price (plus postage and handling). I agree to buy four additional selections or alternates from the wide range of books that will be made available to me in the coming year at substantial savings. When I do not want the current selection – or prefer to order another book – I may do so on the convenient form provided for this purpose. I may cancel my membership at any time after purchasing the four additional books.

First Selection_____

Free Books 1_____

2_____

3_____

Mr.
Mrs.
Miss .....

Please print full name

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip Code B64-25

(Same offer & prices apply in Canada: 105 Bond St., Toronto 2, Ont.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mann. But can a man be both evil and insane? In law and in morality we are accustomed to regard insanity as an excusing condition that mitigates the agent's culpability. A maniac gone berserk may have to be shot down in self-defense (as the Russians proposed to do with the Nazi "mad dogs"), but self-defense is not the same thing as punishment. So if the Nazis were madmen or mad dogs, the criminal proceedings at Nuremberg and in Israel were improper. Yet Mr. Podhoretz approves of the trials. And so do I. But then, can he insist that the Nazis were *literally* insane? Is there, perhaps, a special kind of moral insanity that does not absolve an agent of responsibility?

On the other hand, perhaps Mr. Podhoretz's adverb, "literally," was not meant to be *taken* literally. Yet he also uses the phrase, "bounded by no rational limits." And if he means *this* literally, we are back in the dilemma. For surely there must be a rational structure to evil, if it is to be regarded as moral evil. An agent is subject to moral judgment only if he is rational enough to choose effective means to achieve his goals, only, that is, if he "knows what he is about." And surely the Nazi leaders knew what they were about, as Mr. Podhoretz insists at other points in his essay. Perhaps he would reply that they were rational about their means but not about their "crazy" ends. But who among us *is* rational about his paramount goals of life? Is the gangster who risks his own and others' lives to obtain money any more rational than the Nazi who risks his life and his nation to kill Jews? Both types are unconventional, eccentric, and dangerous, no doubt about it, but they are not irrational or insane. It is a cliché to call people mad when they aim at eccentric goals—an unfortunate cliché when we also want to condemn them as evil. For the more rational men are in their pursuit of vicious ends, the more evil they are, and the Nazis came very close to the ultimate in evil. Had they been rational enough to win the war, they would have *reached* the ultimate.

RAZIEL ABELSON
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I wish to thank Mr. Podhoretz for his superb article, for it synthesized for me many rationalizations and questions which I have carried for many years. I am twenty-six years old, and therefore too young to have personally experienced the emotions and thoughts of the tragedy of European Jewry during the Nazi regime. My feelings are strictly second hand, strong as they may be. . . .

Mr. Podhoretz's closing remark seemed to set my mind free for the first time since I have known of the holocaust. I wish now to answer, for my own satisfaction, if not his, the question: "The Nazis destroyed a third of the Jewish people. In the name of all that is humane, will the remnant never let up on itself?"

We, a part of the remnant, cannot let up, for if we do, then all our defenses fall. Then we will have to admit to ourselves that so hideous a deed could also happen to us—that our complete security as Americans of the Jewish faith could some day be threatened. [Therefore] . . . we must make ourselves believe that these Jews were not like ourselves, that their leaders were unlike the leaders of American Jewry. We have to tell ourselves over and over again that those who carried out Hitler's orders were not living, breathing men, but robots who had the choice to obey or be destroyed. Once we admit that the casual neighbor down the street could become an Adolph Eichmann, our fear is too great. . . . To accept the reality that six million men, women, and children were killed because they were Jews, is too large, too horrible for most of us. Yes, Hitler and his regime were insane; but with the externals of civilized people. They were not wild-eyed, disheveled madmen, screaming incoherent phrases.

To rationalize, to continue pressing for some answer other than the truth is the only way that most of us can absorb what was done. The all-encompassing hideousness is just too great to take. That is why, Mr. Podhoretz, so many will never let up.

(MRS.) JACK LAPIN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Podhoretz asserts that "no person could have joined the Nazi party, let alone the SS, who was not at the very least a vicious anti-Semite." It seems to me that this statement betrays a certain amount of naïveté as well as some ignorance of human nature. Most modern societies are composed of opportunists who will climb on any convenient bandwagon in order to secure for themselves the blessings of wealth, status, and power. Granted that many Nazis, especially the early party members, were viciously and pathologically anti-Semitic, I am convinced that the greatest majority were cold-blooded opportunists, who, all other things being the same, would have joined the party whether it was anti-Semitic, philo-Semitic, or totally indifferent to the existence of Jews.

(DETECTIVE) RONALD REIS
32nd Squad
Police Department
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Of all the vitriolic criticism written on the Arendt book, the Podhoretz thesis has, at least, the virtue of being interesting, original and, as always, exceedingly well put forth. Unfortunately, it is so incredibly wrong-headed and so terribly brilliant in its own perversity that it fails as both criticism and commentary. . . .

Miss Arendt accepts the Eichmann guilt, neither extenuated nor enlarged. She suggests that neither Nuremberg nor the Eichmann trial came close to bringing modern man face to face in a constructive examination of his own behavior. She intimates that neither Nuremberg nor the trials that followed were judicial tribunals to find guilt, but rather public exhibitions to provide a larger innocence. She asks that all of us, for once, consider the behavior of the whole of mankind —assassin, victim, and spectator alike, so that we may avoid a repetition of this sorry and tragic spectacle. That is the whole of her great work. . . .

No, Mr. Podhoretz, Miss Arendt is not perverse, but she is brilliant. The answer to your final question is that no member of the human race who lived during those dark and terrible days dare ever let up on himself until we make a small beginning of understanding and stop depositing our guilt on the shoulders of a banal civil servant. However deep and specific his guilt is, it does not in any way lessen ours. . . .

Not proven, Mr. Podhoretz. One vote for Hannah Arendt.

LEE R. BOBKER
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Thank you for Norman Podhoretz's most extraordinarily interesting article on Hannah Arendt. It was a great pleasure to see a mind so historically informed and so poetically inclined do just battle with an equally talented adversary.

The Eichmann trial and Miss Arendt's book on it had been handled by so many reporters and reviewers that the rough shock of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the plain facts involved became smudged and unrecognizable. Mr. Podhoretz has, in reviewing *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, redrawn the picture and, one hopes, finally turned its face to the wall.

LINDA TUCK

Paris, France

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

While Norman Podhoretz has offered a number of excellent criticisms of Hannah Arendt's new book, I think that the issues involved were handled much better by Oscar Handlin in the November 1962 COMMENTARY ["Jewish Resistance to the Nazis"]. . . .

One other remark: While Miss Arendt is hardly a Prophet, did not the Prophets make "inordinate demands . . . on the Jews to be better than other people, to be braver, wiser, nobler, more dignified—or be damned"?

EUGENE S. MORNELL

Los Angeles, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Podhoretz's interesting article is sadly astray in the selection of an example of double standards:

"When, to take a trivial example, has it ever popped into anyone's head to accuse a prosecutor in an adversary proceeding of being unfair to the defendant he is working to convict?" The answer, which should be elaborated . . . by an expert, is: frequently. Into many heads, public and private. Courts hold prosecutors to standards of conduct which are, and ought to be, as our best prosecutors recognize, higher than those imposed on defense counsel.

NEWELL G. ALFORD, JR.

New York City

MR. PODHORETZ *writes*:

Having already discoursed at some length on all these issues, I only want to make a few brief comments now by way of further clarification:

(1) I did not say that the Nazis were altogether insane or clinically insane: I said they were insane *on the Jewish question*. This seems to me a perfectly acceptable distinction: one can accuse a man of having a crazy idea without implying either that the person so accused is himself crazy, or that he should not be held responsible for his acts. Unlike Mr. Stanley, I think the idea that the Jews were a danger to Germany and to Europe was an insane idea—and by "insane" I mean unrelated to *reality*, not unrelated (as Mr. Stanley strangely puts it) to "any recogniz-

A Monumental Achievement



THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES

1790-1840 A Documentary History

Edited by Joseph L. Blau and Salo W. Baron

This remarkable work explores in detail the life of the Jews in America during the first fifty years of the Republic—a period of Jewish history which has received scant attention from scholars.

Based on careful research, these three volumes present a vivid picture of the Jews of the time and the young American nation in which they lived and worked.

Here—dramatically told by legal documents, military papers, private letters and journals — are the stories of births, marriages and deaths; of schooling and friendships; of commitment to private and public business, religious duties and military service. Here, too, is evidence of Jewish participation in the physical expansion of the United States and of the desire of American Jewry to realize its ideal possibilities.

THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES offers the most complete available picture of the period that set the tone for all future Jewish life in the United States—the period of which one can say "there was no Jewish life in the United States but only life in the United States as lived by Jews." Three volumes $20.00

These volumes highlight a wide variety of Jewish life and thought in the early days of the Republic. A sampling:

• The Jewish attitude toward Palestine • The Damascus Affair of 1840 • The First Jews in American Politics • The Jewish attitude toward the Drama • Three Jewish Dramatists — Samuel G. H. Judah, Mordecai M. Noah, Jonas Phillips • The first American Jewish Poetess — Penina Moise • Jewish Musicians • Early American Synagogues • Religious Adjustment • The place of the Jews in American life • Jewish family and social life ...and much more.



To order send this coupon to your bookseller or

Columbia University Press

2960 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10027

Please send me ___ boxed set(s) of THE JEWS OF THE UNITED STATES @ $20.00 each. ☐ Payment enclosed. ☐ Charge my account. Return privilege after 30 days examination.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ Zone_____ State_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able Western ideological tradition." I know as well as Mr. Stanley that the term "reality" is problematic. But surely we are entitled to say that Nazi anti-Semitism bore no relation to reality. If Hitler had succeeded in "cleansing" Europe of Jews, would Europe have thereby been purified?

(2) The implications of recent history are indeed "horrifying," to use Mr. Stanley's word. But how does it follow from this that we know *nothing* about the nature of man, or of conscience, or of evil? Surely the time has come for everyone to stop bragging about "our inability to comprehend" the ghastly events of our age—as though this inability were by itself a mark of great "profundity." In any case, what I think I know about the nature of conscience, for example, is that if Eichmann can be said to have had one, then the word has no meaning.

(3) While it is true that many Germans joined the Nazi party for opportunistic reasons (though not in the early years, when Eichmann joined), I still find it hard to believe that it would be possible for anyone who *wasn't* an anti-Semite to be a Nazi. This does not, of course, mean that anti-Semitism had to be the *primary* motivation for joining—but then I never said that it did.

(4) I have been convinced that I was wrong about the duties of a prosecutor in an adversary proceeding, and I wish to withdraw the point.

To the Editor of Commentary:

I agree with a lot that Irving Howe has to say in his comment on "Hannah Arendt and the *New Yorker*" [October '63]. But his statement gives the impression that *any* articulate person could take issue with her (or with Mr. Trilling or anyone else) in magazines that print rejoinders. That is so far from being the truth that most of us, when we think of what we would say in rejoinder to this or that, decide not to say it at all. Unless one belongs to the family circle of a particular magazine, or has a name as widely known as Frank Sinatra's, *one is not printed*—except perhaps in a letter of two or three lines—in *Partisan Review* or anywhere else. My hope that this letter itself will get printed is based on three things: first, that I know the editor personally; second, that it is extremely brief; and third, that my name has been before many of the readers of Commentary for nearly two decades. All of which has implications fatal to Mr. Howe's notion that discussion is abundant and representative outside of magazines that don't print any.

Eric Bentley

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mr. Howe criticized the fact that the *New Yorker* permitted its "mass audience" to read the Hannah Arendt articles without some sort of outside commentary or opportunity for rebuttal. Why does Mr. Howe limit this criticism to the *New Yorker*? Using similar logic, the publisher of this book (or any other serious book) should be criticized for not providing each purchaser with such a commentary . . . . There is no doubt a problem in this country arising out of the fact that almost all the mass communications media present a uniform view of the complex issues facing the country, and consequently, there is little opportunity for the people to be made aware of all the facets of these issues. But Howe's thesis that the publication of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* by the *New Yorker* is part of that larger problem is ludicrous.

I think the "mass audience" of the *New Yorker* magazine as well as any other reader of Hannah Arendt's articles would feel more compassion toward the Jews and the Jewish leaders after reading the book than before. There is much in the book worthy of intelligent discussion. . . . Hannah Arendt has called for reason, and her critics appear to be relying on emotion.

Alan E. Bandler

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

I agree with Mr. Howe that "the nature of modern journalism and the peculiar powers it enjoys" pose a serious problem, but surely there are more errors of fact, twisted truths, and dangerous distortions in a single issue of the average newspaper than in several years' issues of the *New Yorker*.

As a reputable scholar, Mr. Howe was, I assume, correct in saying that Hannah Arendt's articles on Eichmann erroneously minimized the heroism of European Jews under Nazism. What is disturbing, however, about Mr. Howe and other of Miss Arendt's critics is their preoccupation with this single aspect of her work.

When six million human beings are methodically slaughtered, individual heroism, as well as individual cowardice, pale into insignificance beside the enormity of the crime and the necessity for preventing its recurrence. It seems to me that Miss Arendt's message to all those "good middle-class Americans" who read the *New Yorker* was that while we all know how to react . . . if we see a child drowning or a thug beating up an old lady, there are events which are too overwhelming to comprehend, which fall outside our normal value system . . . Miss Arendt's approach . . . is especially significant . . . in view of America's position at the moment. With our nation controlling an almost inconceivable destructive force, a substantial minority of United States Senators openly oppose any and all steps toward disarmament. A majority of Senators, during the test-ban debate, made it clear that they favored the treaty only because the United States already has enough nuclear power to destroy Russia. . . . In California we have a number of pretty orange and black signs on the streets, indicating nearby bomb shelters. It is conceivable that most of us are in the process of being herded slowly, and largely without protest, toward these crematoria of tomorrow. . . .

In view of this, it seems unfortunate that intellectuals like Mr. Howe are in effect obscuring Miss Arendt's message by arguing about facts which are, in the face of present reality, largely irrelevant. What Miss Arendt's articles have shown us all—Jews and Gentiles—is that potentially we are, at the same time, in the position of becoming both Eichmann and his six million victims.

Rachelle Marshall

Portola Valley, California

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Mr. Howe's contention that Hannah Arendt's articles reached "a mass audience almost certainly unequipped to judge them critically," is not a very valid criticism.

Not only were Miss Arendt's articles long and difficult and, . . . certainly above the average level, but they elicited strong rebuttals from nearly every quarter and every journal worth its salt. . . . Thus, Mr. Howe's "feeble" protest . . . should have been saved for an author who received a less active press (and, also, pulpit—for I am sure that the Jewish community has done a fairly thorough job of damning Hannah Arendt's work).

As far as the *New Yorker* is concerned, they served the public, even if they never intended to—and they served the intellectual community

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(could, for instance, COMMENTARY afford to publish an article so long and so hostile?).

STEPHEN D. BRYEN
Rutgers University
Pennsauken, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I cannot resist commenting on Irving Howe's statement about Lionel Trilling's essay, "The Fate of Pleasure," which, he says, "I take to be a full-scale attack on the modernist outlook in thought and literature." The vision this conjures up of Mr. Trilling coming out roaring and whirling a club around his head in his "full-scale attack" is so uproariously incongruous with the reality of the man, that . . . it is just as well Howe felt so languid about rebutting the Trilling argument. That particular essay happened to be a fine example of the highly convoluted, intensely cautious way Mr. Trilling habitually deals with his subjects, seeing all sides of the question from beginning to end—whether he wants to or not! One might say that Lionel Trilling seems doomed, even when he starts out wanting to attack something, to end up unable to throw the opposition out of court, because they have a case, and he cannot help seeing it. The very essence of his critical style is that of a man alone in the jungle, treading his way carefully among the hungry beasts on all sides . . . continuing safe only to the extent that he can stretch his empathy—and his wits—to contain all of them, and just possibly, by the sheer force of that empathy, gentle and civilize the creatures a little. . . . This is his way as a teacher and as a writer. It is of the very essence of liberality, of moderation, of mediation. Mr. Trilling is a great mediator by temperament and by a very personal art he has developed. . . .

But this incident casts a light on a previous one that has puzzled me for years . . . I am referring to that virulent flood of hate-Trilling letters in the *Times*, after he had spoken at a Robert Frost celebration—a birthday dinner, I think—and in an effort to escape from the usual banalities of such occasions, had boldly said that Frost's poems were "terrifying," hardly a statement to bring out all the latent murderous impulses in the breasts of retired Columbia professors dotting the Vermont landscape, one would think?

But this slip of Irving Howe's . . . is a clue to what all that fury was about. Why does Howe see a full-scale attack in this unlikely

Changing Ideas in Jewish Life...

the

Reconstructionist

The Reconstructionist is the twice monthly publication of a new movement in Jewish life which conceives of Judaism as an evolving religious civilization.

Founded by Mordecai M. Kaplan.

... IT stresses the need for a community based on diversity.

... IT stresses the role of the humanist approach to religion.

... IT stresses the need for constant evaluation — and change if necessary — of prevailing concepts of worship, education, communal organization.

... IT stresses the vital role of the arts in interpreting Jewish civilization.

... IT stresses the need for applying traditional ethical values to contemporary economic, social and political conflicts.

Some typical subjects of Jewish and general interest to thinking individuals:

Mississippi, the Church, the Lawyers and the Professors
Israel 's Arab Intelligentsia
Religious Fanaticism in Israel
Career Counseling of the Emotionally Ill
The Culture Boom is On!
The Liberalism of Irresponsibility
The Ecumenical Council and the Jews
Jews and Judaism in the Dictionary
The Jews in American Drama
Realism and Truth (Isaac Bashevis Singer)
Shylock, Art and Moral Values
Marc Chagall's Self Revelation
Credo of a Jewish Democratic Socialist
What Can a Modern Jew Believe?

Research material of Menorahs courtesy F. Darmstaedter.

THE RECONSTRUCTIONIST, 15 West 86th Street, N.Y. 24, N.Y.

☐ Please send me 1 year subscription for $6.00.
☐ Please send me a free sample copy.

NAME _____
(please print)

ADDRESS _____

CITY/ZONE _____ STATE _____

Please enclose a self-addressed stamped envelope.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

place? Because he, even he, rabbinical-mannered scholar that he is, *needs* to see combat, evidently. . . . Woe to the mediator, for both sides to the dispute will turn and rend him at the first word that betrays a lack of partisanship.

Not that it matters. Lionel Trilling can take excellent care of himself, of course. But it is entertaining to understand the situation—and to understand, at long last, why I have so long been reading his essays as though they were adventure stories. . . . Will civilization, urbanity, intelligence, survive in the everlasting jungle is the implied problem in each.

SOPHIE WILKINS
New York City

MR. HOWE *writes:*

Mr. Bentley is wrong in fact and shaky in logic. He need only look at any issue of COMMENTARY—or at many other magazines ranging from *Harper's* to *Dissent*—and he will find letters from people who are neither friends of the editor nor famous literary critics. But suppose Mr. Bentley were right about other magazines: how would that affect my criticism of the *New Yorker*? For even if magazines devoted to free discussion sometimes fail to practice it sufficiently, that remains a vastly different matter from a total refusal to print any rejoinders. And in regard to the Arendt articles, there was a special arrogance in the *New Yorker's* refusal: it would not give an inch of space to distinguished Jewish scholars and spokesmen who were prepared to point out the numerous factual errors and historical distortions of which Miss Arendt had been guilty.

Why, asks Mr. Bandler, do I limit my criticism to the *New Yorker*? For a simple reason: that is where Miss Arendt's articles first appeared. And for a second reason: almost any other magazine would have allowed *some* rebuttal in its pages. When the *New Yorker* was merely a magazine of amusement, it had no obligation to open its pages to discussion. Now that it ventures into the Serious, it has a responsibility to let its readers find out for themselves that reputable scholars judge Miss Arendt's work to be shoddy. By now there has been a very large accumulation of detailed factual rebuttal, most of it, alas, in magazines of small circulation. For Mr. Bandler, in view of this fact, to say that Miss Arendt "has called for reason" while her critics "appear to be relying on emotion," strikes me as utter impudence.

Miss Marshall's comments testify to the liberality of her sentiments, not to the cogency of her thought. To say that Hannah Arendt has shown us all that we are potentially "in the position of becoming both Eichmann and his six million victims" is nonsense—though the kind of nonsense encouraged, I suspect, by Miss Arendt's book. I know myself to possess the usual portion of human evil, and perhaps a little more; but while I can see myself as one of Eichmann's victims, I do not for a moment believe that I—or Hannah Arendt or Rachelle Marshall—could ever be an Eichmann. And that is one reason for regarding the view that Eichmann and/or his kind of evil are banal . . . as itself banal.

In Hazard

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Dan Wakefield's piece on Hazard, Kentucky ["In Hazard" September '63], suffers from a familiar journalistic problem: plenty of color and not much depth. It takes nerve to write an authoritative report on the town based on a total of four days spent there . . . .

Because of its position as the focal point of a strike, Hazard is being reported as a typical coalfields town, when, in fact, it is anything but . . . . Mr. Wakefield ought to have dropped in on Harlan to see what developments have taken place since the battles of the Depression that gave it its nickname, "Bloody Harlan"; he should have visited Lynch, where the coal-mining subsidiary of U. S. Steel is presently selling off dozens of flimsy company-owned houses to their occupants, at a handsome profit to the company; or Pert Creek, on Pine Mountain, where a one-room schoolhouse . . . . still functions at the end of a dirt road so deeply rutted that no school bus can pass over it; or Hellier, a ghost town as dead as Tombstone, Arizona, except that there are people still living in its crumbled buildings.

Most people in the fat society of middle-class America know of the lean side only what witnesses like Mr. Wakefield tell them. He owes them more than a superficial yarn of colorful mountain dialects and inhospitable mountain people . . . . People in eastern Kentucky are used to exploitation, economic and otherwise, by "outsiders," and are inclined to be suspicious as a result; but it's easy enough for a writer to break the ice if he can convince them that he is there not to put them on display for the amusement of sophisticated readers in faraway cities but to try to help them out. . . . .

Overlooked in the article was the whole grim subject of population increase in the coalfields . . . the fact that teenage Kentucky girls, with nothing else constructive to do, start producing children while their middle-class Northern cousins are sophomores in high school. It's not uncommon to meet a twenty-five-year old woman with nine or ten children. . . .

It's pointless, and impossible, to chronicle all the flaws in Mr. Wakefield's article. The important thing is that it represents the general failure of reporters and television commentators to go beyond those surface aspects of a social problem which are easiest to deal with. . . .

THOMAS N. BETHELL
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Visions of History

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am filled with admiration for Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg's deft assault on my book *Jews, God and History* ("Writing Jewish History," September '63) without even reviewing its contents. We now know what Rabbi Hertzberg thinks, but the reader has no idea what my book says. Thank goodness, however, that he does grant me a "vision," but as he does not tell your readers what that vision is, permit me to state it. I have a vision of Jewish history pried loose from the obscurantism of Jewish zealots and dogmatists, as Western history was pried loose one hundred and fifty years ago from the obscurantism of priests and Church. I have a vision of Jewish history told without special pleading . . . of the Jew . . . as a proud man of ideas. I see the Jewish saga not as a linear history from Abraham to Ben Gurion, but as a succession of six histories, each developing within the context of the six alien civilizations playing hosts to the Jews. . . . I view Jewish history through sociological, Marxist, existentialist, . . . and psychoanalytic eyes without rejecting religion as a force. . . . I may have done this well or badly, but certainly I have a right to present a secular history of the Jews without its being suggested that I am either vulgar or ignorant for doing it.

Rabbi Hertzberg says that "generally, the popularizers of a vision of history would be expected to follow the scholars rather than to precede it. Max Dimont's book is an example of the opposite pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cess. . . ." How I wish he were right! . . . .

If I have a vision, it is because I stand on the shoulders of such scholars as Victor Tcherikover, whose *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews* has resurrected the fascinating Jewish past in Grecian times, . . . Hugo Mantel and Paul Winter, whose books . . . have brought new illumination to subjects too long shrouded in dogmatism, . . . Yehezkel Kaufmann and Max Weber whose *The Religion of Israel* and *Ancient Judaism* have brought new insights into an old subject, . . . Harry Austryn Wolfson, . . . And yes, also Josephus . . . . I am for the heroic Jew, especially since history supports me . . . I call it heroic that the Jews, with but 24,000 men, held out for four years against 80,000 Roman legionnaires. The much heralded battle of Marathon involved 11,000 Greeks against no more than 25,000 Persians.

Yes, I wish this vision of history were mine, but I acknowledge with pride that I am a popularizer attempting to bring the visions of the great scholars to the people, as has been the Jewish ideal for 2000 years. When men like Dr. Jacob R. Marcus, Will Durant, Max Lerner, Bishop Gerald Kennedy, Louis Untermeyer, and others acclaim *Jews, God and History,* I rest content.

Rabbi Hertzberg's description of my "major howler" in "speaking of the Jews as exempt from Spengler's (really Vico's) law of the decay of civilizations, without once mentioning Nachman Krochmal, the great Jewish source of this idea," leaves me . . . . somewhat puzzled . . . . Since Krochmal died 40 years before Spengler was born, how could he have incorporated Spengler's morphology of civilizations into his thinking? Or is Rabbi Hertzberg suggesting that Spengler cribbed from Krochmal? This would have the charm of novelty. As for Vico, his relationship to Spengler is that of da Vinci's drawing of a flying machine to a modern jet aircraft. The engine is missing.

No, I do not "assure" my readers that "Hasidism and early Christianity were kindred spirits." I present it as an idea for the reader to accept or reject on the basis of three preceding paragraphs. I base many observations on Solomon Schechter's fascinating essay, "The Chassidim" . . . .

Dr. Hertzberg takes me to task for not knowing that the "Hasidim affirmed the Law." What I said was that the Bal-Shem-Tov "opposed the Talmudic intellectuals," which

This is The Regency.

The European concept of a great hotel: elegance, individuality, warmth, service, service, and service. Can a new hotel fulfill this concept? Yes, say those who have stayed at the Regency.

The Regency Hotel

PARK AVENUE AT 61ST STREET • NEW YORK 21 • PLAZA 9-4100 • PIERRE BULTINCK, MANAGING DIRECTOR

A piece of the action from Newsweek:

"A pinball destiny"

"It was as if Damon Runyon had written the last act of a tragedy by Sophocles. The most unlikely nemesis of all time was 52-year-old Jack Ruby, born Jack Leon Rubenstein, a 'street-smart' operator who togged out his fantasies in the Al Capone panoply of white-on-white shirts, triple-ringed hands, and snap-brim fedoras. Ruby, born to nothing in the ghetto of Chicago's West Side, ricocheted through a pinball destiny until he fell into place, master of the grubby revels for the bravos and backslappers of Dallas night life."

From a recent Newsweek story.
A glimpse of how we read these days.
Have you read Newsweek lately?

Newsweek

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is not quite the same thing. But . . . if the Hasidim were such affirmers of traditional Judaism, why did all the other rabbis, including the Vilna Gaon, excommunicate them time and time again? Rabbi Hertzberg speaks of my ignorance of the great Hasidic Talmudists, to which I confess. Which of the thirteen officially listed great Talmudic commentators, since 1700, were Hasidim? . . . .

Jews, God and History is a history of the Jews, not a history of Judaism. There is a difference. As a secular historian, I make no value judgments on religion, though I do *speculate* on some interpretations, after first warning the reader that they are speculations . . . .

MAX I. DIMONT
Clayton, Missouri

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Rabbi Hertzberg's review reveals . . . aspects of American Jewish life more important than the review itself. First, why was a rabbi rather than an historian chosen to review the book? . . . With all due respect to Rabbi Hertzberg and his many talents, he is a historian neither by vocation nor training.

Secondly, the rabbi's comments reveal the dichotomy in the minds of many of the non-Orthodox rabbinate. Rabbi Hertzberg wrote, "In the Bible . . . women give themselves to gain personal position and power, like Queen Esther." . . . (These Freudian allusions have become the *lingua franca* of our rabbinical intelligentsia.) If this represents Rabbi Hertzberg's concept of Esther, why does he permit the *Megillat Esther* to be read in his synagogue on Purim?

The good rabbi is guilty of another Freudian slip in his final comments on what he termed Dimont's "climactic" paragraph . . . concerning the role of the American rabbi, prayer, and the function of the synagogue or temple. Many "positive" American Jews and many other rabbis subscribe to the contents of the paragraph quoted . . . . *Jews, God and History* represents a contribution to Jewish learning in spite of several shortcomings. To call a serious effort of scholarship . . . "vulgar and ignorant" because of a difference in point of view . . . ill becomes a reviewer.

SEYMOUR B. LIEBMAN
Mexico City, Mexico

RABBI HERTZBERG *writes:*

Mr. Dimont could hardly have been expected to like a highly critical review of his book. His letter confirms the obvious.

I can only reiterate: what kind of hash is a "sociological, Marxist, existentialist . . . and psychoanalytic" view of history? Mr. Dimont's letter begins by accusing me of not having read his book. It is interesting that he does not reply on some matters of fact on which I questioned him in the original review. For example, where indeed did I get the idea that he gives the Jewish population in France at the time of the revolution incorrectly as 70,000 instead of 40,000? I got it from a careful reading of his book. I wonder from which of the impressive names that he hurls in his letter he derived such information.

Mr. Dimont does try to answer another of my specific strictures, *in re* Spengler and Krochmal. He tells me that Spengler never heard of Krochmal—*so there*. This is of course not what I was maintaining. My point in the review was, rather, that in 19th-century Jewish thought, and in Jewish historiography to this day, Nachman Krochmal is the source of the cyclical theory of Jewish history. It is almost inconceivable that a book about Jewish history, even a short one, could be written without mentioning him at all in his own right as a seminal intellectual figure of the first magnitude. This is all the more surprising in an author whose view of history is based to a considerable degree on the law of decay of civilizations. Why, therefore, did Mr. Dimont not mention Krochmal? I suspect that this really reflects an insufficiency in Dimont's knowledge of Hebrew. Krochmal has never been translated into English. Despite a publisher's blurb attributing Hebrew scholarship to Mr. Dimont, I can understand the text of his book only if that means that he once had a moderately good Jewish education, so that letters of the Hebrew alphabet are not entirely foreign to him. It is clear that Dimont wrote without the use of modern historical scholarship in Hebrew. Otherwise the absence of the work of Ben Zion Dinur, the leading Israeli historian, both from his bibliography and from any influence in his text is inexplicable. It makes sense only if my supposition is correct, that Dimont either reads no modern Hebrew or pieces it out with great difficulty.

Where in the world did Mr. Dimont get a list of "thirteen officially listed great Talmudic commentators since 1700"? I know of no Jewish authority which decides who are the great Talmudic commentators, either before or after 1700. This is the kind of notion that one might possibly find in a Sunday School text, but that is hardly a prime source even for the popular historian.

If Mr. Dimont's research into Hasidism had led him to standard works available only in Hebrew, like the four volumes of Horodetzsky, he would have understood the distinction that I made in the review. Concurrently with the appearance of Hasidism, the false messiah Jacob Frank was active in the same milieu. The memories of Shabbetai Zvi, and indeed remnants of his followers, were also present. It is little wonder therefore, out of fear of any innovation, that the Hasidim were excommunicated in the first years. What is important is that this soon faded. Jacob Frank's followers and Shabbetai Zvi's both left and were driven from the Jewish fold. The Hasidim did not form a separate religion nor were they made to form one. In our own time, the most deeply Orthodox group consists of a harmonious coalition of both Hasidim and the descendants of their Lithuanian enemies. Why? For the reason that I gave in the original review: contrary to Mr. Dimont, who did try to make them out to be a sect opposed to the Law, the Hasidim remained within the Jewish community because they affirmed the Law.

On this point I am really shocked at Mr. Dimont's defense of himself. Did he really say no more than that "the Baal-Shem-Tov opposed the Talmudic intellectuals"? I have always regarded tendentious quotation as a cheap trick in reviewers. What is one to say of it in an author, in relation to his own book? Here is the whole paragraph (p. 283 in Dimont's text) from which he quotes the phrase about the Baal-Shem-Tov and let the reader judge:

> Hasidism was not a simple thing; it was a complex syndrome. It was the triumph of ignorance over knowledge. The Talmud said that no ignorant man could be pious. *Hasidism preached the reverse. It affirmed the Jewish spirit without the Jewish tradition.* It created its own tradition proclaiming itself more Jewish than Jewishness itself. Hasidism was strength through joy, an affirmation of the ecstatic, not the ecstasy of knowing God. In one fell swoop, Baal-Shem-Tov turned weakness into strength, defeat into triumph. Just as Jesus had opposed the Pharisee intel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lectuals, so Baal-Shem-Tov opposed the Talmudic intellectuals. Hasidism and early Christianity were kindred spirits.

Mr. Liebman raises other issues. His remark about my "Freudian allusions" in discussing Queen Esther is ill-informed. The Talmud is certainly pre-Freudian. In *Megillah* 13b (and the *Tosafot a. l.*) Mr. Liebman can find a startlingly frank discussion of Esther's sex-life, as shared between Ahasuerus and Mordecai. That her marriage troubled the minds of the rabbis is evident in talmudic literature almost every time it is discussed; see, for example, *Esther Rabbah* 6:10. Why do I read the Scroll of Esther on Purim? For the obvious, and talmudic, reason: it is the account, whether true or fanciful, of Jewish deliverance from a classic anti-Semite.

However, what really annoys Mr. Liebman is not an incidental remark about Queen Esther but my rabbinic title. I may be an incompetent critic of historical writing, but Mr. Liebman cannot prove it except by argument about facts and ideas. Geiger was a rabbi; so was Guedemann. Graetz held the title and taught at a rabbinical seminary. This is but a small sample of a long list. Surely even Mr. Liebman would agree that their rabbinical training did not debar these men, *a priori,* from competence in Jewish history. On the personal level, I am glad that Columbia University does not share Mr. Liebman's prejudices, for I have enjoyed serving that institution for the last several years as Lecturer in Jewish history in the Graduate Faculty.

Symposium

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Congratulations on your symposium "America and the World Revolution" [October '63]! The discussion is the most penetrating and illuminating consideration of the problem I have read. It is to your credit that you have provided your readers with an exchange of this caliber among four such extraordinary minds. . . .

JANE K. SCHWARTZ
Washington, D. C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Some years ago, Sidney Hook accused the American intellectual of a "failure of nerve." Your round-table discussion demonstrates that the accusation was devastatingly accurate.

A piece of the action from Newsweek:

"Dream boats"

"He had spent 64 years in jail, longer probably than any man alive.... Honeck was speaking in the austere 5- by 11-foot cell he had occupied for eleven years. From there he could look across a corridor and through a dirt-stained window. He could see a segment of highway, a stretch of railroad track, a tall stand of trees, and the Mississippi River gleaming broadly beyond. Through that window, he saw the steam locomotive give way to the diesel, and the Model-T to the shining dream boats of today."

From a recent Newsweek story.
A glimpse of how we read these days.
Have you read Newsweek lately?

Newsweek

"America is suffering a nervous breakdown... brought on by culture."*

A noted anthropologist holds the mirror up to America's heroes, villains, policy-makers, average families and advertising agencies . . . its teachers, parents, and children in "one of the most telling and creative examinations of American culture and its values written in this century."
—ASHLEY MONTAGU*



By JULES HENRY,
formerly with the National Institute of Mental Health and the World Health Organization
$7.95, now at your bookstore

RANDOM HOUSE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this vitally important and long-awaited book,

David Ben-Gurion

tells the dramatic story of his country's coming of age in the 20th century

ISRAEL

Years of Challenge

"Marshaling his words in masterly literary style and pouring them forth like precious waters from a free-flowing fountain, Israel's most authoritative and authentic source provides valuable memoirs of the state's recent past and credible dreams for its distant future."—*Chicago Tribune*

"Clear, concise, well constructed....A challenging book, well worth reading."—*N. Y. Times Book Review*

"There is much here to confirm Ben-Gurion's status as an inspiring leader of his people, a redoubtable opponent of his rivals and enemies, and a man of the historical moment at which he lived."—*Book Week*

Photographs and maps • 2nd large printing

$5.00 at all bookstores, or from

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

383 Madison Ave., New York 10017

After the panel has gracefully skirted the real issue for an hour or two, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg asks the symposiasts the Big Question: Is it not your duty to tell us not what is expedient, not what is politically possible, but what is *right*?

And what is the intellectual community's response to the rabbi's challenge? Without exception, they cop a plea. . . . Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. . . . rises nobly to the occasion. He has learned his political lessons well—if you don't like the question, attack the interrogator. Aren't you ashamed, says he, to ask such a question when there are millions starving and you glut yourself on three meals a day?

Moderator Podhoretz disposes of the rabbi gently but finally: "We don't, it appears, have any utopians up here."

No utopians indeed! And nobody with any new ideas or any nerve either. And no nay-sayers. And no gadflys. And no dissenters. In short, no intellectuals worthy of the name. Only four more sycophants who have made their uneasy peace with the status quo.

WILLIAM C. LINDSEY
Jacksonville, Florida

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . What dawned on me after reading the symposium was how good we are at being specialists, how self-satisfied about our wealth. . . . Mr. Gass, alone, seemed to maintain some sanity about pressing our perfect model upon the unsuspecting peoples of the world. Somehow I thought we had all progressed beyond the point where we thought we were "the white men" and they "our burden." . . .

We have become too special for our specialists, while they have spun themselves an elaborate jungle of ideas. We've just got to cut through it all with an ax and emerge in a clearing of some sort where there is bound to be . . . some last vestige of elemental human feeling. . . .

Perhaps . . . with Rabbi Hertzberg, we may learn one day what it is to give simply of the simplicity of our love.

(MRS.) EARL SCHUB
Nutley, New Jersey

Buber's Hasidism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Those who have read my essay criticizing Martin Buber's presentation and interpretation of Hasidism ["Martin Buber's Hasidism," October 1961] will be able to judge for themselves to what extent his article ["Interpreting Hasidism," September, 1963] constitutes an answer to the considerations I advanced. I shall therefore limit myself to two remarks which may nevertheless be necessary.

Concerning Buber's passages on the Hasidic teaching and legend and their relation to the life of the community, there is the following to be said: what is missing from these statements—which are in any case offered here in such generalities that they will scarcely encounter any fundamental contradiction—is the main point at issue between us. The teaching of Hasidism was developed by the immediate disciples of the Baal-Shem and the Maggid of Mezritch, and in fact with the use of concepts which the first Masters themselves employed; these concepts came to them from the Cabbala. But these disciples were writing at the same time under the full impact of the new group life, which to a great extent they themselves had helped to create. There is in the Hasidic tradition no basis whatsoever to attempt, as Buber does, to construct a possible contradiction between the particulars of this group life and the concepts through which it unfolded. The very writings in which the original impulse was still most effective and attained immediate expression, those where the epigonic element, in Buber's sense, is least prominent, do reproduce, to be sure, many maxims of the Baal-Shem (in clear enough contrast to the style of the disciples), but they contain no legends in Buber's sense of the term. The salient point of my critique was that these writings completely contradict Buber's general assertions about the meaning of Hasidic life as formulated in his later writings, and that he silently passes over this contradiction in order to rely on anecdotes, which are more susceptible to reinterpretation in his sense. He attempts, to be sure, to make it plausible that these anecdotes could be as old as the theoretical writings, but *in concreto* this can rarely be proved, while in many cases just the opposite is demonstrable. It is precisely the critical analysis of the oldest sources of the Hasidic legends that makes this clear. The older and more authentic the historical and social frame in which many of these oldest legends revolve are enclosed, the less do they stand in real contradiction to the theoretical writings of the same milieu, produced at least at the same time or substantially earlier. I do not say, of course,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the legends are worthless as evidence. What I say, rather, is that Buber's interpretation, where it establishes such a contradiction, must be false to anyone familiar with the texts. Buber does not like it when the manifest subjectivity of his selection is emphasized, and by way of reply, appeals to the "reliability of the man in the face of his special task." But his appeal to that "special task" which he has set for himself, and which determined his procedure in selecting the material and his attitude toward the sources, is of no avail here. I am convinced that his selection corresponds as far as possible to his own sense of his message. I am not convinced, however, that the sense of his message, as he has formulated it in his later writings, is that of Hasidism.

I would like further to say a few words about the parallel which Buber draws between the Hasidic anecdotes and the Zen stories, a parallel that I do not believe to be valid. The Zen stories are not legends at all, but rather—and this does not appear in Buber's exposition—problems set for meditation, and therefore belonging to a completely different category. That they are garbed in narrative form does not make them legends. Without exception, they are statements that are at first glance senseless or paradoxical in the highest degree—statements upon which the disciple is instructed to meditate for weeks or months, in an endeavor to progress toward illumination. They transmit a mystical reality which cannot be grasped by words of doctrine and which therefore revels in the assertion of extreme paradoxes. But the Hasidic anecdote, precisely as canonized by Buber's masterful reformulations, is altogether another matter. Its sense and meaning disclose themselves immediately and transmit something that is transmissable. Thus it moves in a completely different sphere of religious experience. I cannot believe, therefore, that there is anything to be gained for the understanding of the specific character of the Hasidic stories by confronting them with the Zen stories. The anecdotal embodiment of the "Koan," which names names and events, is more closely related to the form in which great teachers of jurisprudence used to give seminar assignments to their students, than it is to religious legend.

In order to make clear how little Buber's selection of Hasidic material can be categorically compared with the provocatively unintelligi-

A piece of the action from Newsweek:

"Kicking the Coppers"

"Unlike most people, the British have traditionally admired their policemen. The British bobby, social historian John D. Scott once wrote, is regarded as 'a decent person ... who is in authority but never loses his temper—he is the English ideal.' That was eight years ago. Today, the fashionable gag going the rounds in London from roughneck Notting Hill Gate to uppercrust Mayfair is: 'Don't forget! Kick a copper for Christmas.'"

From a recent Newsweek story.
A glimpse of how we read these days.
Have you read Newsweek lately?

Newsweek

For 100 years—
the essential reference
work on world affairs

THE
STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK
1963-64

CENTENARY EDITION
Edited by S. H. Steinberg

The one volume encyclopedia of all nations, with special added features to celebrate the centenary. $10.00

ST MARTIN'S PRESS, New York 10010

NEW Vintage BOOK

"This book will serve to focus today's economic policy debate on the real issues which face the nation. ... [an] important and effective contribution."—WALTER W. HELLER, *Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.*

A PRIMER ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING

by Robert L. Heilbroner and Peter L. Bernstein

$1.45, now at your bookstore
Random House

WRITERS' CONFERENCE

Iona College

New Rochelle, New York

Session I (Saturday, April 11), novel and short story; Session II (April 18), journalism and general non-fiction; Session III (April 25), poetry and children's books. Workshops for beginning writers, round tables for market seekers, addresses and readings by established writers. Manuscript evaluation service. Registration closes Monday, April 6, 1964. For full details phone (914 NE 6-2100) or write.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Today, Goodman matters."

George Steiner, Commentary

Paul Goodman's new novel

MAKING DO

weaves his trail-blazing ideas into an amazing, shocking, vital story of a group of "dropouts" from contemporary society – a community of young men and women who cannot escape the consequences of their own eccentric, erotic behavior. As Paul Pickrel writes in *Harper's*, "A good deal of this book could not have been published this side of Paris a dozen years ago."

Other reviewers say:
"*Making Do* is not only by a man who has accepted and grappled with the large responsibilities of citizenship, it is about such a man . . . *Making Do* . . . deals with matters of intense and urgent interest."
– James Finn, *New York Times Book Review*

"Clearly an aftermath of books like *Growing Up Absurd* that turned Mr. Goodman into a public figure . . . He is a beautiful lyricist of motives, with an acute ear for the way in which people phrase their behavior."
–John Hollander, *New York Review of Books*

$4.95

MACMILLAN 60 Fifth Ave., N. Y. 10011

ble Zen utterances, I would like to tell a little story about Buber himself. I once asked Buber—it was three years ago—why he had suppressed in his writings the significant and abysmal words about the messianic age which were transmitted in the name of Rabbi Israel of Rishin. His answer is unforgettable to me. He said: because I do not understand them.

GERSHOM SCHOLEM
Hebrew University
Jerusalem, Israel

Praise

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Allow me to praise the interview with Isaac Bashevis Singer by Joel Blocker and Richard Elman [November 1963]. It is the best example of this dubious genre that I have seen. Many new things seem to come out in the process; it is not just silly or a rehash of fixed positions and prejudices.

PAUL GOODMAN
New York City

Bruce's Comedy

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Regarding Albert Goldman's farfetched notions about Lenny Bruce ["The Comedy of Lenny Bruce," October '63]: . . . shamans function among peoples who truly believe in good and evil . . . and who desire to be delivered from evil influences. (We lost most of Bruce's audience right there.) Secondly, the shaman ordinarily attempts this deliverance by performing a ritual often highly formalized, and not by becoming . . . evil himself. Shamans are respected members of their communities . . . burdened with the welfare of their people.

Lenny Bruce, however, is nothing more than a man cringing before his own conscience . . . who hates himself, . . . [who has] fallen from the level of satire to a point where he appears to be displaying only a near hysterical desperation.

JOAN HOGE
Bayard, New Mexico

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Is there not something salutary in confronting adults with topics about which they meditate privately but fear to discuss publicly . . . ? Is there not a time to extricate oneself from pretense, hypocrisy, and inhibition? Or, are we willing to conclude that psychology, sociology, and psychiatry . . . can provide us with insight into our individual and group behavioral patterns? Comedian Bruce displays no passion for nihilism or the vulgar. He does, however, confront his audience with a dimension of reality by exploring themes which the puritan would term scandalous. The comedian's function is to convey some aspect of life and reality which his audience has not discovered or which it has attempted to suppress, with unhealthy results. By this standard, Lenny Bruce is to be admired.

ELLIOTT A. COHEN
Jamaica Estates, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I once asked the sponsors of a Mort Sahl concert here in Washington why they didn't do the same for Lenny Bruce. They said he was too obscene, which they may have truly felt, illustrating their lack of perception, sophistication, and sense of humor, along with an excess of puerile Puritanism, mawkish hypocrisy, and moral putrefaction. I suspect their vehement rejection of the idea really stemmed from their reluctance to deal with the difficulties always incurred when handling a manifestation of truth. They simply didn't have the guts for it. They would have been afraid of Sahl six, seven years ago, too. For me, Lenny is among that illustrious minority of moral, courageous, electric, and possessed people who are actively engaged in exposing the insanities and distortions that are rampant in the society around us.

I'd like to thank Mr. Goldman for a penetrating, illuminating, and profound profile on one whose role of shaman (his word choice and beautifully precise) is revitalizing and transforming us, perhaps bringing us closer to a one-world-scene. We need Lenny Bruce, even though there are the majority who cannot, or will not, open their eyes to the truths he is laying down. . . .

HARRY HART
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Ordinarily, I believe that laws against obscenity should be limited in scope, but in the case of a deliberate and conscious wallowing in filth, let us hope the higher courts uphold Lenny Bruce's conviction in Chicago and his sentence of one year in jail and $1,000 fine. Goldman's attempt to come out in defense of Bruce's outright obscenity as satire is ridiculous. . . .

HUGH RUSSELL FRASER
Atlanta, Georgia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW from SCHENKMAN...

Breeder of Democracy

by Philip Marson

A history of the Boston Latin School and, through anecdotal accounts of its famous alumni, of the United States.

"One of the clearest, most authoritative voices to be raised during our post-Sputnik analysis of educational procedures and goals . . . from a distinguished teacher whose experience goes back to 1916. His prose is superb and his message is crystal clear."

—*San Francisco Chronicle*
(reviewing Mr. Marson's *A Teacher Speaks*, 1960)

"If James Conant has been at once the most reasoned critic and ardent vindicator of the public school system, Philip Marson has proved not less militant as the critic, champion and now historian of the specific and exceptional public school that pioneered American education generally and has contributed so amazingly to the history of Boston and the American community. . . . He brings to his new book a love born of unqualified attachment not alone to the Latin School itself but to the whole scheme of things of which the Latin School has been at once a proud part and a major American architect. . . . One cannot help praying that Marson's book will bring the Latin School experience to bear on the thinking of millions of parents, teachers and administrators all over the land."

—Bishop John Wright
reviewing *Breeder of Democracy*
in the *Boston Globe* **$5.95**

Human Fertility and Population Problems

Essays Edited by Roy O. Greep
and Proceedings of the Seminar
sponsored by
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences
with the support of the Ford Foundation

The chapters in this book grew out of addresses given by distinguished doctors, scientists, and professors at a Seminar sponsored last year by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. They present some of the latest research and discoveries in different fields bearing on population and fertility control. The *problem* is concisely summarized in the report on the growth of world population just published by the National Academy of Sciences: "If the present world population should continue to increase at its present rate of 2% per year then within two centuries there will be more than 150 billion people. Fifty times the present number . . ." The far-reaching significance of the problem and the critical importance of both fundamental and clinical research in this field are portrayed here.

Information from every major division of the natural and social sciences must be examined before man can develop intelligent policies on population control. Chapters in this book, therefore, are contributed by experts in economics, sociology, and anthropology (Professors Ansley J. Coale, Ronald Freedman and Cora A. Du Bois), as well as in physiology, gynecology and other clinical and research branches of medicine (Doctors Hudson Hoagland, A. S. Parkes, Gregory Pincus, John Rock, etc.).

While this volume is of razor-sharp scientific sophistication, students and intelligent laymen of different professional and national backgrounds will find it important and timely. *Human Fertility and Population Problems* will help give a better understanding of an increasingly difficult problem, and the several chapters delineate for the reader the extent of the already accumulated knowledge and important problems for future research. The book is a landmark in its field.

paperback **$3.50**
cloth **$7.45**

SCHENKMAN PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
ONE STORY STREET • HARVARD SQUARE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One whisky has
a special kind of taste.
Imported V.O.

One whisky has combined
lightness and a brilliance of taste.
Imported V.O.

One whisky
most people like the very
first time they taste it.
Seagram's Imported

V.O.

Distilled
and bottled
in Canada

Known by the company it keeps

CANADIAN WHISKY—A BLEND OF SELECTED WHISKIES. SIX YEARS OLD. 86.8 PROOF. SEAGRAM DISTILLERS COMPANY, N.Y.C

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PIUS XII, THE JEWS, AND THE GERMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

GUENTER LEWY

This month, the New York production of Rolf Hochhuth's play Der Stellvertreter *is scheduled to open under the title* The Deputy. *Because it sharply criticizes Pope Pius XII for never having issued a public protest against the Nazi assault on the Jews, the play has already touched off a heated discussion in Europe, and it is bound to provoke a similar discussion in this country. In the article that follows,* GUENTER LEWY *deals not with* The Deputy *itself (a review of the New York production will appear in a forthcoming issue of* COMMENTARY), *but rather with the questions Hochhuth has raised, and particularly with the historical record which must form the basis of any intelligent consideration of these questions.*

Mr. Lewy—a new contributor to our pages—was born in Breslau, Germany, in 1923 and came to the United States in 1947. He holds a Ph.D. in political theory from Columbia and has taught both at Columbia and Smith Colleges. His articles have appeared in scholarly periodicals such as the American Political Science Review, Church History, *and* Social Research, *and his book,* The Roman Catholic Church and the Third Reich *(from which the present piece has been adapted) is scheduled for publication later this year by McGraw-Hill.*

ROLF HOCHHUTH's controversial "Christian tragedy," dealing with the failure of Pope Pius XII to protest publicly against the incredible horrors that Nazi Germany was inflicting upon the Jews of Europe, has dramatized a problem that is as old as Christianity itself. Hochhuth, to be sure, relates this failure to the personality of Pius XII himself, who is portrayed in *The Deputy* as a cold, unfeeling politician worried only about the interests of the Church. But the truth is that the Pope's stand cannot adequately be understood in terms of personalities. For one thing, we must remember that the Nazi assault upon the Jews of Europe took place in a climate of opinion conditioned by centuries of Christian hostility to Jews and Judaism. And for another, we must realize that in acting—or failing to act—as he did, Pius XII was to a considerable extent influenced by the behavior of his "constituency" within Germany itself. Consequently, it is with German Catholicism that any effort to explain the Pope's silence must begin.

1. The Weimar Period

FROM THE TIME the National Socialist movement appeared in the 20's, organized German Catholicism came into repeated conflict with it, but anti-Semitism was not one of the primary bones of contention. On the contrary, many Catholic publicists—like the Franciscan Father, Erhard Schlund—agreed with the Nazis on the importance of fighting "the destructive influence of the Jews in religion, morality, literature and art, and political and social life," and objected only to the extremist tone of the movement.[1]* Thus, for example, the Jesuit Gustav Gundlach, writing in a reference work edited by Bishop Buchberger of Regensburg, argued that a political anti-Semitism, directed against the "exaggerated and harmful influence" of the Jews, was permitted so long as it utilized morally admissible means.[2] And Bishop Buchberger himself, while deploring racialism, concluded that it was "justified self-defense" to ward off the rule of "an overly powerful Jewish capital." [3]

Concentrating her fire upon liberals and free thinkers, many of whom were of Jewish descent, the Church did practically nothing to stem the inroads anti-Semitism was making on German life throughout the period of the Weimar Republic. Though the German bishops during these years spoke up against Hitler's glorification of race and blood, they rarely found anything specific to say about the virulent anti-Semitic propaganda the Nazis were spreading or about the acts of violence against Jews that were becoming more and more common. So far as individual Catholic clerics in the pre-Hitler years were concerned, the *Verein für die Abwehr des Antisemitismus,* an organization of Christians and Jews struggling against the rising anti-Semitic agitation, counted two Catholic priests as members of its board of sponsors, while only a few Catholic laymen—like the journalist

*All numbered footnotes appear at the end of this article, on pp. 34-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Franz Steffen and the editor Felix Langer—ever raised their voices against the anti-Semitic tirades of the Nazis and their allies.[4]

2. The Pre-War Hitler Years

ON APRIL 26, 1933, shortly after coming to power, Hitler had a talk with two dignitaries of the German church, Bishop Berning and Prelate Steinmann. In the course of this talk he reminded his visitors that the Church for 1500 years had regarded the Jews as parasites, had banished them into ghettos, and had forbidden Christians to work for them; he, Hitler said, merely intended to do more effectively what the Church had attempted to accomplish for so long.[5]

The reaction of the two Church dignitaries to Hitler's attempt to identify his brand of anti-Semitism with the age-old anti-Judaism of the Church is not known. What we do know, however, is that from the time Hitler came to power all the German bishops began declaring their appreciation of the important natural values of race and racial purity, and they limited their dissent to insisting that this goal be achieved without resort to immoral means. The article on "Race" in an authoritative handbook on topical religious problems, edited by Archbishop Gröber, expressed this position in the following words:

> Every people bears itself the responsibility for its successful existence, and the intake of entirely foreign blood will always represent a risk for a nationality that has proven its historical worth. Hence, no people may be denied the right to maintain undisturbed their previous racial stock and to enact safeguards for this purpose. The Christian religion merely demands that the means used do not offend against the moral law and natural justice.[6]

Similarly, in his celebrated Advent sermons of 1933, Cardinal Faulhaber observed that the Church did not have "any objection to the endeavor to keep the national characteristics of a people as far as possible pure and unadulterated, and to foster their national spirit by emphasis upon the common ties of blood which unite them." To what, then, did the Church object? To hatred of other nations, said Faulhaber, and to setting loyalty to race above the obligations one owed to the Church.[7]

Faulhaber was severely criticized by the Nazis for these qualifications, and his palace was fired on—a fact which has been taken as proof that German Catholicism actually did condemn the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Yet in the same series of sermons, in his eloquent vindication of the sacred character of the Old Testament (which Rosenberg had attacked as the "Jewish Bible"), Faulhaber went out of his way to make clear that he was not concerned with defending the Jews of his time. We must distinguish, he told the faithful, between the people of Israel before the death of Christ, who were vehicles of divine revelation, and the Jews after the death of Christ, who have become restless wanderers over the earth. But even the Jewish people of ancient times could not justly claim credit for the wisdom of the Old Testament: "People of Israel, this did not grow in your own garden of your own planting. This condemnation of usurious land-grabbing, this war against the oppression of the farmer by debt, this prohibition of usury, is not the product of your spirit."[8]

Whatever ambiguity may still have attached to his position after these pronouncements, Faulhaber soon acted to dispel. In the summer of 1934 a Social Democratic paper in Prague published a sermon against race hatred which Faulhaber had allegedly preached. The Basel *National-Zeitung* in Switzerland reprinted excerpts from this sermon, and the World Jewish Congress at a meeting in Geneva praised the Cardinal's courageous stand. But the sermon turned out to be a fabrication, and Faulhaber had his secretary write a widely publicized letter to the Jewish organization protesting against "the use of his name by a conference that demands the commercial boycott of Germany, that is, economic war." The Cardinal, the letter continued, "in his Advent sermons of the previous year has defended the Old Testament of the Children of Israel but not taken a position with regard to the Jewish question of today."[9]

Lesser Church dignitaries quite naturally took the cue from their Archbishop. An article written by a canon of the cathedral chapter of Regensburg, and published in *Klerusblatt*, the organ of the Bavarian priests' association, advised Catholic teachers to point out to pupils that the sacred books of the Old Testament were not only beyond the Jewish mentality but in direct conflict with it. "The greatest miracle of the Bible is that the true religion could hold its own and maintain itself against the voice of the Semitic blood."[10]

The embarrassing fact that Jesus had been a Jew was handled in a similar manner. In a pastoral letter of 1939 Archbishop Gröber conceded that Jesus Christ could not be made into an Aryan, but the Son of God had been fundamentally different from the Jews of his time—so much so that they had hated him and demanded his crucifixion; and "their murderous hatred has continued in later centuries."[11] Jesus had been a Jew, admitted Bishop Hilfrich of Limburg in his pastoral letter for Lent 1939, but "the Christian religion has not grown out of the nature of this people, that is, is not influenced by their racial characteristics. Rather it has had to make its way against this people." The Jewish people, the Bishop added, were guilty of the murder of God

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and had been under a curse since the day of the crucifixion.[12]

The attempt to swim with the anti-Semitic tide was even more pronounced in the previously cited *Handbook* of Archbishop Gröber. Marxism here was defined as "the materialistic socialism founded primarily by the Jew Karl Marx," [13] and Bolshevism was characterized as "an Asiatic state despotism, in point of fact in the service of a group of terrorists led by Jews." [14] The Führer had correctly described the struggle against this evil force as a defense of European civilization against Asiatic barbarism. "No people can avoid this clash between its natural tradition and Marxism which is opposed to national ties and led mostly by Jewish agitators and revolutionaries." [15] And in yet another article, the *Handbook* asserted that most of the unhealthy and un-German developments in art since the 19th century had been the work of "the uprooted and atheistically perverted Jew," or those under Jewish influence.[16]

If such language could be endorsed by an archbishop, it is no wonder that lower ranking figures in the Church felt free to express their anti-Semitic sentiments still more openly. Thus the theologian Karl Adam spoke of the need to purge the press, literature, science, and art of the "Jewish mentality," adding the usual caveat that "the Christian conscience must insist that these legal ordinances be implemented in a spirit of justice and love." [17] Thus also an article on the revolution of 1918 in the paper of the Bavarian priests accused the Jew [sic] Karl Liebknecht of treason, and told how "the Jew Emil Barth equipped his *Untermenschen* [inferior humans] with hand grenades and automatic pistols in order to attack the national defense from the rear." [18]

And so it went. The Jews had had a "demoralizing influence on religiosity and national character." [19] The Jews, as a spiritual community, had brought the German people "more damage than benefit." [20] The Jews had been "the first and most cruel persecutors of the young Church." [21] The Jews had killed Jesus and in their boundless hatred of Christianity were still in the forefront of those seeking to destroy the Church.[22]

If we take into account this climate of opinion within the Church—all the sentiments just cited were published between 1933 and 1939 in journals edited by priests or in books bearing the *Imprimatur*—we will find it easier to understand how it happened that the Church retreated in the face of the Nazis' anti-Semitic legislation, even where these ordinances touched upon vital domains of ecclesiastical jurisdiction such as matrimony.

According to canon law, the Church had exclusive jurisdiction over the marriage of Catholics. In practice, however, the Church in many countries had recognized the right of the state to impose certain conditions on marriage, so long as these did not conflict with natural law. Thus in Germany, the Church had long agreed to the provision that a civil marriage ceremony normally had to precede the ceremony conducted by the priest,[23] and this agreement was ratified by the Concordat of 1933 between the Nazi government and the Vatican.

As early as 1934 the Church had made clear to the Nazi government that the enactment of a law forbidding racially mixed marriages would create a very difficult situation. In the eyes of the Church, the German bishops pointed out in a memorandum, every Catholic, whether born to a pure German or to a racially mixed marriage, whether baptized as a child or as an adult, was equally entitled to the sacraments. Hence if two baptized persons of racially mixed stock insisted on being married by a priest, the latter would have to comply, even if the state were to have prohibited such a union.[24]

This, however, is precisely what the state soon did, for one of the practical results of the so-called Nuremberg laws of September 15, 1935, was to make it illegal for two Catholics to marry when one was considered racially "non-Aryan" under the standards set up by the law. (Since the persecution of the Jews had led to many new conversions to the Catholic religion, the number of such marriages was undoubtedly rising at the time.) The central office of information of the German episcopate in Berlin reported in September 1935 that earlier Catholic couples of racially mixed descent had been traveling to England to get married there, but now even those marriages had become illegal, and the Church had a very serious problem on its hands. [25] What did she do? In some instances priests circumvented the law by using a provision of the Concordat of 1933 which, in cases of "great moral emergency," permitted a church marriage without a preceding civil ceremony,[26] but by and large the Church conformed to the law, bowing to what earlier she had termed an inadmissible infringement of her spiritual jurisdiction.

For some elements in the Church, to be sure, bowing was unnecessary, for they actually welcomed the Nuremberg laws. While a distinguished German Catholic in exile, Waldemar Gurian, was denouncing the Nuremberg ordinances as violations of natural law and of the moral teachings of the Church, and declaring that they were "only a stage on the way toward the complete physical destruction of the Jews," [27] an article in the *Klerusblatt* of January 1936 was justifying the new anti-Jewish statutes as indispensable safeguards for the qualitative makeup of the German people.[28] So, too, Bishop Hudal, the head of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German Church in Rome, said that the Nuremberg laws were a necessary measure of self-defense against the influx of foreign elements. The Church in her own legislation, the Bishop contended, had held a radical position on the Jewish question "until the walls of the Ghetto had been torn down in the 19th century by the liberal state first and not by the Church." Consequently, from the point of view of the Church, there could be no objection to laws containing discriminatory provisions for Jews. "The principles of the modern state [based on the rule of equal treatment before the law] have been created by the French Revolution and are not the best from the standpoint of Christianity and nationality." [29]

The Church surrendered in a similar fashion when the so-called Aryan clause was applied to clerical teachers of religion. This ordinance, enacted in 1938, meant that priests teaching religion in the public schools had to submit proof of their Aryan descent before they could continue in their posts. However, the policy in question affected very few clerics and had no further ramifications. Such was not the case when the Church agreed to supply data from her own records on the religious origin of those under her care. A decree of April 7, 1933 which resulted in the discharge of numerous Catholic civil servants, had also provided for the dismissal of all Jews, except veterans of the first World War, from the civil service. Henceforth, anyone applying for government employment—and soon for various other positions as well—had to submit proof that he was not a Jew. Since prior to 1874-76 births had been registered only by the churches, the latter were asked to help in determining who was or was not fully Aryan, for under Nazi law this depended on the racial (i.e., religious) status of parents and grandparents. The Church cooperated as a matter of course, complaining only that priests already overburdened with work were not receiving compensation for this special service to the state.[30] The very question of whether the Church should lend its help to the Nazi state in sorting out people of Jewish descent was never debated. On the contrary. "We have always unselfishly worked for the people without regard to gratitude or ingratitude," a priest wrote in the *Klerusblatt* in September of 1934. "We shall also do our best to help in this service to the people." [31] And the cooperation of the Church in this matter continued right through the war years when the price of being Jewish was no longer dismissal from a government job and loss of livelihood, but deportation and outright physical destruction.[32]

The bishops sometimes showed concern for these non-Aryan Catholics, for whom the Church felt a special responsibility. Already in September 1933, Archbishop Bertram inquired from the Papal Secretary of State whether the Holy See could not put in a good word with the German government for the Jewish converts to the Catholic religion who were being made destitute on account of their non-Aryan descent.[33] Soon the *St. Raphaelsverein,* a Catholic organization founded in 1871 for the protection of German émigrés, and presided over by Bishop Berning, began to take care of these Catholics. In the years 1936-37 the *St. Raphaelsverein* helped 516 Catholic non-Aryans to emigrate; in 1938 it facilitated the emigration of 1,850 such persons.[34]

But what of non-Aryans who were not members of the Catholic faith? During these years prior to the adoption of the Final Solution, a few instances are on record where individual churchmen did speak up in defense of the Jews. In March, 1933, a priest in the Rhineland in a sermon characterized the vilification of the Jews as unjust and was fined 500 marks for abuse of the pulpit.[35] In 1934 another priest, who for reasons of safety chose to remain anonymous, took his Church to task for not helping the Jews.[36] And yet another priest, in Bavaria in 1936, declared that the stories being told in Germany about the Jews were a pack of lies.[37] In Berlin on the morning after the *Kristallnacht* pogrom of November 1938, Provost Bernhard Lichtenberg prayed for the persecuted non-Aryan Christians and Jews and added: "What took place yesterday, we know; what will be tomorrow, we do not know; but what happens today, that we have witnessed; outside [this church] the synagogue is burning, and that also is a house of God."[38]

There probably were other such statements, and here and there acts of Samaritanism may have taken place that have remained unrecorded. But the Church as such, speaking through the voice of her bishops, extended neither aid nor sympathy to other than Catholic non-Aryans, and remained silent in the face of anti-Jewish legislation, burning temples, and the first round-ups of Jews.

3. The Final Solution

IN A SPEECH delivered on January 3, 1939, the Führer served public notice of his intentions: "If international Jewry should succeed, in Europe or elsewhere, in precipitating nations into a world war, the result will not be the bolshevization of Europe and a victory for Judaism, but the extermination of the Jewish race."[39] A few months later Hitler attacked Poland and World War II began. On July 31, 1941 Heydrich was charged "with making all necessary preparations . . . for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe."[40] The machinery of destruction went into action.

It began with a decree dated September 1, 1941 which provided that no Jew was to leave his place

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of domicile without special permission, and could appear in public only when marked with a yellow star. The idea of marking the Jews had first been applied in Poland, and now the system of identification was extended to the entire Reich. The decree covered so-called Mosaic Jews as well as baptized Jews; only those who had converted before September 15, 1935 (the date of the Nuremberg laws) and non-Aryans married to Aryan partners were exempt.

The wearing of the yellow star had a paralyzing effect upon those who were forced to do so. Many were afraid to leave their houses, and this fear created a special problem for the Catholics affected. In a number of towns these non-Aryan Catholics applied to the police for permission to remove the yellow star while going to and attending church services, and they asked their bishops to support the request.[41] Accordingly, Bishops Wienken and Berning in Berlin tried to obtain permission from the Gestapo for the "Jewish" Catholics not to wear the Star of David while in church. But their efforts failed—the Gestapo was adamant.

Meanwhile, on September 17, Cardinal Bertram addressed a letter to the episcopate in which he counseled the avoidance of such "rash measures that could hurt the feelings of the Jewish Catholics as the introduction of special Jewish benches, separation when administering the sacraments, introduction of special services in specific churches or private houses." The segregation of the Catholic non-Aryans would violate Christian principles and therefore should be avoided as long as possible. (Priests might, however, advise Jewish Catholics to attend early mass whenever possible.) Admonitions to the faithful to exercise brotherly love toward the non-Aryans similarly should be postponed until disturbances resulted; and "Only when substantial difficulties result from attendance at church by the non-Aryan Catholics (like staying away of officials, party members and others . . .), should the Catholic non-Aryans be consulted about the holding of special services."[42]

Mass deportations of German Jews to the East began on October 15, 1941. Bishop Berning, in a letter of October 27, informed Cardinal Bertram that while discussing the question of the Jewish star with the Gestapo he had also pointed to the harshness accompanying "the evacuation of the non-Aryans" and had requested some amelioration. He had been told that Christian non-Aryans would be evacuated only in exceptional cases (such as where earlier conflicts with the Gestapo had occurred). For the time being non-Aryans in mixed marriages would not be affected by these measures.[43]

The promises made by the Gestapo to Bishop Berning were of course not honored. On October 27, Bishop Hilfrich of Limburg informed Bishop Wienken, the episcopate's troubleshooter in Berlin, that the transport of Jews from Frankfurt earlier in the month had included Catholic non-Aryans to whom no preferred treatment had been granted. Their fate was especially sad since they were being regarded by their *"Rassengenossen"* (fellow Jews) as apostates. Hilfrich inquired whether for this reason it might not be possible to secure their exemption; if that could not be done, they should at least be put into special settlements where they could be given religious care more easily.[44] Wienken replied a few days later that negotiations in the matter of the deportation of Catholic non-Aryans had been started at the highest level.[45] The bishops of the Cologne and Paderborn church provinces, meeting in November 1941, also suggested that the government be petitioned in the matter of the deportations. They furthermore recommended that non-Aryan or half-Aryan priests and nuns volunteer to accompany the deportees in order to hold services for them and provide religious instruction for the children.[46]

Meanwhile, rumors were spreading about the fate of the Jews in the East. These rumors had been making the rounds ever since the attack upon Russia on June 22, 1941, which had brought in its wake the employment of special detachments (*Einsatzgruppen*) assigned to the job of machine-gunning Jews. By the end of 1941 the first news had also trickled back about the fate of the deported German Jews who had been shot by mobile killing detachments near Riga and Minsk.[47] And in the spring of 1942 the "White Rose," an organization made up of a group of students and a professor of philosophy at the University of Munich, distributed leaflets telling of the murder of 300,000 Jews in Poland and asking why the German people were being so apathetic in the face of these revolting crimes.[48]

In December, 1941, the first death camp began operations near Lodz. Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz went into operation in the course of the year 1942. By the end of 1942 more than 100,000 German Jews had been sent to their death in the East, and the vague rumors about their fate had been replaced now by hard and persistent reports that included details of the mass gassings. In August, 1942, Colonel Kurt Gerstein, who had joined the S.S. to investigate the stories of extermination for himself, tried to tell the Papal Nuncio in Berlin about a gassing he had witnessed near Lublin. When Monsignor Orsenigo refused to receive him, he told his story to Dr. Winter, the legal advisor of Bishop Preysing of Berlin, and to numbers of other persons. He also requested that the report be forwarded to the Holy See.[49] During the same period, other reports about the extermination of the Jews reached the bishops through Catholic officers serving in Poland and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia.[50] For a long time Dr. Joseph Müller, an officer in Canaris's Military Intelligence Service and also a confidant of Cardinal Faulhaber, had kept the episcopate well informed about the systematic atrocities committed in Poland.[51] Another source of information was Dr. Hans Globke, a Catholic and a high official in the Ministry of the Interior entrusted with handling racial matters. It is, then, clear that by the end of the year 1942 at the latest, the German episcopate was possessed of quite accurate knowledge of the horrible events unfolding in the East.

Until 1942 half-Jews and quarter-Jews, the so-called *Mischlinge,* as well as non-Aryans married to Aryans, had been exempt both from wearing the yellow star and from deportation. (The number of such persons in the Reich-Protektorat area was estimated at above 150,000.[52]) Though the Nuremberg laws had forbidden marriages between Jews and Aryans, they had not annulled existing mixed marriages. With the progress of the Final Solution, however, this loophole was now to be closed. A conference of experts in March, 1942 decided upon the compulsory dissolution of racially mixed marriages, to be followed by the deportation of the Jewish partner. If the Aryan partner failed to apply for a divorce within a certain period of time, the public prosecutor was to file a petition for divorce which the courts would have to grant.

The bishops heard of the contemplated measure through Dr. Globke in the Ministry of the Interior, and they reacted promptly. On November 11, 1942, Archbishop Bertram in the name of the episcopate addressed a letter of protest against the planned compulsory divorce legislation to the Ministers of Justice, Interior, and Ecclesiastical Affairs. The intervention of the bishops, he insisted, was not due "to lack of love for the German nationality, lack of a feeling of national dignity, and also not to underestimation of the harmful Jewish influences upon German culture and national interests." The bishops merely felt called upon to emphasize that the duty of humane treatment also existed toward the members of other races. Among the persons affected by the contemplated measure, Bertram went on, were many thousands of Catholics whose marriages, according to Catholic doctrine, were indissoluble. Respect for the religious rights of the Catholic Christians was an indispensable condition for the peaceful cooperation of Church and State, which had never been as necessary as in the present situation. The bishops therefore hoped, the letter ended, that the government would withdraw the planned divorce ordinance.[53]

Despite the fact that the ordinance was still tied up in bureaucratic difficulties, the Gestapo in February 1943, in the course of deporting the last German Jews, seized several thousand Christian non-Aryans, partners of mixed marriages. In Berlin alone about 6,000 such men were arrested on February 27. But then something unexpected and unparalleled happened: their Aryan wives followed them to the place of temporary detention and there they stood for several hours screaming and howling for their men. With the secrecy of the whole machinery of destruction threatened, the Gestapo yielded, and the non-Aryan husbands were released.[54]

A few days after this unique event Bertram composed another letter. This time he also sent copies to the chief of the Reich Chancellery and to the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA), Himmler's headquarters. About 8,000 non-Aryan Catholics, Bertram complained, had been seized and deported. The episcopate could not silently accept these measures. He then repeated what he had said in November 1942 about the illegitimacy of compulsory divorce.[55] On April 16 Bishop Preysing informed his fellow bishops that the contemplated divorce decree was soon to be made public. He urged that for the time being the matter be treated as strictly confidential; but in the event that the order should be issued, a statement drawn up by Bertram was to be read from the pulpits. The statement reaffirmed the indissolubility of Christian marriage and the validity of this principle even in the case of racially mixed marriages, and it asked for prayer for the unfortunates affected by the decree.[56]

About two months later Preysing sent word to his colleagues through a messenger that the threatened decree had been postponed. The bishops were asked to write letters to all the ministries; they should inquire in strong language as to the whereabouts of the deportees, demanding pastoral care for the Christians and threatening a public protest. The point of departure should be concern for the Christian Jews, "but beyond this one should speak clearly about the outrages inflicted upon the Jews generally."[57] We do not know how many bishops acted upon Preysing's request.

In November 1943, Bertram sent out another appeal in the name of the entire episcopate to the Minister of the Interior and the RSHA. The episcopate, he wrote, had received information according to which the non-Aryans evacuated from Germany were living in camps under conditions that would have to be called inhuman. A large number of the sufferers had already succumbed. "In view of the reputation of the German name at home and abroad," and in view of the commands of the Christian moral law concerning the duties owed fellow men even of foreign races, the bishops considered it necessary to plead for an amelioration of conditions in these camps. In particular, Bertram continued, the bishops wished

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to demand the benefit of pastoral care for the imprisoned Catholics. The episcopate would gladly designate priests for divine services and the administration of the sacraments in the camps.[58]

Bertram's letter neither employed strong language nor said anything very definite about the outrages against the Jews, as Bishop Preysing had suggested. Such vagueness was typical of the few public pronouncements the bishops made on this matter in the years following the adoption of the Final Solution. They spoke of the right to life and liberty, not to be denied even those "who are not of our blood," [59] to "men of foreign races and descent," and to "the resettled,"[60] but the word "Jew" never once appeared in any of these documents.

In his next and last letter to the government, dispatched in January 1944, Bertram wrote that reports had been received to the effect that measures which had previously been applied only to Jews were now to be applied also to the *Mischlinge*. These Christians had already been barred from military service and institutions of higher learning, but now, it seemed, they were to be conscripted into special formations for labor service. "All these measures," Bertram continued, "aim clearly at segregation, at the end of which extermination threatens." In the name of the episcopate he felt obligated to point out that any change in the meaning of the term "Jew"—when the Nuremberg statutes had been accepted as the final word on this question for almost ten years—would seriously undermine confidence in the law. The *Mischlinge* were Germans and Christians and had always been rejected by the Jews. "The German Catholics, indeed numerous Christians in Germany," Bertram warned, "would be deeply hurt if these fellow Christians now had to meet a fate similar to that of the Jews." The bishops would not be able to reconcile it with their conscience to remain silent in the face of such measures.[61]

As against the case of the euthanasia program of the early war years, then—when the episcopate did not mince words and succeeded in putting a stop to the killings—the bishops continually played it safe where the Jews were concerned. Such public protests as they did register could, indeed, have been seen as referring to the Jews, but any Catholic who chose to interpret them otherwise (as referring, say, only to Slavs) was left free to do so. Close to half the population of the Greater German Reich (43.1 per cent in 1939) was Catholic, and even among the S.S., despite all pressures to leave the Church, almost a fourth (22.7 per cent on December 31, 1938)[62] belonged to the Catholic faith. Yet while the episcopate had in the past issued orders to deny the sacraments to Catholics who engaged in dueling or agreed to have their bodies cremated, the word that would have forbidden the faithful, on pain of excommunication, to go on participating in the massacre of the Jews was never spoken. And so Catholics went on participating conscientiously, along with other Germans.

There was, however, at least one Catholic churchman in Germany for whom the Christian duty to love one's neighbor amounted to more than a pious formula—the sixty-six-year-old Provost Lichtenberg of Berlin, who, right through the stepped-up anti-Semitic agitation, continued to say a daily prayer for the Jews. He was finally arrested on October 23, 1941, a week after the first of the mass deportation of Jews had begun. During questioning by Himmler's henchmen, the Provost asserted that the deportation of the Jews was irreconcilable with the Christian moral law, and asked to be allowed to accompany the deportees as their spiritual adviser. Sentenced to two years imprisonment for abuse of the pulpit, Lichtenberg was seized by the Gestapo upon his release in October, 1943, and shipped off to the concentration camp at Dachau. He died during the transport on November 5, 1943.[63]

THE PASSIVITY OF the German episcopate in the face of the Jewish tragedy stands in marked contrast to the conduct of the French, Belgian, and Dutch bishops. In Holland, where the Church as early as 1934 had prohibited the participation of Catholics in the Dutch Nazi movement, the bishops in 1942 immediately and publicly protested the first deportations of Dutch Jews,[64] and in May 1943, they forbade the collaboration of Catholic policemen in the hunting down of Jews even at the cost of losing their jobs.[65] In Belgium members of the episcopate actively supported the rescue efforts of their clergy, who hid many hundreds of Jewish children.[66] And in France, the highest dignitaries of the Church repeatedly used their pulpits to denounce the deportations and to condemn the barbarous treatment of the Jews.[67]

Throughout Western Europe untold numbers of priests and members of the monastic clergy organized the rescue of Jews, hid them in monasteries, parish houses, and private homes. Many lay Catholics in France, Holland, and Belgium acted in a similar fashion, thus saving thousands of Jewish lives. The concern of the Gentile populations of these countries for their Jewish fellow-citizens was undoubtedly one of the key factors behind the bold public protests of the French, Dutch, and Belgian bishops—just as the absence of such solicitude in Germany goes a long way toward explaining the apathy of their German counterparts. In France, Belgium, and Holland, declarations of solidarity and help for the Jews were almost universally regarded as signs of patriotism; in Germany, on the other hand, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bishops in so acting would have incurred new charges of being un-German and of being in league with Germany's mortal enemies. Their own parishioners, moreover, would probably have failed to understand or support any signs of sympathy for the Jews—whom the Church, after all, had herself long been branding as a harmful factor in German life. Consequently, at the very moment when the bishops might perhaps have wanted to protest the inhuman treatment of the Jews, they found themselves the prisoners of their own anti-Semitic teachings.

Indeed, in Germany only a handful of Jews were hidden by the clergy or otherwise helped by them in their hour of distress.[68] In Freiburg there was Dr. Gertrud Luckner, an official of the *Caritas* (the large Catholic philanthropic organization) who helped Jews get across the Swiss border, sent packages to deportees, and distributed money from a special fund established by the episcopate for non-Aryans. She was arrested in November 1943, while trying to bring a sum of money to the few remaining Jews in Berlin and spent the rest of the war in a concentration camp.[69] A few cases are also recorded of individual Catholics hiding and saving Jews,[70] but only in Berlin did a significant number of Jews find refuge with friends and neighbors; according to Provost Grüber, most of these courageous people were workers, many of them were unconnected with any church.[71]

There were, then, exceptions, but the overall picture was one of indifference and apathy. "Among the Christians," a group of German Protestant and Catholic theologians concluded in 1950, "a few courageously helped the persecuted, but the large majority failed disgracefully in the face of this unheard-of provocation of the merciful God."[72]

4. The Role of the Papacy

In April 1933 a communication reached Pope Pius XI from Germany expressing grave concern over the Nazis' anti-Semitic aims and requesting the Supreme Pontiff to issue an encyclical on the Jewish question. The letter was written by the philosopher Dr. Edith Stein, a Jewish convert to Catholicism and later known as Sister Teresia Benedicta a Cruce of the Order of the Carmelites.[73] Edith Stein's request was not granted and nine years later, in August 1942, she was seized by the Gestapo from a Dutch monastery in which she had sought refuge, and sent to Auschwitz to be gassed. The debate over whether the Papacy could have prevented or should at least have vigorously protested the massacre of the Jews of Europe, of which Edith Stein was one of the victims, has been going on ever since and has acquired new vigor as a result of the Hochhuth play.

In response to Hitler's anti-Semitic drive, Pius XII's predecessor, Pius XI, like the German episcopate, seems to have limited his concern to Catholic non-Aryans. At the request of Cardinal Bertram, the Papal Secretary of State in September 1933 put in "a word on behalf of those German Catholics" who were of Jewish descent and for this reason suffering "social and economic difficulties."[74] In the years that followed the Holy See often took issue with the Nazis' glorification of race, but the Jewish question specifically was never discussed. In 1934 the influential Jesuit magazine *Civiltà Cattolica*, published in Rome and traditionally close to Vatican thinking, noted with regret that the anti-Semitism of the Nazis "did not stem from the religious convictions nor the Christian conscience . . . , but from . . . their desire to upset the order of religion and society." The *Civiltà Cattolica* added that "we could understand them, or even praise them, if their policy were restricted within acceptable bounds of defense against the Jewish organizations and institutions . . ."[75] In 1936 the same journal published another article on the subject, emphasizing that opposition to Nazi racialism should not be interpreted as a rejection of anti-Semitism, and arguing—as the magazine had done since 1890—that the Christian world (though without un-Christian hatred) must defend itself against the Jewish threat by suspending the civic rights of Jews and returning them to the ghettos.[76]

Pius XI's encyclical *"Mit brennender Sorge"* of March 1937 rejected the myths of race and blood as contrary to revealed Christian truth, but it neither mentioned nor criticized anti-Semitism *per se*. Nor was anti-Semitism mentioned in the statement of the Roman Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, issued on April 13, 1938 and attacking as erroneous eight theses taken from the arsenal of Nazi doctrine.[77] On September 7, 1938, during a reception for Catholic pilgrims from Belgium, Pius XI is said to have condemned the participation of Catholics in anti-Semitic movements and to have added that Christians, the spiritual descendants of the patriarch Abraham, were "spiritually Semites." But this statement was omitted by all the Italian papers, including *L'Osservatore Romano*, from their account of the Pope's address.[78]

The elevation of Cardinal Pacelli to the Papacy in the spring of 1939 brought to the chair of St. Peter a man who, in contrast to his predecessor, was unemotional and dispassionate, as well as a master of the language of diplomatic ambiguity. "Pius XII," recalls Cardinal Tardini, "was by nature meek and almost timid. He was not born with the temperament of a fighter. In this he was different from his great predecessor."[79] But whether, as Hochhuth has speculated, Pius XI

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would have reacted to the massacre of the Jews during World War II differently from Pacelli, is a question to which no definite answer is possible.

That the Holy See had no intrinsic objection to a policy of subjecting the Jews to discriminatory legislation again became clear when in June 1941 Marshal Pétain's Vichy government introduced a series of "Jewish statutes." The Cardinals and Archbishops of France made known their strong disapproval of these measures, but Léon Bérard, the Vichy ambassador at the Holy See, was able to report to Pétain after lengthy consultations with high Church officials that the Vatican did not consider such laws in conflict with Catholic teaching. The Holy See merely counseled that no provisions on marriage be added to the statutes and "that the precepts of justice and charity be considered in the application of the law." [80] In August 1941 the consequences of this discriminatory policy could not yet be clearly seen, but when mass deportations from France got under way in 1942, the Papal Nuncio, without invoking the authority of the Holy See, requested Laval to mitigate the severity of the measures taken against the Jews of Vichy France.[81] By that time, however, such pleas could no longer halt the machinery of destruction.

MEANWHILE, there was growing criticism of the Pope's failure to protest publicly against Nazi atrocities, and especially against the murder of the Jews in the Polish death factories. In July 1942, Harold H. Tittmann, the assistant to Roosevelt's personal representative at the Holy See, Myron C. Taylor, pointed out to the Vatican that its silence was "endangering its moral prestige and is undermining faith both in the Church and in the Holy Father himself." [82] In September 1942, after authorization by Secretary of State Hull, Tittmann and several other diplomatic representatives at the Vatican formally requested that the Pope condemn the "incredible horrors" perpetrated by the Nazis. A few days later Taylor forwarded to the Papal Secretary of State, Luigi Maglione, a memorandum from the Jewish Agency for Palestine reporting mass executions of Jews in Poland and occupied Russia, and telling of deportations to death camps from Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, Slovakia, etc. Taylor inquired whether the Vatican could confirm these reports, and if so, "whether the Holy Father has any suggestions as to any practical manner in which the forces of civilized opinion could be utilized in order to prevent a continuation of these barbarities." [83] On October 10 the Holy See, in reply to Taylor's note, said that up to the present time it had not been possible to verify the accuracy of reports concerning the severe measures that were being taken against the Jews. "It is well known," the statement added, "that the Holy See is taking advantage of every opportunity offered in order to mitigate the suffering of non-Aryans." [84]

After the Western Allies in December 1942 had vigorously denounced the cold-blooded extermination of the Jews, Tittmann again asked the Papal Secretary of State whether the Holy See could not issue a similar pronouncement. Maglione answered that the Holy See, in line with its policy of neutrality, could not protest particular atrocities and had to limit itself to condemning immoral actions in general. He assured Tittmann that everything possible was being done behind the scenes to help the Jews.[85]

Two days later, in the course of a lengthy Christmas message broadcast by the Vatican radio, Pope Pius made another of his many calls for a more humane conduct of hostilities. Humanity, the Pope declared, owed the resolution to build a better world to "the hundreds of thousands who without personal guilt, sometimes for no other reason but on account of their nationality or descent, were doomed to death or exposed to a progressive deterioration of their condition." [86] Again, addressing the Sacred College of Cardinals in June 1943, the Pontiff spoke of his twofold duty to be impartial and to point up moral errors. He had given special attention, he recalled, to the plight of those who were still being harassed because of their nationality or descent and who without personal guilt were subjected to measures that spelled destruction. Much had been done for the unfortunates that could not be described yet. Every public statement had had to be carefully weighed "in the interest of those suffering so that their situation would not inadvertently be made still more difficult and unbearable." Unfortunately, Pius XII added, the Church's pleas for compassion and for the observance of the elementary norms of humanity had encountered doors "which no key was able to open." [87]

The precise nature of these interventions has not been revealed to this day. We do know, however, that Nuncio Orsenigo in Berlin made inquiries several times about mass shootings and the fate of deported Jews. (Ernst Woermann, the director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, recorded on October 15, 1942 that the Nuncio had made his representation with "some embarrassment and without emphasis." [88]) State Secretary Weizsäcker told Monsignor Orsenigo on another such occasion that the Vatican had so far conducted itself "very cleverly" in these matters, and that he would hope for a continuation of this policy. The Nuncio took the hint and "pointed out that he had not really touched this topic and that he had no desire to touch it." [89]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Pope's policy of neutrality encountered its most crucial test when the Nazis began rounding up the 8,000 Jews of Rome in the fall of 1943. Prior to the start of the arrests, the Jewish community was told by the Nazis that unless it raised 50 kilograms of gold (the equivalent of $56,000) within 36 hours, 300 hostages would be taken. When it turned out that the Jews themselves could only raise 35 kgs., the Chief Rabbi, Israel Zolli, asked for and received a loan from the Vatican treasury to cover the balance. The Pope approved of this transaction.[90] But the big question in everyone's mind was how the Supreme Pontiff would react when the deportation of the Jews from the Eternal City began.

The test came on the night of October 15/16. While the round-up was still going on, a letter was delivered to General Stahel, the German military commander of Rome. Bearing the signature of Bishop Hudal, the head of the German Church in Rome, it said:

> I have just been informed by a high Vatican office in the immediate circle of the Holy Father that the arrests of Jews of Italian nationality have begun this morning. In the interest of the good relations which have existed until now between the Vatican and the high German military command . . . I would be very grateful if you would give an order to stop these arrests in Rome and its vicinity right away; I fear that otherwise the Pope will have to make an open stand which will serve the anti-German propaganda as a weapon against us.[91]

A day later, Ernst von Weizsäcker, the new German Ambassador at the Holy See, reported to Berlin that the Vatican was upset, especially since the deportations had taken place, as it were, right under the Pope's window:

> The people hostile to us in Rome are taking advantage of this affair to force the Vatican from its reserve. People say that the bishops of French cities, where similar incidents occurred, have taken a firm stand. The Pope, as supreme head of the Church and Bishop of Rome, cannot be more reticent than they. They are also drawing a parallel between the stronger character of Pius XI and that of the present Pope.[92]

Contrary to Hudal's and Weizsäcker's apprehensions, however, the man in the Vatican palace remained silent. On October 18, over one thousand Roman Jews—more than two-thirds of them women and children—were shipped off to the killing center of Auschwitz. Fourteen men and one woman returned alive. About 7,000 Roman Jews—that is, seven out of eight—were able to elude their hunters by going into hiding. More than 4,000, with the knowledge and approval of the Pope, found refuge in the numerous monasteries and houses of religious orders in Rome,[93] and a few dozen were sheltered in the Vatican itself. The rest were hidden by their Italian neighbors, among whom the anti-Jewish policy of the Fascists had never been popular. But for the Germans, overwhelmingly relieved at having averted a public protest by the Pope, the fact that a few thousand Jews had escaped the net was of minor significance. On October 28 Ambassador Weizsäcker was able to report:

> Although under pressure from all sides, the Pope has not let himself be drawn into any demonstrative censure of the deportation of Jews from Rome. Although he must expect that his attitude will be criticized by our enemies and exploited by the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon countries in their propaganda against Catholicism, he has done everything he could in this delicate matter not to strain relations with the German government, and German circles in Rome. As there is probably no reason to expect other German actions against the Jews of Rome, we can consider that a question so disturbing to German-Vatican relations has been liquidated.
>
> In any case, an indication for this state of affairs can be seen in the Vatican's attitude. *L'Osservatore Romano* has in fact prominently published in its issue of October 25-26, an official communiqué on the Pope's charitable activities. The communiqué, in the Vatican's distinctive style, that is, very vague and complicated, declares that all men, without distinction of nationality, race, or religion, benefit from the Pope's paternal solicitude. The continual and varied activities of Pius XII have probably increased lately because of the greater sufferings of so many unfortunates.
>
> There is less reason to object to the terms of this message . . . as only a very small number of people will recognize in it a special allusion to the Jewish question.[94]

SINCE THE END of World War II, Pius XII has often been criticized for his silence. It has been argued—and most recently by Hochhuth—that the Pope could have saved numerous lives, if indeed he could not have halted the machinery of destruction altogether, had he chosen to take a public stand, and had he confronted the Germans with the threat of an interdict or with the excommunication of Hitler, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis belonging to the Catholic faith. As examples of the effectiveness of public protests, it is possible to cite the resolute reaction of the German episcopate to the euthanasia program. Also, in Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, the forceful intervention of Papal nuncios, who threatened the Quisling governments with public condemnation by the Pope, was able, albeit temporarily, to stop the deportations.[95] At the very least, it has been suggested, a public de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nunciation of the mass murders by Pius XII, broadcast widely over the Vatican radio, would have revealed to Jews and Christians alike what deportation to the East actually meant. The Pope would have been believed, whereas the broadcasts of the Allies were often shrugged off as war propaganda. Many of the deportees who accepted the assurances of the Germans that they were merely being resettled, might thus have been warned and given an impetus to escape; many more Christians might have helped and sheltered Jews, and many more lives might have been saved.

There exists, of course, no way of definitively proving or disproving these arguments. Whether a papal decree of excommunication against Hitler would have dissuaded the Führer from carrying out his plan to destroy the Jews is very doubtful, and revocation of the Concordat by the Holy See would have bothered Hitler still less. However, a flaming protest against the massacre of the Jews coupled with an imposition of the interdict upon all of Germany or the excommunication of all Catholics in any way involved with the apparatus of the "Final Solution" would have been a more formidable and effective weapon. Yet this was precisely the kind of action which the Pope could not take without risking the allegiance of the German Catholics. Given the indifference of the German population toward the fate of the Jews and the highly ambivalent attitude of the German hierarchy toward Nazi anti-Semitism, a forceful stand by the Supreme Pontiff on the Jewish question might well have led to a large-scale desertion from the Church. When Dr. Edoardo Senatro, the correspondent of *L'Osservatore Romano* in Berlin, asked Pius XII whether he would not protest the extermination of the Jews, the Pope is reported to have answered, "Dear friend, do not forget that millions of Catholics serve in the German armies. Shall I bring them into conflicts of conscience?" [96] The Pope knew that the German Catholics were not prepared to suffer martyrdom for their Church; still less were they willing to incur the wrath of their Nazi rulers for the sake of the Jews, whom their own bishops for years had castigated as a harmful influence in German life. In the final analysis, then, "the Vatican's silence only reflected the deep feeling of the Catholic masses of Europe." [97]

Some Catholic writers have suggested that a public protest by the Pope would not only have been unsuccessful in helping the Jews but might have caused additional damage—to the Jews, to the *Mischlinge,* to the Church, to the territorial integrity of the Vatican, and to Catholics in all of Nazi-occupied Europe. So far as the Jews are concerned, it is tempting to dismiss this argument by asking what worse fate could possibly have befallen them than the one that actually did. But in any case, the Catholic bishops of Holland tried the gamble and failed. In July 1942, together with the Protestant Churches, they sent a telegram of protest against the deportation of the Dutch Jews to the German *Reichskommissar* (commissioner) and threatened to make their protest public unless the deportations were halted. The Germans responded by offering to exempt from deportation non-Aryans converted to Christianity before 1941 if the churches agreed to remain silent. The Dutch Reformed Church accepted the bargain, but the Catholic Archbishop of Utrecht refused and issued a pastoral letter in which he denounced the wrong done to the Jews. The Germans retaliated by seizing and deporting all the Catholic non-Aryans they could find, among them Edith Stein.[98] There was thus some basis for the fear that a public protest, along with any good that could come of it, might make some things worse, if not for the Jews, at least for the *Mischlinge* and the Catholics themselves.

THE POPE had other, perhaps still weightier, reasons for remaining silent. As Mr. Tittmann was told by highly placed officials of the Curia, the Holy See did not want to jeopardize its neutrality by condemning German atrocities, and the Pope was unwilling to risk later charges of having been partial and contributing to a German defeat.[99] Moreover, the Vatican did not wish to undermine and weaken Germany's struggle against Russia. In the late summer of 1943, the Papal Secretary of State declared that the fate of Europe depended upon a German victory on the Eastern front; [100] and Father Robert Leiber, one of Pius XII's secretaries, recalls that the late Pope had always looked upon Russian Bolshevism as more dangerous than German National Socialism.[101]

Finally, one is inclined to conclude that the Pope and his advisors—influenced by the long tradition of moderate anti-Semitism so widely accepted in Vatican circles—did not view the plight of the Jews with a real sense of urgency and moral outrage. For this assertion no documentation is possible, but it is a conclusion difficult to avoid. Pius XII broke his policy of strict neutrality during World War II to express concern over the German violation of the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg in May 1940. When some German Catholics criticized him for this action, the Pope wrote the German bishops that neutrality was not synonymous "with indifference and apathy where moral and humane considerations demanded a candid word." [102] All things told, did not the murder of several million Jews demand a similarly "candid word"?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

* * * * *

[1] Erhard Schlund, O.F.M., *Katholizismus und Vaterland* (Munich, 1923), pp. 32-33.

[2] Gustav Gundlach, S.J., *"Antisemitismus," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche,* 2nd rev. ed. (Freiburg, Br., 1930), I, 504. The new edition of this work, published after the downfall of Nazism, has replaced this article by one that condemns all types of anti-Semitism.

[3] Michael Buchberger, *Gibt es noch eine Rettung?* (Regensburg, n.d. [1931]), pp. 97-98.

[4] Franz Steffen, *Antisemitische und deutschvölkische Bewegung im Lichte des Katholizismus* (Berlin, 1925); Felix Langer, *Der "Judenspiegel" des Dr. Justus kritisch beleuchtet* (Leipzig, 1921).

[5] Memorandum of unknown authorship, *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* Series C, Vol. I, doc. 188, p. 347.

[6] Article *"Rasse"* in Konrad Gröber, ed., *Handbuch der religiösen Gegenwartsfragen,* (Freiburg, Br., 1937), p. 536.

[7] Sermon of December 31, 1933, in Michael Faulhaber, *Judaism, Christianity and Germany,* trans. George D. Smith (London, 1934), p. 107.

[8] Sermon of December 17, 1933, *ibid.,* pp. 68-69.

[9] *Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese München und Freising,* November 15, 1934, supplement.

[10] J. Scherm, *"Der alttestamentliche Bibelunterricht: Planungen und Wegweisungen," Klerusblatt,* XX (1939), p. 225.

[11] Pastoral letter of January 30, 1939, *Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese Freiburg,* no. 3, February 8, 1939, p. 15.

[12] Pastoral letter for Lent 1939, *Amtsblatt des Bistums Limburg,* no. 1, February 6, 1939, pp. 1-8.

[13] Article *"Marxismus,"* Gröber, *Handbuch der religiösen Gegenwartsfragen,* p. 404.

[14] Article *"Bolschewismus," ibid.,* p. 86.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 87.

[16] Article *"Kunst," ibid.,* p. 372.

[17] Karl Adam, *"Deutsches Volkstum und Katholisches Christentum," Theologische Quartalschrift,* CXIV (1933), pp. 60-62.

[18] *"Vor 17 Jahren: Marxismus über Deutschland," Klerusblatt, XVI* (1935), pp. 785-788.

[19] F. Schühlein, *"Geschichte der Juden," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche,* 2nd ed. (Freiburg, Br., 1933), V, p. 687.

[20] Gustav Lehmacher, S.J., *"Rassenwerte," Stimmen der Zeit,* CXXVI (1933), p. 81.

[21] *"Verdient die katholische Kirche den Namen 'Judenkirche'?", Klerusblatt,* XVIII (1937), p. 542.

[22] Theodor Bogler, O.S.B., *Der Glaube von gestern und heute* (Cologne, 1939), p. 150.

[23] Erwin Roderich Kienitz, *Christliche Ehe: Eine Darstellung des Eherechts und der Ehemoral der katholischen Kirche für Seelsorger und Laien* (Munich, 1938), pp. 47-54.

[24] *Denkschrift über die Reform des Deutschen Strafrechtes,* mimeographed, 39 pp., copy in Diocesan Archives Passau.

[25] Circular letter of the *"Kirchliche Informationsstelle der Bischöflichen Behörden Deutschlands,"* no. 341, September 16, 1935, Diocesan Archives Eichstätt.

[26] This was the complaint of Alfred Richter, *"Parteiprogramm der NSDAP und Reichskonkordat: Zum dritten Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung des Reichskonkordats (20. Juli 1933)," Deutschlands Erneuerung* XX (1936), p. 468. The occurrence of such marriages was confirmed to me by the former Vicar General of Hildesheim, Dr. Wilhelm Offenstein, in an interview on February 5, 1962. The German Federal Republic subsequently legalized these illegal marriages.

[27] *Deutsche Briefe,* no. 52, September 27, 1935, pp. 6-7.

[28] Regierungsrat Münsterer, *"Die Regelung des Rassenproblems durch die Nürnberger Gesetze," Klerusblatt,* XVII (1936), p. 47.

[29] Alois Hudal, *Die Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus* (Leipzig, 1937) pp. 75 and 88.

[30] The Conference of the Bavarian Bishops in March 1934 decided to request permission from the Ministry of the Interior to charge a small sum so that priests would be able to hire additional research help. *Niederschrift der Konferenz der bayerischen Bischöfe in München am 21. März 1934,* p. 3.

[31] J. Demleitner, *"Volksgenealogie," Klerusblatt,* XV (1934), p. 503.

[32] All of the diocesan archives preserved contain voluminous files of correspondence in connection with the certification of Aryan descent.

[33] Bertram to Pacelli, September 2, 1933, copy in Diocesan Archives Passau.

[34] *Protokoll der Verwaltungsratssitzung und der Hauptversammlung des St. Raphaelsvereins in Dortmund am Freitag, den 27. August 1937,* mimeo, 12 pp., Diocesan Archives, Mainz, file *"St. Raphaelsverein";* minutes of the Fulda Bishops' Conference of August 1939, *Bundesarchiv* (Koblenz), R43II/177a. The recent claim of a German Catholic paper, *Petrusblatt* (Berlin, April 16, 1961) that the *St. Raphaelsverein* helped 1,950 Jews to emigrate and supported 25,000 Jews has no foundation in fact—unless one still wants to use the concept "Jew" as a term of racial classification.

[35] *Bundesarchiv* (Koblenz), R43II/174.

[36] *Von einem deutschen, römisch-katholischen Priester, "Die katholische Kirche und die Judenfrage," Eine heilige Kirche,* XVI (1934), 177.

[37] Report of the Gestapo Munich, January 1, 1937, *Bayerisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv* (Munich), MA1946/019.

[38] Quoted in Alfons Erb, *Bernhard Lichtenberg* (Berlin, 1949), p. 43.

[39] Quoted in Léon Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate* (London, 1956), p. 30.

[40] Quoted in Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago, 1961), p. 262.

[41] Several such letters can be found in Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[42] Bertram to the German bishops, September 17, 1941, Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[43] Berning to Bertram, October 27, 1941, copy in Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[44] Hilfrich to Wienken, October 27, 1941, Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[45] Wienken to Hilfrich, October 30, 1941, Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[46] *Niederschrift über die Konferenz der Bischöfe der Kölner- und Paderborner Kirchenprovinz am 24. und 25. November 1941 in Paderborn,* mimeo, p. 5.

[47] Stewart W. Herman, Jr., *It's Your Souls We Want* (New York, 1943), p. 234; Bernhard Lösener, *"Das Reichsministerium des Inneren und die Judengesetzgebung: Aufzeichnungen," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* IX (1961), p. 310.

[48] Inge Scholl, *Die weisse Rose* (Frankfurt a.M., 1961), pp. 126-128.

[49] *"Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I (1953), p. 193. The opening scene of Hochhuth's play *Der Stellvertreter* is based on Gerstein's account, which is considered fully reliable by all students of the subject.

[50] Interview with Dr. Gertrud Luckner, March 9, 1962. One such officer, Dr. Alfons Hildenbrand, took special leave from his unit stationed near Minsk in order to report about the massacres he had witnessed to Cardinal Faulhaber. Cf. Thomas Dehler, *"Sie zuckten mit der Achsel,"* Fritz J. Raddatz, ed., *Summa iniuria oder Durfte der Papst schweigen?* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1963), p. 231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[51] Interview with Dr. Joseph Müller, March 26, 1962.

[52] Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[53] Bertram to Thierack, November 11, 1942, Archives of the Ministry of Justice (Bonn), R 22 Gr. 5/XXII-2; copy in Diocesan Archives Aachen.

[54] Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, *Berlin Underground 1938-1945*, trans. Barrows Mussey (New York, 1947). p. 92.

[55] Bertram to Thierack, March 2, 1943, Archives of the Ministry of Justice (Bonn), R 22 Gr. 5/XXII-2; copy in Diocesan Archives Mainz, 1/1.

[56] Preysing to the German bishops, April 16, 1943, Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[57] Memo on oral information from Preysing relayed to the Bishop of Limburg etc. on June 26, 1943 by Father Odilo Braun, O.P., Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[58] Bertram to the Minister of the Interior and the RSHA, November 17, 1943, copy in Diocesan Archives Limburg, file *"Nichtarier."*

[59] Archbishop Joseph Frings, Pastoral letter of December 12, 1942, Wilhelm Corsten, ed. *Kölner Aktenstücke zur Lage der Katholischen Kirche in Deutschland 1933-1945* (Cologne 1949) doc. 218, p. 269.

[60] Joint pastoral letter of August 19, 1943, *ibid.*, doc. 227, pp. 301-303.

[61] Bertram to Thierack, January 29, 1944, *Bundesarchiv* (Koblenz), R 22 Or. 5/XXI, la.

[62] From an internal report, National Archives, (Washington, D.C.), T-580, roll 42, file 245.

[63] Erb, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-65.

[64] For the text of the protests see W. W. Visser't Hooft, ed., *Holländische Kirchendokumente* (Zollikon-Zürich, 1944), pp. 58-60.

[65] Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945* (Stanford, Cal., 1963), p. 161.

[66] Philip Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers* (New York, 1957), pp. 70-71; C. Leclef, ed., *Le Cardinal van Roey et l'Occupation Allemande en Belgique: Actes et Documents* (Brussels, 1945), ch. 8.

[67] Emile Maurice Guerry, *L'Eglise Catholique en France sous l'Occupation* (Paris, 1947), pp. 33-65; Jules Géraud Saliège, *Fürchtet euch nicht: Hirtenbriefe und Ansprachen* (Offenburg, 1949), pp. 150-151; Friedman, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.

[68] The case of a Jewish mother and her son, who were hidden in a monastery near Berlin, is described by Kurt R. Grossmann, *Die unbesungenen Helden* (Berlin, 1957), p. 153.

[69] Grossmann, *op. cit.*, p. 113; Ernst Schnydrig, *"Hilfe für die verfolgten Juden," Zentralvorstand des Deutschen Caritasverbandes, An der Aufgabe gewachsen* [60th anniversary *Festschrift*] (Freiburg, Br., 1957). pp. 74-77; interview with Dr. Gertrud Luckner, March 9, 1962.

[70] Cf. Gertrud Ehrle, ed., *Licht über dem Abgrund* (Freiburg, Br., 1951), pp. 118-124.

[71] Heinrich Grüber, *"Zu Rolf Hochhuth's 'Stellvertreter,'"* Raddatz, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[72] *"Thesen christlicher Lehrverkündigung im Hinblick auf umlaufende Irrtümer über das Gottesvolk des Alten Bundes" (Schwalbacher Thesen), Freiburger Rundbrief,* II (1949-50), no. 8/9, p. 9.

[73] Cf. Hilda Graef, *Leben unter dem Kreuz: Eine Studie über Edith Stein* (Frankfurt a.M., 1954), p. 130.

[74] Note of the Papal Secretariat of State to the German government, September 9, 1933, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, C, I, doc. 425, p. 794.

[75] *Civiltà Cattolica*, no. 2024, quoted in Daniel Carpi, "The Catholic Church and Italian Jewry under the Fascists (to the Death of Pius XI)," *Yad Washem Studies*, IV (1960), p. 51.

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

[77] Cf. Yves M.— J. Congar, *Die Katholische Kirche und die Rassenfrage*, trans. W. Armbruster (Recklinghausen, 1961), p. 69.

[78] The statement was first reported by *La Croix*, no. 17060, September 17, 1938. It is accepted as accurate by Luigi Sturzo. *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York, 1946), p. 47.

[79] Domenico Tardini, *Pius XII*, trans. Franz Johna (Freiburg, Br., 1961), p. 59.

[80] Quoted in Poliakov, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

[81] Abetz to Foreign Ministry, August 28, 1942, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Bonn), *Staatssekretär, Vatikan, Bd. 4.*

[82] Tittmann to the Secretary of State, July 30, 1942, *U.S. Diplomatic Papers 1942*, III, p. 772.

[83] Taylor to Maglione, September 26, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 776.

[84] Tittmann's summary of Holy See statement of October 10, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 777.

[85] Tittmann to the Department of State, December 22, 1942, Department of State Papers, 740.0016 European War 1939/689.

[86] Corsten, *Kölner Aktenstücke*, doc. 220, p. 280. The message was mimeographed and distributed in Germany by the diocesan chanceries. I have seen a copy in Diocesan Archives Eichstätt.

[87] Pius XII to the Cardinals, June 2, 1943, excerpts in *Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese München und Freising*, August 12, 1943.

[88] Memo of Woermann, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Bonn), *Staatssekretär, Bd. 4.*

[89] Weizsäcker to Woermann etc., December 5, 1941, quoted in Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

[90] Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

[91] Gumbert (of the German Embassy at the Quirinal) to the Foreign Ministry, October 16, 1943, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Bonn), Inland II g, 192. Bishop Hudal had signed this letter at the urging of several anti-Nazi officials in the German legations at the Quirinal and Holy See, who had composed it. I have used the English translation of Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

[92] Weizsäcker to the Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1943, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Bonn). Inland II g, 192. The translation is that of Poliakov, *op. cit.*, p. 297, n. 16.

[93] Cf. Robert Leiber, S.J., *"Pius XII und die Juden in Rom 1943-1944," Stimmen der Zeit,* CLXVII (1960-61), pp. 429-430.

[94] Weizsäcker to the Foreign Ministry, October 28, 1943, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (Bonn), Inland II g, 192. The English translation is that of Poliakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-298, n. 16.

[95] Cf. Hilberg, *op. cit.*, p. 539; Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* (New York, 1953), pp. 431-432. The successful intervention of the Papal Nuncio in Rumania was attested to by the former Chief Rabbi of Rumania at the Eichmann trial (cf. New York *Times*, May 24, 1961, p. 12).

[96] Statement of Dr. Senatro on March 11, 1963 at a public discussion in Berlin (Raddatz, *op. cit.*, p. 223).

[97] Poliakov, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

[98] Louis de Jong, "Jews and non-Jews in Nazi-Occupied Holland," Max Beloff, ed., *On the Track of Tyranny* (London, 1960), pp. 148-149.

[99] Tittmann to the Department of State, October 6, 1942, *U.S. Diplomatic Papers 1942*, III, 777; Tittmann dispatch of September 8, 1942, Department of State Papers, 740.00116 European War 1939/573, 1|2.

[100] Reported by Weizsäcker, September 23, 1943, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes* (Bonn), *Staatssekretär, Vatikan, Bd. 4.*

[101] Robert Leiber, S.J. *"Der Papst und die Verfolgung der Juden,"* Raddatz, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[102] Pius XII to the German bishops, August 6, 1940, copy in Diocesan Archives Regensburg.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISAAC BABEL

TWO STORIES

Some two decades after his disappearance and probable execution, the Russian-Jewish author ISAAC BABEL *has come to be widely regarded as one of the greatest short story writers in modern literature. The following two pieces of fiction were suppressed in Russia during his lifetime and are being published here for the first time (in* MAX HAYWARD*'s translations). "Froim Grach" belongs to the famous series of Odessa stories and was possibly intended as the concluding one. "Kolyvushka" is taken from a novel about collective farming that Babel was not able to complete. Both selections will be included in a volume of Babel's letters and previously unpublished fiction that Farrar, Straus is bringing out this June under the title* Isaac Babel: The Lonely Years.

Froim Grach

IN 1919 Benya Krik's men ambushed the rear guard of the White Army, killed all the officers, and captured some of the supplies. As a reward for this, they demanded three days of "Peaceful Insurrection," but permission was not forthcoming, so they looted the goods in all the shops on Alexandrovski Avenue. After that they turned their attention to the Mutual Credit Society. Letting the customers enter ahead of them, they went into the bank and requested that the clerks put bales of money and valuables into a car waiting on the street. A whole month went by before the new authorities started shooting them. Then people began to say that Aron Peskin, who ran a sort of workshop, had something to do with the arrests. Nobody quite knew what went on in this workshop. In Peskin's apartment there was a large machine with a bent bar made of lead and the floor was strewn with shavings and cardboard for binding books.

One morning in the spring Peskin's friend, Misha Yablochko, knocked on the door of the workshop.

"Aron," Misha said to Peskin, "It's wonderful weather outside. You have before you a man who thinks of getting hold of half a bottle of vodka and some snacks and going up to Arkadia for a ride in the fresh air. You might laugh at me but I just like to take my mind off things once in a while."

Peskin put on his coat, went off with Misha, and took the street car to Arkadia. They rode around in a hansom until evening. At dusk Misha came into the room where Madame Peskin was washing her fourteen-year-old daughter in a tub.

"Good evening to you," Misha said, and he took off his hat. "We really had a great time. The fresh air was something out of this world, the only trouble was, it's not easy to talk to your husband. He's an awkward customer, your husband."

"You can say that again," Madame Peskin said, and she grabbed her daughter by the hair and yanked her back and forth. "Where is he, that adventurer?"

Misha replied, "He's resting in the back garden."

Misha Yablochko raised his hat again, said goodbye, and went off on a street car. Not waiting for her husband, Madame Peskin went into the garden to look for him. He was sitting, his straw hat on, slumped against the rustic table, showing all his teeth.

"You adventurer," Madame Peskin said to him. "It's all very well, your grinning all over your face, but that daughter of yours is having fits, she won't let me wash her head. Come and have a word with that daughter of yours."

Peskin didn't say a word and just kept on showing his teeth.

"No good son-of-a-bitch," Madame Peskin said. She looked under her husband's straw hat and screamed. The neighbors came running.

"He isn't alive," Madame Peskin said to them. "He is dead."

But she was wrong. Peskin had been shot through the chest in two places and his skull was broken, but he was still alive. They took him to the Jewish hospital. Doctor Zilberberg himself, no other, did an operation on him but Peskin had no luck and died under the knife. That same night the Cheka arrested a man nicknamed "the Georgian" and his friend Kolya Lapidus. One of them

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was the fellow who had driven Peskin and Misha Yablochko around in the hansom and the other was the one who had been waiting for them in Arkadia, on the seashore next to the turning that leads out into the open country. They were shot after a very brief questioning.

Only Misha Yablochko got away. They lost track of him and it was a few days before an old woman selling sunflower seeds came to the yard of Froim Grach's house. She was carrying a basket full of the stuff. One of her eyebrows rose up like a shaggy black bush and the other, only faintly outlined, ran in a curve over the eye. Froim Grach was sitting with his legs wide apart near the stable, playing with his grandson, Arkadi. Three years ago the child had fallen out of the mighty womb of his daughter, Baska. Froim stuck his finger out and the child grabbed hold of it, hung onto it, and began to swing back and forth as if were a cross-bar.

"You little devil," Froim said to his grandson, looking at him with his only eye.

The old woman with the bushy eyebrow and man's shoes tied with string, came up to them and sat down.

"Froim," said the old woman, "these people have no human feelings, I'm telling you. They are like wild animals. They are slaughtering us in the cellars like dogs. They don't give us a chance to talk before we die. We ought to go for them with our teeth and tear their hearts out. . . . Why don't you say something, Froim?" asked Misha Yablochko, "the boys are waiting for you to say something."

Misha got up, put the basket in his other hand, and went away arching that black eyebrow. Three girls with their hair done in braids met him by the church on Alexeyev Square. They were walking arm in arm.

"Young ladies," Misha said to them, "I can't treat you to tea and honey-cake."

He tipped some sunflowers out of the glass into the pockets of their dresses and made off around the church.

FROIM GRACH was alone in his yard. He was sitting there without moving, staring into space with his one eye. Mules captured from the White Army munched hay in the stable and over-fed mares with their foals were grazing in the paddock. Coachmen played cards in the shade of a chestnut tree, sipping wine out of broken cups. Hot gusts of wind swept the limestone walls, and the sunlight, blue and relentless, poured down over the yard.

Froim got up and went onto the street. He crossed over Prokhorovskaya which was blackening the sky with the poverty-stricken smoke of its kitchen, went through the rag market where people draped in curtains were trying to sell them to each other. When he got to Yekateriminskaya Street he turned off by the statue of the Empress and went into the Cheka building.

"I am Froim," he said to the duty officer, "I want to see the boss."

The head of the Cheka at that time was Vladislav Simen who had come from Moscow. When he heard about the arrival of Froim, he called in one of his interrogators, Borovoi, to find out about the visitor.

"He's a fantastic fellow," Borovoi told him, "you will see the whole of Odessa in this man."

The duty officer led the old man into the room. He was in a long canvas coat. He had red hair and was as huge as a house with one eye closed and a badly scarred cheek.

"Boss," Froim said, "who do you think you're killing—You're killing the best. You'll be left with nothing but riff-raff, boss."

Simen made a movement and opened the drawer of his desk.

"I've got nothing on me," Froim said, "I've got nothing in my hands or in my boots, and I've got nobody waiting on the street outside. Let my boys go, boss, just name your price."

They put the old man in an armchair and brought him some brandy. Borovoi left, went to his own room, and called in all the interrogators and commissars who were from Moscow.

"I want you to see this fellow here," he said, "He's a legend, there's nobody like him."

Borovoi told them that it was the one-eyed Froim, not Benya Krik, who was the real boss of Odessa's forty-thousand thieves. He kept very much in the background but it was the old man who had masterminded everything—the looting of the factories and the municipal treasury in Odessa, the attacks on the White and Allied troops. Borovoi waited for the old man to come out so they could have a talk with him, but there was no sign of him. He went through the whole building and finally went out into the yard at the back. Froim Grach was lying there sprawled under a tarpaulin by an ivy covered wall. Two Red Army men had rolled themselves cigarettes and were standing smoking over his body.

"He was strong as an ox," the older of the two said when he saw Borovoi, "never seen anything like it. An old man like that'd live forever if you didn't kill him. There were ten bullets in him but he was still kicking." The Red Army man was all flushed, his eyes were shining, and his cap was askew.

"You're talking out of the top of your head," said the other soldier. "He just died like they all do, they're all the same." "They're not the same!" the other one shouted, "some of them go down on their knees and scream and others don't make a sound. How can you say they're all the same?"

"They're all the same to me," the younger one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

went on stubbornly. "They all look alike, I can't tell them apart."

Borovoi bent down and pulled back the tarpaulin. The old man's face was still contorted in its last grimace.

Borovoi went back to his room. It was a circular room and the walls were covered with damask. There a meeting was going on about new rules of work. Simen was reporting on the irregularities which he had found on taking over—the illiterate way in which sentences were written out and the nonsensical fashion in which the records of interrogations were made. He was insisting that the interrogators should form themselves into groups for study with legal experts, and that they should conduct their business in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down by the Chief Directorate in Moscow.

Borovoi listened from his corner of the room. He was sitting by himself, a long way from the others. Simen went up to him after the meeting and took him by the arm.

"I know you're angry with me," he said, "but we are in power, Sasha, we are the power of the State, you've got to remember that."

"I'm not angry," Borovoi replied, "you're not from Odessa and you couldn't know how it was about that old man here." They sat down side by side, the head of the Cheka who was just twenty-two, and his subordinate. Simen pressed Borovoi's hand.

"Tell me as a Chekist," he said after a pause, "tell me as a revolutionary: what good was this man for the society of the future?"

"I don't know." Borovoi sat motionless and stared in front of him, "I suppose he wasn't . . ."

He pulled himself together and drove away his memories.

Then Borovoi livened up and began to tell the Chekists from Moscow about the life of Froim Grach, about his cunning and elusiveness, and about his contempt for his fellow-men—all these extraordinary stories that are now a thing of the past.

* * *

Kolyvushka

FOUR MEN came into the yard of Ivan Kolyvushka's farm: Ivashko, the representative of the Regional Executive Committee, Evdokim Nazarenko, the head of the village soviet, Zhitnyak, the chairman of the newly formed *kolkhoz*, and Adrian Morinets. Adrian walked around just like a clocktower on the move. Pressing his folding cloth briefcase to his hip, Ivashko ran past the barns and the sheds and marched straight into the house. Ivan's wife and his daughters were spinning yarn by the window on a blackened spinning wheel. With their kerchiefs and long gowns, with their bare feet, tiny and clean, they looked like nuns. On the walls, hanging between the embroidered cloths and cheap mirrors, there were photographs of ensigns in Czarist uniform, schoolmistresses, and townspeople on vacation in the country. Ivan followed the visitors into the house, and took off his cap.

"How much tax does he pay?" Ivashko asked, twisting round.

Evdokim, the head of the village soviet, stood there with his hands in his pockets and watched the spinning wheel fly around. When he heard that Kolyvushka paid 216 rubles Ivashko snorted:

"Can't he manage any more? . . ."

"He can't, by the looks of it. . . ."

Zhitnyak spread his dry lips and Evdokim just went on staring at the spinning wheel. From where he was standing in the doorway, Kolyvushka winked at his wife, and she took a receipt from behind the icons and gave it to the representative of the Regional Executive Committee.

"And what about his seed fund? . . ." Ivashko asked his questions brusquely, tapping his foot impatiently and digging it into the floorboards.

Evdokim raised his eyes and looked around the room.

"In this farm," he said, "everything's been handed over, comrade chairman . . . there couldn't be anything here that hasn't been handed over. . ."

The whitewashed walls converged over the heads of the guests to form a low, cozy dome. The flowers in the glass lamps, the plain cupboards, the polished benches, all reflected painstaking cleanliness. Ivashko made a move and hurried to the door with his dangling briefcase.

"Comrade chairman," Kolyvushka said, following him out, "Will I be hearing from you, or what? . . ."

"You'll get a notification," Ivashko shouted, his arms swinging, and he hurried off.

Adrian Morinets, larger than life, went after him. Timish, the cheerful bailiff of the village soviet, appeared fleetingly in the gateway at Ivashko's heels. He was churning up the mud of the village street with his long legs.

"What's it all about, Timish?" Ivan beckoned him and grabbed him by the sleeve. Timish bent down like a grinning beanstalk and opened his huge mouth crammed with a purple tongue and set with rows of pearls.

"They're taking your house away . . ."

"And what about me? . . ."

"You're being expelled . . ."

Then Timish ran off with his long strides to catch up with his superiors.

There was a harnessed horse standing in Ivan's yard. The red reins were thrown over some sacks of wheat. In the middle of the yard near a crooked lime tree, there was a stump with an ax stuck in it. Ivan touched his cap with his hand, pushed it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

back, and sat down. The mare came up to him dragging a sledge behind her. She put out her tongue and curled it up. She was with foal and her belly was very distended. Playfully she caught her master by the shoulder of his padded coat and nuzzled at it. Ivan was looking down at his feet. The trampled snow around the stump dazzled him. With hunched shoulders he jerked out the ax, held it up in the air for a moment, and struck the horse on the head. One of its ears jerked back, the other twitched and then lay flat. The mare groaned and bolted. The sledge turned over and wheat scattered in curved lines over the snow. The horse reared up with its forelegs in the air and its head thrown back. Beside one of the sheds it got caught up in the teeth of a harrow. Its eyes appeared from under a veil of pouring blood and it whinnied plaintively. The foal stirred inside it and a vein swelled up on its belly.

"I didn't mean it," Ivan said, stretching out his hand toward her, "I didn't mean it, little one."

The palm of his hand was open. The horse's ear was limp, its eyes were rolling and there were bloody rings round them. Its neck formed a straight line with its head. Its upper lip was curled up in despair. It pulled on the harness and moved forward again, dragging the harrow behind it. Ivan drew back his hand with the ax behind his back. He hit the mare right between the eyes. The foal stirred once again as the mare lay on the ground. Ivan wandered round the yard, went up to a shed, and dragged out a seeding machine. He smashed it with long slow blows and twisted the ax in the delicate mesh of wheels and in the drum. His wife appeared on the steps of the house in her long gown.

"Mother," Ivan heard his wife's voice in the distance, "Mother, he's wrecking everything."

The door opened and an old woman in canvas breeches came out of the house, leaning on a stick. Her yellow hair hung down over the hollows of her cheeks, her shift hung loosely on her thin body like a shroud. She stepped down into the snow in her rough stockings.

"Murderer," she said to her son, taking the ax out of his hand. "Have you forgotten your father? Have you forgotten your brothers who worked like slaves . . . ?"

Neighbors crowded into the yard. Then men stood in a half-circle and looked to one side. One of the women started forward and began to wail.

"Shut up, you bitch," her husband said to her.

Ivan stood leaning against a wall. His stertorous breathing could be heard all over the yard. It was as though he were doing a job of heavy work, gasping and panting.

His uncle Terenti was fussing near the gate and trying to close it.

"I'm a man," Ivan said all at once to the people standing round him, "I'm a man, a peasant . . . haven't you ever seen one before? . . ."

Terenti hustled everybody out of the yard. The gates creaked and shut. They opened again only in the evening. A sledge piled high with belongings came out. The women were sitting on bundles like frozen birds. A cow was hitched to the sledge by the horns. It went round the edge of the village and disappeared in the flat wastes of snow. The wind blew close to the ground, moaning in this wasteland and stirring up blue waves. The sky beyond them was leaden. The sky was covered by a glittering diamond mesh.

KOLYVUSHKA, looking straight ahead, went down the street to the village soviet. A meeting of the new *kolkhoz*, "rebirth," was going on there. The hunchbacked Zhitnyak was lolling behind a table.

"Now, this change in our life: what's it all about, this change?" the hunchback pressed his hands to his body and held them out again. "We are going over to dairy farming and market-gardening. This is of the greatest importance . . . Our fathers and grandfathers walked roughshod on a treasure and we are now digging it up. Isn't it a disgrace, isn't it a scandal that living about forty miles from the town, we haven't started farming on scientific lines? Our eyes were closed, we've been running away from ourselves . . . What is forty miles, does anybody know? . . . In this country it means about an hour in time, but that short hour belongs to us, it's worth something."

The door of the village soviet was flung open. Kolyvushka came in and stood by the wall in his fur coat which looked as though it had been cast in a mold. Ivashko's fingers twitched and stabbed at the papers in front of him.

"I must ask people deprived of the vote," he said, looking down at his papers, "to leave our meeting . . ."

Outside, beyond the dirty window-panes, the sun was setting in a flood of emerald rays. In the half-light of the village hut, sparks gleamed faintly in the thick smoke of home-grown tobacco. Ivan took off his hat and his mop of hair tumbled down.

He went up to the table at which the committee was sitting: Ivga Movchan, a woman who had worked as a farmhand, the chairman Evdokim, and the tight-lipped Adrian Morinets.

"People," Kolyvushka said, and he put a bunch of keys on the table, "I'm leaving you . . ."

The steel fell on the blackened boards with a clank. Adrian's twisted face peered out of the darkness.

"Where will you go, Ivan? . . ."

"People won't have me—maybe the ground will . . ." Ivan went out on tiptoe, his head bobbing up and down.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"He's up to something," Ivashko screeched, as soon as the door shut behind him, "it's all a provocation . . . He's gone for his shotgun, he's gone for his shotgun, that's what!"

Ivashko banged his fist on the table. Words about panic and the need to keep calm rushed to his lips. Adrian's face went back into its dark corner.

"No," he said out of the darkness, "maybe he hasn't gone for his gun, chairman."

"I have a proposal," Ivashko shouted. His proposal was that a guard should be posted outside Kolyvushka's house.

They appointed Timish, the bailiff, as guard.

Making faces, he brought a bentwood chair out of the house into the porch and slumped into it. He placed his shotgun and truncheon at his feet. From the top of the steps, from the height of his village throne, Timish shouted to the girls, whistling and hollering and rattling his gun. The night was mauve and heavy like a precious stone. It was streaked with the veins of frozen streams. A star fell down a well of black clouds.

In the morning Timish reported that there had been no incidents.

Ivan had spent the night with Abraham, an old man covered with proud flesh. Abraham had gone out to the well in the evening.

"What for, Abraham?" Ivan asked.

"For the samovar," the old man said.

They stayed in bed late. There was already smoke over the other houses in the village, but their door was still shut.

"He's bolted," Ivashko said at the *kolkhoz* meeting. "We shan't shed any tears . . . What do you think, friends?"

Zhitnyak, his bony, tremulous elbows spread wide apart on the table, was writing down in a ledger the descriptions of confiscated horses. His hump threw a moving shadow.

"We can never have enough now," Zhitnyak prated, whenever he had a free moment, "we need everything there is: water-sprinklers, hoeing machines, tractors, pumps . . . That's gluttony for you, friends . . . The whole of our country is gluttonous . . ."

The horses he was writing down were either bay or piebald; they were called either "lad" or "lass." Zhitnyak made each owner sign against his name.

He was disturbed by a noise like a distant, muffled thudding of hooves. A tidal wave was rolling nearer and breaking over the village. A crowd surged along the broken street. Legless cripples scuttled along in front. An unseen banner fluttered above them. When they reached the village soviet, the crowd changed step and drew up in formation . . . A circle opened up in their midst, a circle of ruffled snow, an empty space like the one made for priests during a church procession. Kolyvushka was standing there with his shirt hanging out from under his waistcoat, and his head all white. The night had silvered his mop of gypsy hair; not a black hair was left. Snowflakes, tired birds carried by the wind, drifted past under a sky which had grown warmer. An old man with broken legs pushed forward and looked eagerly at Kolyvushka's white hair.

"Tell us, Ivan," the old man said, raising his hands, "tell us what you have on your mind . . ."

"Where are you sending me?" Kolyvushka said, looking round. "Where can I go? . . . I was born among you . . ."

The crowd began to mutter. Morinets elbowed his way up to the front.

"Let him stay and work," the cry could scarcely leave his body, and his low voice shook, "let him work. Will he take food out of anybody's mouth?"

"Yes, out of mine," Zhitnyak said with a laugh. He shuffled up to Kolyvushka and winked at him.

"I slept with a wench last night," the hunchback said, "When we got up, she made a lot of pancakes. We ate so much, we were farting all over the place . . ."

The hunchback broke off and stopped laughing; the blood drained from his face.

"You've come to put us up against the wall," he said in a quieter voice, "you've come to torment us with that white head of yours. Only we won't be tormented, Ivan . . . We're fed up of being tormented nowadays . . ."

The hunchback came nearer on his thin, bandy legs. Something inside him whistled like a bird.

"You should be killed," he whispered, as the idea came to him, "I shall fetch the gun and destroy you . . ."

His face lit up. He touched Kolyvushka's hand gleefully and dashed off to the house for Timish's shotgun. Kolyvushka gave a lurch and walked away. The silver fleece of his head receded into the distance between two rows of houses. His legs were unsteady, but then his step got firmer. He turned off on the road to Ksenyevka. He was never seen again in Velikaya Staritsa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAVID DANZIG

THE MEANING OF NEGRO STRATEGY

In May of 1963, the world was abruptly made aware that a new minority community had emerged as a significant and self-conscious force in American society. The evidence was clear, eloquent, and disturbing. In Birmingham, Alabama during the week of May 13, the formerly dispersed and demoralized masses of Negroes suddenly became a well-organized, resolute body of citizens, marching forward to their daily encounter with the city's police force and fire department. The following week in Nashville, Tennessee, students of Fisk University led a protest march of their fellow Negroes through the main avenues of the city as part of a new campaign for complete desegregation. In Raleigh, North Carolina, five hundred college students broke three years of relative racial peace that had followed the desegregation of lunch counters, and launched a similar drive for total equality by a demonstration at the Governor's mansion. In Greensboro, North Carolina, a thousand Negroes attempted to sit in at two movie houses and a public cafeteria. In Cambridge, Maryland, as in Albany, Georgia, the long, desperate struggle was joined again, while in Selma, Alabama, the first stage of a new one was initiated by Negro leaders in a campaign to register voters. But it was not only in the South that the presence and pressure of a coherent movement were unmistakably apparent. Immediately following "Birmingham," the groundwave of protest began to swell in the Negro ghettos of New York, Chicago, and Detroit, as well as in pleasant suburbs like Orange and Englewood in New Jersey. Following these two weeks in May the tide of Negro group action continued to grow through the late spring and summer, rolling across the Eastern half of the nation and culminating in the great demonstration in Washington on August 28.

The most immediate and dramatic reaction of the white community was that of resentment and resistance. Nothing was quite to match that long Saturday night of May 18 in Birmingham when the motel where Martin Luther King had set up headquarters and the home of King's brother were both bombed, and when for some hours Negroes and police struggled amid the havoc and terror of an incipient race war. But almost everywhere that Negroes protested there was violence or the threat of it. The demonstrations in Nashville ended in knife-fighting between Negroes and whites; in Greensboro 241 marchers were arrested while a mob of whites swirled about them under the banners of "Blacks, Go Home," and "Go Back to Africa." And the mood of white resistance was to continue making itself felt in the infamous church bombing in Birmingham, and in the chain of assaults and police harassment that eventually extended from Jackson, Mississippi, to New York.

This outcropping of violence and intransigence, bombings and imprisonment, however, tended to obscure the less dramatic but more significant development of a new stage in Negro-white relations. For example, even as the Birmingham police were packing the marchers off to jail, an unprecedented series of negotiations was taking place between the leading businessmen of the city—six white and six Negro—which culminated in an agreement providing for a phased integration of lunch counters and the opening of job opportunities to Negroes. So, too, the Negro demonstrations in Nashville, Raleigh, and Greensboro were promptly followed by the establishment of new bi-racial committees to plan further desegregation, backed by statements from the white business leaders of both cities calling for the removal of all public and business policies that denied rights and services on racial grounds. And similarly, in Orange, New Jersey, the efforts of the Negro community resulted in an order from the State Commissioner of Education to present a plan for integrating a segregated elementary school in that town.

In other words, what underlay the specific conflicts both in the South and in the North during

DAVID DANZIG is associate director of the American Jewish Committee and a lecturer in intergroup relations at the Columbia University School of Social Work. His previous contributions include "Christianity in a 'Post-Western' Era" (January 1961) and "The Radical Right and the Rise of the Fundamentalist Minority" (April 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this two-week period in May was the emergence of an organized Negro community in each town representing the interests of its members and able to negotiate for them. Even the agreement reached in Birmingham—though it was soon to be repudiated by the business community of the city, not to mention the city government, the state police, and the fanatical terrorists—is an illustration of this development. Written in the spirit of civic pragmatism that has been displacing the rabid intransigence of the racists, the Birmingham agreement reads like what it essentially is: a pact between two distinct political bodies:

> Responsible leaders of both Negro and white communities of Birmingham, being desirous of promoting conditions which will ensure sound moral, economic and political growth of their city, in the interest of all citizens of Birmingham, after mutual consideration and discussion of the issues relating to the recent demonstrations in the city, have agreed to . . .

What we have here, in effect, is a radical departure from the traditional conception of civil rights as the rights of individuals. This departure lies at the heart of the "Negro Revolution," and may, indeed, almost be said to *be* that revolution. Today, in America as elsewhere, the Negro has made us forcefully aware that the rights and privileges of an individual rest upon the status attained by the group to which he belongs—that is to say, by the power it controls and can use. That this fact determined race relations in the 19th century is clear enough: Hillaire Belloc, disdaining to rationalize colonialism as "the white man's burden," put the matter very simply: "When all is said and done, we have the Gatling gun and they have none." To the extent that power is available to him, the Negro is now responding in kind. And in the American pluralistic pattern, where social power is distributed by group, the Negro has perforce come to recognize that he can achieve equal opportunities only through the concerted action of the Negro community. No longer addressing himself exclusively to the white man's attitudes of prejudice, to effecting changes in "the hearts and minds of men"—an approach that dooms him to gradualism—the Negro now confronts the white society on the issue of his rights with all the political and economic strength that his group is able to wield.

The Negro bloc of yesterday, in short, has become the mass movement of today. The speed with which this change has occurred, as well as its tendency to become identified with specific personalities like Martin Luther King and with specific incidents like those in Birmingham or Jackson or Albany, have deflected attention from the more general meaning of what has been happening. First of all, it is clear that the upsurge of Negro action is not merely a matter of temporary fervor; it is rather a profound response to a number of pressures which have been generated by the Negro's changing relation to American society and which, taken together, constitute a social upheaval of major significance. Among the more salient of these pressures is the accelerated migration of Negroes from the South to the North and from rural areas to the cities. While the state of Mississippi has been losing over thirty per cent of its Negro population in each of the past two decades, cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles have been experiencing an equally phenomenal rise in their Negro populations. Within the deprived and impacted Negro ghettos, the demands steadily grow for improved housing, education, and other public services. At the same time, the mounting population and its concentration in big cities provide Negro leaders with an increasingly strong base of political power. For example, in the Woodlawn neighborhood of Chicago's Black Belt, whose Negro population has increased by 80 per cent since the war, a grass-roots political movement has sprung up recently which has been agitating effectively for better police protection, school facilities, and housing, and which has forged a new spirit of group solidarity and communal responsibility that has enabled its leaders to oppose the acquisition of the best sections of the neighborhood by the powerful University of Chicago.

In the economic sphere, similarly, the advent of automation and other technological advances has produced a growing unemployment rate among Negroes and a widening split between Negro and white incomes. As the pressures of Negro poverty and frustration mount, the barriers of job discrimination become that much more unendurable; the result has been a concerted effort to breach them through mass demonstrations against labor and management alike, as well as through boycotts, selective buying, and other pressure tactics.

GIVEN ALL THESE tensions within the Negro population, it is not surprising that they should be pressing for action. What is surprising, however, is the solidarity and skill which have characterized Negro action during the past year. The March on Washington presented an especially conclusive example of Negro unity. Such unity—indeed, unity of any kind—is new in Negro life; one of the important effects of the strategy of mass demonstrations has been to create a sense of community among a people whose group ties were deliberately and persistently shattered during the period of slavery and whose subsequent social history has produced, for the most part, no larger unit of community than the church congregation. The spectacle of 200,000 people marching last summer through Washington, along with the other group demonstrations in the North and South and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the innumerable acts of individual heroism, have produced a new feeling of collective self-awareness, of peoplehood. The March on Washington, moreover, was a testimony to the rapid progress that the Negro has been making in wielding power. The organizational feat involved in planning and carrying through the huge demonstration, and the discipline of the marchers themselves, most of them Negro, marked an impressive stage in the maturing of the community. And it showed that a new Negro bureaucracy had come to the fore whose political sophistication and organizational talent were comparable to those of the best leadership found among the other ethnic and religious groups.

Thus, within a very short time, the Negro has developed the rudimentary group coherence and indigenous leadership that enables him to speak for his own rights and interests. Lacking these strengths, the Negro has in the past necessarily been dependent upon whites to represent him in American society. Both the Urban League, his main social agency, and the NAACP, his main political action group, were founded by whites and until recently have functioned within the ambience of the white community. Similarly with the Negro's political power, which has been mortgaged to the liberal coalition of the big-city political machines and the CIO that was created a generation ago under the New Deal. While the Negro has not as yet withdrawn from this coalition, he is no longer willing to accept the theory that what is good for the Democratic party is necessarily good for him. Nor is he any more patient with the "trickle-down" concept of prosperity when it is advanced to him by Big Labor than was the union man himself when he heard it expressed by Big Business during the Hoover years. Having taken into his own hands the reins of his destiny in American society, the Negro has found that the gradualism to which so many Northern liberals are committed can be as pressing an obstacle as the intransigence of the Southern conservatives, and consequently he has been forced to assert specific Negro demands in the North through his attacks upon the unions, upon de facto school and housing segregation, and through his drive for greater political patronage and a more independent use of the vote. What is now perceived as the "revolt of the Negro" amounts to this: the solitary Negro seeking admission into the white world through unusual achievement has been replaced by the organized Negro insisting upon a legitimate share for his group of the goods of American society. The white liberal, in turn, who—whether or not he has been fully conscious of it—has generally conceived of progress in race relations as the one-by-one assimilation of deserving Negroes into the larger society, finds himself confused and threatened by suddenly having to come to terms with an aggressive Negro community that wishes to enter it *en masse*.

Accordingly, in the arena of civil rights the Negro Revolution has tended to take the struggle out of the courts and bring it to the streets and the negotiating tables. Granting the potential for unprecedented violence that exists here, it must also be borne in mind that what the Negro people are now beginning to do, other ethnic minorities—who brought to America their strong traditions of communal solidarity—did before them. With this powerful asset the Irish rapidly acquired political strength, and the Jews succeeded in raising virtually an entire immigrant population into the middle class within the span of two generations. Viewed in this perspective, the Negroes are merely the last of America's significant ethnic minorities to achieve communal solidarity and to grasp the role of the informal group power structure in protecting the rights and advancing the opportunities of the individual members of the community.

INDEED, ETHNIC GROUPS (including of course the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant group) have played a much more significant role in American society than is commonly recognized or at least admitted. Except in the realm of politics, where the backing of a given ethnic group is often the primary qualification for office, we tend to maintain the fiction that American society is made up of isolated individuals who depend mainly upon their own talents for the position they achieve in it. The truth is, however, that the economic structure of the nation has been no less strongly influenced by ethnic factors than political ones. Wherever we look—whether at heavy industry or dairy farming, public utilities or banking, the building or the garment trades, organized crime or law enforcement—we find clearly marked ethnic patterns of occupation opportunities. Though these patterns have been breaking down in recent decades, in many of the older industries and vocations it still makes a difference whether one's forebears came from Ireland or Italy or whether one's first name or last name is Milton.

The converse of the fiction of social individualism has been the idea that minority organization hinders assimilation and perpetuates the disabilities of minority status. In the light of this idea, the immigrants pouring into America at the turn of the century were repeatedly advised that naturalization was an individual—and not a group—process and were admonished to shed their group identities and organizations as rapidly as possible. Today, Negro solidarity and its forms of collective self-assertion are provoking a similar anxiety and counsel from the dominant group. Disapproval by the majority, however, is unlikely to have much influence on the new Negro movement. The traditional approach to civil rights and equal oppor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tunities as the slow but continuous expansion of democracy on an individual basis means little to a group which is demanding the immediate rectification of a severe and continuous injustice to it. Moreover, when the authority of state governments and the power of most social and economic institutions have been used to deny the individual Negro his rights and opportunities merely because of his membership in the Negro group, it seems only fitting that he should muster the power he possesses to establish his rights and opportunities on a group basis.

But Negro action has not only turned the civil rights program into a conflict between groups, it has also extended this conflict to employment, housing, and education. Looking beyond the demand for civil rights, Negro leaders see that the "open society" of 1964 is in many areas even more closed to their community than was the ethnocentric WASP society of 1900 to the waves of new immigrants, and that the inequities suffered by Negroes are more extreme. Even in jobs, residential neighborhoods, and schools where Negroes are not excluded by explicit policy, their absence in significant numbers is rightly seen as proof of discrimination. The sad and brutal truth is that de facto segregation permeates our institutions and exerts a cumulative force: like a tropism beyond the reach of law, it impels the white man to identify with his race and to turn his back on the Negro.

The real issue, then, is not that of giving special consideration to Negroes to compensate for past injustices, but that of adopting realistic measures which will begin to correct a profound tendency in our society to exclude and penalize the Negro. So profound is this tendency that even where the formula "regardless of race, creed, or color" has been taken seriously, the Negro has found himself excluded on the ground of inadequate qualifications. The present anxiety about "maintaining standards" is far from new: it is a traditional ethnocentric reaction to any serious threat from outsiders, and it is as often a rationalization for prejudice as a concern for quality. Certainly the recently expressed determination of the building trades unions to maintain the "standards" of their craft must seem unconvincing to any occupant of a modern New York apartment. Where there is good will, the problem of equipping Negroes would seem to be no more difficult than that faced by American industry during World War II when it created virtually a whole new skilled work force through on-the-job training. After all, no one is suggesting that Negro laborers should immediately be sent to medical school, though no doubt a good many more Negro college students with good grades in biology should be.

To deal with this form of institutional prejudice the Negro activists have adopted the new strategy of attempting to fix responsibility on the management level—housing authorities, trade-union officials, corporation executives, boards of education, and so forth. Such an approach to the objective of increasing vocational, housing, and educational opportunities must sooner or later involve a discussion of numbers. However, insistence that the number of Negroes in some industries, housing projects, and schools be increased to a proportion reasonably related to Negro incidence in the population has been misrepresented, sometimes intentionally, as a demand for a rigid quota that would be imposed for the benefit of Negroes and at the expense of whites. Both Governor Rockefeller and President Kennedy received strong support from the white community when they condemned quotas. The President did so on practical grounds: "We are too mixed, this society of ours, to begin to divide ourselves on the basis of race or color." The governor made his opposition a matter of doctrine, arguing that such quotas were both unlawful and counter to American principles. The New York *Times*, having acknowledged that Negroes are justified in being impatient about the rate of unemployment in their community, went on to observe that "this impatience often finds expression in suggestions for a conscious system of reverse discrimination in favor of Negroes." Trade unions have also found reasons for strongly condemning quotas. So has President Eisenhower who fears that we may be in danger of "over-compensating" the Negro.

In general, white opposition to the Negro movement has crystallized around the issues of "quotas" and "preferential treatment." But to the Negro seeking a radical improvement in his situation, the issues are jobs and decent living conditions, not quotas; improved education, not school-busing privileges. Due to the lack of white support of any large-scale measures to aid the Negro, progress in these basic areas has been pitifully small. After being subjected to immense pressure, for example, the building trades agreed to add Negro apprentices; three thousand applicants were screened and 14 accepted! And in the other areas of the Negro plight, the advances have been no less meager.

LIBERAL opinion, in the North and in the South, thus continues to stand upon its traditions of gradualism—the one-by-one admission of deserving Negroes into the larger society—and to reject the idea that to help the Negro it must help the Negro community. Yet the fact is that the Negro belongs to an economic as well as a racial group. Certainly a child born in East Harlem is as much bound by economic limitations as a coal miner's child in eastern Kentucky. Given the conditions in a region like eastern Kentucky, we recognize that opportunity is in good part socially determined:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if unemployment goes over 7 per cent, the town qualifies as a "depressed area" and the community as a whole receives federal aid. But the Negro, who by virtue of his color belongs to an economic community which suffers almost constantly from an unemployment rate of more than 12 per cent, is expected to find resources and opportunities by himself and on his own.

Secretary of Labor Wirtz recently remarked that machines can now do more cheaply and effectively most work done by the high-school graduate. Obviously the resources needed for earning an acceptable place in our society are far different from what they were a century ago when a grant of three acres and the ability to farm it provided a sufficient start. However, we still tend to accept the American frontier ideology of resourceful individualism in positing the requirements for success in our society, just as we still accept the classical liberal ideology of laissez-faire as the backbone of our economic system. The truth is that this frontier ideology has as little relation to the actual routes to advancement in our highly developed technocracy as the laissez-faire ideology has to the actual operation of our federally subsidized and highly integrated economy. The individual who is adequately equipped to meet its demands usually has the backing of community and family achievement, which motivates him to seek a college education and orients him in making use of it.

Why then should we still insist upon holding the Negro to an extreme and outmoded doctrine of individual merit? More than half of all Negro men have not even graduated from primary school, and the continuing process of discrimination makes a bad situation increasingly worse. Between 1952 and 1962, the average Negro income dropped from 57 per cent to 53 per cent of the average white income, and the future looks even darker than the present. Negroes are heavily over-represented in unskilled labor, where jobs are decreasing daily, and heavily under-represented in the white-collar fields, which accounts for nearly all new jobs nowadays and where the rate of Negro unemployment is already about twice as high as the white rate.

The number of Americans living on a minimal subsistence level has been variously estimated as ranging between 36 and 50 million. Let us accept the mid-point figure of 44 million. It has been pointed out that 11 million of these people—that is, *only* one out of four—are Negroes. But looked at from another point of view, nearly two-thirds of all Negroes are impoverished. As Michael Harrington has demonstrated, poverty, like wealth, is inherited. Within the larger perspective of American society as a whole, the inherited poverty of whites, though far from negligible, is still a minority phenomenon; from the Negro's perspective, inherited poverty is a majority phenomenon, indeed an endemic one. In the generally accepted notion that America is an affluent society, we merely confirm our exclusion of the Negro from it.

This prolonged, virtually systematic exclusion of the Negro group from American life and the growing desperation of his position explain why the Negro is making such radical demands for freedom and opportunity—"now." But along with objecting to the Negro's impatient and militantly self-interested demands as "racism in reverse," white liberals have also questioned the efficacy of his strategy. The position expressed by Professor Eli Ginzberg is typical:

> In the past the Negro has made significant gains when he has been included in important national efforts—the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the New Deal, the C.I.O., World War II, the expansion of public programs for health, education, and welfare. There is little prospect that white America will do much for the handicapped Negro group. But we *can* expect our democracy to attend to its less fortunate citizens, Negroes included. All America needs a higher level of employment, more and better education, a closer approximation to true equality. To the extent that we move energetically towards these national goals, to that extent will the status of the Negro be improved.

One need hardly argue the superior value, to say nothing of the political advantage, of a national program supported by a wide variety of groups for the benefit of all deprived members of the society. But what allows us to "expect our democracy to attend to its less fortunate citizens, Negroes included" when doing so to any real effect would require major structural changes in the economy as well as in our institutional patterns? What political force will generate such a program? For there is very little political action today that does not have its source in one or another organized and powerful group—and (as was amply demonstrated during the battle for medicare) our forty to fifty million citizens who live in poverty are far too heterogeneous to constitute themselves into an effective political bloc. In general, Professor Ginzberg's analysis reduces to the moral rhetoric that contemporary liberals tend to substitute for political insight. Professor Andrew Hacker has described the situation of the underprivileged in far more realistic and relevant terms:

> It may well be that two Americas are emerging, one a society protected by the corporate umbrella and the other a society whose members have failed to affiliate themselves with the dominant institutions . . . . more importantly, it [the "second America"] will be comprised of the unemployed, the ill-educated and the entire

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

residue of human beings who are not needed by the corporate machine.

One might expect organized labor to begin to concern itself with the economic needs of this second America. But for the most part the unions in practice act as a conservative establishment that is mainly worried about maintaining its prerogatives against the sweeping changes of automation. During the Depression, the AFL denied its support to the unemployed and to those in the mass-production industries. Today, with one-fourth of the nation still ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clothed (about the same absolute number of individuals as in the Depression), the AFL-CIO is hardly more interested in speaking for the unorganized worker than the AFL was then. And just as the failure of the AFL in the 30's necessitated the organization of the CIO, so the inadequacy of the trade-union movement today forces the Negro group into acting to mitigate its own economic plight. Thus the sectarian character of the Negro's economic and political demands can be understood as a consequence of the absence of any political movement in the United States that speaks for the new American proletariat in general.

IN THE POSTWAR period, the emergence of a highly integrated mass society has forced the politics of sectionalism to give way to the politics of groups. More than ever before, the key to political power is group interest. And as often as not, the group interest in question is ethnic, religious, or racial. Such special interests are not necessarily antagonistic to the general good; indeed, they have often helped to advance the general interest by strengthening our democracy and by promoting programs of social welfare. Today the special interest of the Negro involves the burdens of poverty, inadequate training, and other social disabilities that afflict the entire "under-class" of the society, though they fall most heavily upon him. And it is already becoming evident that the Negro's militancy on behalf of his own cause may well serve the cause of the new American proletariat as a whole. The March on Washington, though primarily concerned with civil rights, also included among its ten points a request for a massive federal program to train unemployed workers—Negro and white; a national Minimum Wage Act that would give to all a decent living; and a broad Federal Labor Standards Act covering all areas of employment which are presently excluded. More generally, the Negro movement today provides the only likely center around which a new coalition might be created to fill the current political vacuum.

A. Philip Randolph, the Negroes' leading spokesman in the councils of labor, is keenly aware of the strategic role of the Negro movement at this juncture of history. Addressing the AFL-CIO Convention in November, he argued for an alliance between labor and the Negro:

> Let our alliance be strengthened. It is in labor's own interest. For the Negro's protest today is but the first rumbling of the *"under-class."* As the Negro has taken to the streets, so will the unemployed of all races take to the streets. . . . To discuss the civil rights revolution is therefore to write the agenda of labor's unfinished revolution. The labor movement cannot ignore this under-class. It cannot degenerate into a mere protective association, insulating the "haves" from the "have-nots" in the working class . . .

The implications of such an alliance were graphically spelled out in a subsequent speech at the same convention by Hank Brown, President of the Texas AFL-CIO:

> There are a half-million Negroes in our state working for less than fifty cents an hour. There are nearly a million unorganized Latin Americans in our state working for less than fifty cents an hour. . . . Civil rights means more than just doing something for the Negro . . . we can't win in Texas against the money changers that run the temple, called the state government, with just organized labor. We formed, Brother Randolph, the alliance you speak of a year ago then known as the coalition . . . and we would like for other states to take the hand of the Negro, the Latin American, the Indian, whatever he is, if he is a worker, and he is not making at least $2.00 an hour. Then that is the brother that we need to get with and win the kind of progress we are talking about.

It is still too early to say whether local coalitions like the one in Texas are the grass-roots beginnings of a new national coalition. Certainly any such coalition would have to be formed in the teeth of the apathy toward the unorganized poor that currently prevails among many of labor's statesmen as well as much of the rank-and-file. Be that as it may, it is becoming evident that only the new proletariat speaking for itself can join the issues of the day. The social planners who have analyzed the problems, the liberals who have moralized them, and the politicians who have articulated them can help in a new progressive coalition, but they lack the energy to initiate it. Group self-interest provides the very core of real politics, and Negro solidarity will have a large role to play if our democracy is once again to find its way to those humane values which were so important in shaping the original conception of America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOHN MANDER

THE "NEW STATESMAN" & THE ENGLISH LEFT

THE *New Statesman* recently marked its fiftieth birthday, and here in London the happy event has been duly and decorously celebrated. There was a grand party at a grand hotel; the columnists cooed; the Prime Minister sent his good wishes; and the *New Statesman*'s rivals offered appropriate—and even flattering—congratulations to their wayward sister. The black sheep of British journalism had been readmitted to the fold, and Mr. Kingsley Martin, the man whose editorial reign from 1931 to 1960 had made many devoted friends—and still more devoted enemies—for the *New Statesman*, received public absolution. In one of those bouts of orgiastic good-fellowship which confirm foreigners in their suspicion that British political and intellectual controversies are so much shadow-boxing, the past errors of the journal were ritually washed away—and washed away, as one spoil-sport critic remarked, in prime quality champagne. It was all very cozy and reassuring, and it showed once more that for even the most aggressive non-conformist, there will eventually be a place at last in the bosom of the great British public. For the wider public—a good third of the *New Statesman*'s readers are to be found in countries other than England—there was reassurance too. These foreign readers are for the most part Anglophiles of the tribe who see in Britain the world's perfect resolution of conservatism and dissent, rebellion and conformity. For many thousands of intellectuals in India and Africa (and indeed America), it is very necessary to believe that such a resolution is possible. And so the champagne flowed for them as well.

The *New Statesman* is a success story for idealists. Founded in 1913, by Bernard Shaw and Beatrice and Sidney Webb, it has climbed in fifty years from a readership of 2,000-odd to a circulation of 90,000 and a readership of something like half a million. By the standards of weekly and Sunday journalism in Britain (Sunday *Times* 1,200,000; *Observer* 700,000), the figure may not seem impressive. Again, by the standards of international weekly news magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek*, the readership is small. But comparing like with like, the figure begins to seem very impressive. In Britain, where the intellectual weekly has traditionally flourished, the *New Statesman*'s nearest rival is the *Spectator* with a circulation of 45,000. Neither France, Germany, nor Italy has produced an intellectual weekly with so firm a circulation base and so broadly spread an international audience. Evidently, then, the *New Statesman* is a unique journalistic triumph.

How do we explain the phenomenon? It would be easy to put down the *New Statesman*'s international resonance to the linguistic advantage any English-language paper has over a magazine written in German, Italian, or French. Yet despite the fact that France and Germany have traditionally had a more well-defined intellectual class than England or than the United States, there are no journals in Europe comparable to the *New Statesman*. Successful weeklies like *Der Spiegel* and *L'Express* make far greater concessions to middlebrow taste (*L'Express* approximates to the British Sunday newspaper with its "magazine section"; *Der Spiegel* superimposes a specifically German tradition of political muckraking on the *Time* magazine formula). Nor has the supposed linguistic advantage enjoyed by the *New Statesman* given any American magazine the kind of intellectual influence that the *New Statesman* possesses in the English-reading world. In part, no doubt, this can be explained by the residual influence of British institutions and patterns of thinking in ex-colonial Asia and Africa. But the *New Statesman*'s success was built up, and still largely depends, on the strength of its home base, and its influence can therefore only be fully understood in terms of the psychology of the British intelligentsia.

The difference between the magazine-reading intelligentsia in Britain and America has been well described by that notorious Anglophile, Mr. Dwight Macdonald. What he says of the British in *Against the American Grain* is all too flattering to Britain and doubtless unfair to America, but it

JOHN MANDER, who is currently assistant editor of *Encounter*, resigned from the staff of the *New Statesman* last year because of his disagreement with its stand on the Berlin question.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does provide us with a useful working distinction. "In England," writes Mr. Macdonald, "the cultural line is still drawn with some clarity. There are no British equivalents of our mid-cult magazines like the *Atlantic* and the *Saturday Review*." On the other hand,

> the one kind of magazine we haven't had here, since the liberal weeklies stubbed their toes on the Moscow trials, is the serious widely-read weekly . . . These British weeklies have large enough circulations to be self-supporting and to pay their contributors a living wage. Their nearest parallels here, in quality, are our little magazines which have small circulations (5,000 is par, 15,000 prodigious), run at a chronic deficit, and pay contributors and editors meagerly.
>
> What must be done here marginally, with help from "angels," either personal or institutional, can be done there as a normal part of journalism. Although a much smaller percentage of the English population goes to college, they have a larger and more cohesive cultural community than we do . . . England still has something of a functioning class system, culturally speaking. An American living in London is delighted by the wide interest in art and letters, the liveliness of the intellectual atmosphere, the sense he gets constantly from the press and from conversations of a general interest in what he is interested in. It is, of course, generally true of only perhaps five per cent of the population. But in America it isn't even this much general; it is shared only with friends and professional acquaintances. But in London, one meets stockbrokers who go to concerts, politicians who have read Proust. . . .

What can one say? I wish Mr. Macdonald would introduce me to these people. Yet I can see what he means. The success of journals like the *New Statesman*, the *Spectator*, and the *Economist* does depend on the existence of an intellectual class:

> It is indicative of the disorganized quality of our intellectual life that of all the remarkable increase in the consumption of high-class culture since 1945, not one intellectual weekly has been produced. There has been a number of new little magazines. But, like the old ones, they are essentially anthologies. They print the best current fiction, poetry, essays, and criticism, but they cannot form a center of consciousness as the English weeklies do, since this requires 1) at least monthly topical comment, and preferably weekly; and 2) a regular interchange between writers and editors and readers such as is provided in the correspondence columns of the English weeklies.

I cannot judge if this is a fair account of American intellectual life. But as an account of British intellectual life it is both true and perplexing. Mr. Macdonald speaks of the strength and coherence of the English intellectual class or intelligentsia, and I believe he is right. Yet nothing rings more strangely in British ears than the notion of an "intellectual class." That is simply not how our intellectuals think of themselves. Again, Britain is still in many ways the country Matthew Arnold described in *Culture and Anarchy*—a country divided between Barbarians (upper class) and Philistines (middle class), and the public schools still produce a hybrid of these two strains. In golf club and smoking room, intellectual and artistic philistinism is as deeply entrenched as it is said to be in America. There is perhaps this difference: the Englishman is a philistine with a good conscience, whereas on the whole the American seems not to be (a point surely to his credit). Yet here is Mr. Macdonald, with his concert-going stockbrokers and Proust-reading politicians, holding up the British system, class distinctions and all, for general emulation. How have we deserved it?

At this point, let me introduce two practical definitions. An intellectual class can be, it seems to me, at least two things: an *intelligentsia*, or a "clerisy." I italicize *intelligentsia* with intent: the word and the concept are Russian, imported into English in the 19th century. The old Russian *intelligentsia* was a social grouping in its own right, distinct from the other components—army, church, bureaucracy—of the Czarist ruling class. Its social position was ambivalent. Administratively, especially in the teaching profession, it was an organ of the state. Indispensable to the regime, it was yet held by it in deep distrust. Caught between a rigid hierarchy above, and an inert peasant mass below, the *intelligentsia* was a natural focus of intellectual and social dissent, and it soon became the vehicle of national revival and social liberation. In this form, an *intelligentsia* was typical of all East European countries up to the outbreak of the Second World War. More recently, under Communism, the *intelligentsia* has been institutionalized—and forced back into its 19th-century mold in the process.

The term passed into the Western European languages, but the concept it represented never quite fitted Western European society—though it fitted Germany better than France, and both France and Germany better than England. The reason is clear enough: a critic like Matthew Arnold felt keenly the intellectual's alienation from society at large, but he spoke for little more than an elite of writers and artists concerned, like himself, about "the condition of England." The university and high-school teacher, the doctor, the lawyer, and the engineer were nowhere more firmly integrated into society than in England. There was not even, as in continental Europe, that residual cleavage between bourgeois and aristocrat that kept alive earlier traditions of dissent; the public schools had closed that gap. By the end of the 19th

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century, England's upper and middle classes had achieved a high degree of internal mobility. In bringing about this revolution they were strongly influenced by the conservative, Coleridgean notion of a "clerisy": a society ruled by a civilized and educated elite; a society on the medieval model, but adapted to the needs of a secular, industrial age. No doubt what the public schools created was a caricature of Coleridge's blueprint for England's social regeneration. But Coleridge's was a compelling vision—how compelling, one can guess from Mr. Macdonald's account of England's "intellectual class," in which, it seems to me, he confuses the ideal of an educated elite with the reality of a hierarchy of class distinctions.

Nevertheless, Mr. Macdonald is three parts right. The English class system may be a pale shadow of Coleridge's clerisy, yet it is this ideal, however imperfectly realized, that has made England's intellectual weeklies possible. But isn't my thesis contradicted by the fact that the most successful British weekly is the one most sharply critical of the class system? I suggest that the contradiction can be resolved by assuming the gradual emergence in England, alongside the traditional clerisy, of something resembling the *intelligentsia* of Eastern Europe. If I am right, the *New Statesman*'s resonance among the disaffected intellectuals of the English-speaking world, and particularly of Africa and Asia, becomes easier to explain. If the ideal of a clerisy had not persisted within the English class system, the *New Statesman* would have been in the position of the American liberal weeklies. But if a disaffected intelligentsia had not also gradually come into being since 1900, the *New Statesman* would not have achieved so long a lead over its rivals, or acquired so much international influence.

THE VERY structure of the British weeklies points to the persistence of this ideal of clerisy. Traditionally, each is divided into a "front half" and a "back half." The front half is concerned with political analysis and comment on the events of the week; the back with more leisurely analysis and comment on current publications—literary, historical, sociological. There was always considerable overlap, of course, but usually the two halves were under distinct editorial supervision: the literary editor was appointed by the editor; but, once appointed, he had considerable freedom of action. This separation of powers was nowhere more marked than in the *New Statesman*. It was commonly said of the journal under Kingsley Martin that the front half knoweth not what the back half doeth—and vice versa. Indeed Martin's *New Statesman* was a pantomime horse: the editor and the literary editor seldom seemed to pull in the same direction. But if the split was wide, it was not for personal reasons. The *New Statesman* was always something of a shotgun marriage between the dry, Benthamite, philistine Fabianism of the Webbs and the preciosities of Bloomsbury, and this became even truer after absorption of the old, liberal *Nation* in 1931, at Kingsley Martin's accession. (The title reverted to *"New Statesman"* three years ago.)

Kingsley Martin's own chief literary enthusiasms were Wells and Shaw; though tolerant of the antics of the "back half" (and well aware of its importance in terms of circulation), he tended to regard his literary colleagues as a clique of aesthetes—charming, but politically unserious. On the other hand, the chairman of the *New Statesman* company during the greater part of Kingsley Martin's reign was John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had important political disagreements with Martin (most notoriously, over the publication in October 1939 of a letter from Bernard Shaw demanding a negotiated peace with Hitler). Yet Keynes typified, more than any other English figure of his time, the clerisy ideal. Influential in government circles, famous as an economic theorist, married to a Russian ballet dancer, he was the intimate friend of Lytton Strachey, E. M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, and the other artists and intellectuals of the Bloomsbury group. It is not easy to imagine a comparable figure in any other Western country —with the possible exception of France. Here was a political man who most certainly knew his Proust; an economist who was a discerning critic of the arts. If nowhere else, Mr. Dwight Macdonald's Anglophilia is justified in figures like John Maynard Keynes, or St. Loe Strachey, editor of the *Spectator* at the turn of the century, uncle of Lytton Strachey, and father of the late John Strachey.

The English clerisy made both the *New Statesman* and the *Spectator* possible. In his somewhat uninspired history of the *New Statesman*,* Mr. Edward Hyams ignores what to my mind is the most interesting aspect of the journal's climb to fame. From the Hyams account, one would gather that the conjunction of Bloomsbury "back half" and Fabian "front half" was fortuitous. It is true that Kingsley Martin cared little for the content of the back half of his paper, but he knew that it accounted for much of its popularity, and he was never eager to fill its columns with the left-wing reportage and polemic of the Auden-Spender-Day Lewis group. Was this merely shrewd calculation? His opponents think so and indeed go further: they argue that the brilliant highbrow literary journalism of the back half was intended as bait for the unpolitical. By this backdoor method, the London literary *intelligentsia*, less politicized than their brethren on the continent, could be drawn

* *The New Statesman: The History of the First Fifty Years 1913—1963*, St. Martin's Press, 317 pp., $7.50. See also *New Statesmanship: An Anthology*, selected by Mr. Hyams, St. Martin's Press, 290 pp., $6.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the sphere of radical socialist politics. The reader who began with a mild liking for the prose of Virginia Woolf or Lytton Strachey would end up as an apologist for the Stalinist liquidators of Bukharin. It is an ingenious idea, but its supporters fall into the same error as Mr. Hyams in assuming that the conjunction of Kingsley Martin's fellow-traveling and Bloomsbury aestheticism was fortuitous.

If the Hyams idea appears plausible, the reason is evident. Insofar as a political commitment can be found in the writings of Lytton Strachey, Virginia Woolf, Keynes, E. M. Forster, it is a liberal commitment (in the British, not the American sense), rather than a socialist one. As a literary group, Bloomsbury was concerned almost exclusively with personal values. On the face of it, the contrast between this ethos and the semi-Marxist, semi-Fabian militancy of the front half of the *New Statesman* would seem to be very great—so great as to imply two distinct readerships for the paper. Even today, a foreigner in London will meet literary intellectuals who tell him they "never look at the front half," or politicians who tell him they "never look at the back half." But this is very largely an act, akin to those tedious Oxford-and-Cambridge jokes, put on for the benefit of the outsider.

Of course, the complexions of both back half and front half have changed a great deal since the 30's. Under John Freeman (who succeeded Kingsley Martin in 1961), the *New Statesman* has steered a much steadier political course; and its literary interests under Karl Miller, John Freeman's appointee, have shifted from Bloomsbury's traditional Francophilia to the intellectually tougher-minded, but less cosmopolitan, world of Dr. Leavis and the New Criticism. If these changes have gone unremarked by many readers—and I suspect they have—that is because the *New Statesman* is still living on past capital, the capital accumulated by Kingsley Martin during his long reign. Looked at objectively, the gap between front and back has narrowed considerably, but it is still palpably there. It is difficult to imagine that the *New Statesman*'s hectoring social oratory is the political tone that readers of V. S. Pritchett or Frank Kermode most admire. Though less sharply than in the 30's, it is still as if the paper were written and edited for two distinct readerships.

Appearances to the contrary, however, I do not believe that the *New Statesman* ever had two distinct readerships. The gap existed, but it was a gap within the mind of a single, sociologically homogeneous public. The "typical" *New Statesman* reader was always, in his political and literary affections, a quite different animal. If the political half of the paper habitually addressed him as a latter-day Jacobin, and the literary half as a sensitive, leisured gentleman-of-letters, that was how he *wished* to be addressed. (By way of qualification, it should be said that this did not apply to the 10 or 20 per cent at either end of the spectrum who actually were socialist militants or leisured *literati*.)

How do we account for this startling ambivalence, this dichotomy between aesthetic quietism and political *engagement*? There are, I suppose, two possible explanations. It could be argued that the literary delights of the back half were, to the militant socialists of the front half, not so much a cover for nefarious activities as an expression of cultural snobbery. But with Kingsley Martin this explanation will not do: like the Webbs, Martin was a philistine with a good conscience. The alternative explanation is less flattering, but I believe correct: it was the harsh politics of the front half that reflected the fantasy life of the *New Statesman* reader, and the literary amateurism of the back that reflected the reality. In the 1930's this was not a fortunate combination, for the actual politics of that age were very harsh indeed. In England, where neither fascism nor Communism had real strength, it was not easy for people to grasp what was happening on the continent of Europe. It is true, of course, that the *New Statesman* did much to alert British and foreign opinion to the nature of Nazism, but it is also true that it systematically misled liberal opinion as to the nature of Communism (the *New Statesman*, too, "stubbed its toes on the Moscow 'Trials'"). And when it came to the point—in September 1938—the *New Statesman* was among the first to recommend a British sellout of the Czech Republic.

The terms of the *New Statesman*'s advocacy of appeasement—three weeks before the famous *Times* editorial which gave Chamberlain's policy the stamp of Establishment approval—are interesting in their very deviousness:

> *Hitler enters Rhineland:* It would be folly to reply by a mere *non possumus* . . . The sane policy would be to invite her [Germany] back into the League on terms which will do justice to her and ensure that she is a better neighbor. (*NS and N*, 13 March 1934)
>
> *Munich 1938:* If Mr. Chamberlain is prepared for the results of isolation, let him say so. We for our part, regarding war as the greatest of all catastrophes, and recalling the results of one war to prevent Germany from holding the hegemony of Europe, would applaud and support such a decision. (*NS and N*, March 1938)
>
> The question of frontier revision should at once be tackled. (*NS and N*, August 1938)
>
> Nothing we or anyone else could do would save Czechoslovakia from destruction. (*NS and N*, August 1938)
>
> In the last resort there is no doubt that Britain as well as France and the whole democratic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world would stand by the Czechs. (*NS and N*, early Sept. 1938)

The Murder of a Nation. (21 September 1938)

In his history, Mr. Hyams does not conceal these famous lapses. Instead, he produces new arguments to defend them. He contends that Kingsley Martin, torn between hatred of war and loyalty to the democratic cause, decided to take his readers into his confidence. Every week, in his *London Diary*, he shared his doubts and perplexities with the reader. If he was fearful, so were they. If he advocated resistance to Hitler (but not the means of ensuring it), so did the British public. Thus the apparently devious editorial course traced in the quotations cited above—defiance, persuasion, approval of appeasement, retrospective indignation—was really proof of his candor.

At first sight, this defense might seem as devious as the very line it is defending. (Mr. Hyams is himself an old *New Statesman*ite; he contributes a column on "The Countryside" to the journal.) Yet Mr. Hyams is right: the essence of Kingsley Martin's journalistic genius lay precisely in this intimate, hysterical, soul-baring approach to the reader. Kingsley Martin, it was said, "was always going around looking for a crown of thorns." This taste for public crucifixion has been much psychologized over (it has been traced to his upbringing as the son of a non-conformist minister), but the interesting thing is that so many intellectuals of the period shared it with Martin. The *New Statesman* was able between 1931 and 1951 to mature (if that is the word) from a sectarian weekly review into the foremost English-language journal of dissent precisely *because* Martin's personality mirrored the psychology of the disaffected intelligentsia that came into being in Britain and the British colonial empire during the same period. The savior would have been no savior had there not been so widespread a desire to be crucified at his side.

THE *New Statesman* published, in its fiftieth anniversary number, a review of Mr. Hyams's *History* by Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, late of the United Nations and Katanga (and the author, under another name, of a brilliant study of the Catholic novel, *Maria Cross*). Mr. O'Brien's article contains perhaps the most damaging—though by no means the most extreme—criticism of the *New Statesman* that has ever appeared in print. It is an article that will long be treasured by that journal's exasperated admirers—what other magazine, it will be said, would have given space to so devastating a critique of itself? The cynic is at liberty to reply that Mr. O'Brien's critique was directed against the *New Statesman* of the 30's, rather than against the *New Statesman* of today, and that the decision to publish it had something of the flavor of Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin. Nonetheless, the *New Statesman* obviously does deserve credit for publishing the piece.

What is the essence of Mr. O'Brien's case? "The point is not," he remarks,

> that the *New Statesman* was soft on Communism . . . the point is that with a sort of instinctive coziness it usually preferred settling down among the hopeful illusions of its readers—including you and me—to losing popularity and "influence" by blasting those illusions. . . . This, surely, was the real treason of the clerks: that leaders of opinion, instead of showing to the very best of their ability and knowledge how things actually are, should . . . present them with a version which is thought to be better for them or more suited to their limited capacity of understanding . . . Plato's Noble Lie is really just another lie, the nobility being in the vocabulary of the liar.

Mr. O'Brien is arguing that non-conformity has bred its own conformism—the more impregnable for its narrow, protestant self-righteousness. That this sense of belonging to an elect was important to the *New Statesman* ethos cannot be denied. But Mr. O'Brien is wrong to imply that there was an element of conscious deceit (the Noble Lie) in Kingsley Martin's attitude toward his readers. Kingsley Martin's reaction, in an article in the following issue, to Mr. O'Brien's attack on his editorship (which was to deny every charge, and to reaffirm the rightness of the *New Statesman*'s policy in the 30's) argues a sincere self-righteousness so impregnable as to exclude conscious deceit. The hypocrisy is undeniable, and fatally Protestant non-conformist; but that is another matter. The dissenter is hypocritical precisely because he attempts to combine absolute honesty with absolute consistency.

It may appear that I have given too much weight to the personality of Kingsley Martin, and too little to his thinking. But the fact is that the *New Statesman*'s ethos was always more emotional than intellectual. What Martin served up to his readers in the 30's was an amalgam of the Fabian progressivism of Shaw and the Webbs, the Guild Socialism of G. D. H. Cole, and the neo-Marxism of Harold Laski and John Strachey—not a very impressive intellectual diet. Indeed, the irony is that the real thinking of the 30's was being done by J. M. Keynes, the man whose advice Martin consistently refused. But it did not matter—only Martin's personality mattered: querulous, well-meaning, rationalistic, philanthropical, melioristic. This pattern was indelibly stamped on the *New Statesman*, and it is still visible today: in the aggressive conviction of the leading articles, in the patronizing tone of moral superiority that marks the *London Diary* and the—often very funny—*This England* column. It is that same tone that once sounded throughout the literary half of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paper—Bloomsbury arrogance was a genuine counterpart to socialist self-righteousness. Many have found this tone intolerable, as they have found the personality of Kingsley Martin intolerable. But the qualities that repel are also the qualities that attract and hold a world-wide readership (the *New Statesman* has one of the most faithful readerships in the world: over half its present readers have been subscribing for twenty years). Other *New Statesman* writers have caught the tone, and often with great brilliance: in particular, R. H. S. Crossman, who was on the staff of the paper from the late 30's to the middle 50's, and, in the younger generation, Paul Johnson, who is now deputy editor. But Kingsley Martin's is still the reigning spirit, and it is in his shadow that Freeman, Crossman, Johnson, and the rest live, move, and have their being.

So much for the *New Statesman*'s personality: what of its audience? As I have said, I do not think that a sharp distinction can be drawn between a "back-half" and a "front-half" readership. What the *New Statesman* has created in Britain and elsewhere, I would say, is a kind of pseudo-Left whose distinguishing characteristics are that it thinks more radically than it acts, and that it affects solidarity with foreign causes more revolutionary than it would be prepared to stomach at home. (One wonders, for example, whether the *New Statesman* ethos could have survived a really powerful Communist movement in Great Britain.) A classical attack on this mentality is to be found in George Orwell's essay "Inside the Whale" (1940), where he says of the appeal of Communism for British intellectuals of the 30's:

> It was simply something to believe in. Here was a church, an army, an orthodoxy, a discipline. . . . Patriotism, religion, Empire, military glory—all in one word: Russia. Father, leader, hero, Savior—all in one word: Stalin. God—Stalin. The Devil—Hitler. . . . it is the patriotism of the deracinated.

All this was possible because the general softness of English life "made things like purges, secret police, summary execution . . . too remote to be terrifying." Orwell quotes from Auden's poem "Spain"—"*Today the deliberate increase in the chances of death/The conscious acceptance of guilt in the necessary murder*"—and comments: "Notice the phrase 'necessary murder.' It could only be written by a person to whom murder is at most a word." It was the armchair revolutionism in Auden that excited Orwell's contempt: "Mr. Auden's brand of immoralism is only possible if you are the kind of person who is always somewhere else when the trigger is pulled."

Orwell, of course, exaggerated. Though many English intellectuals in the 30's came to think of Hitler as the Devil, very few thought of Stalin as God. Orwell's admirers among the extreme anti-Communists, however, have argued on his authority that the *New Statesman* was—and is—little more than a Communist front. It would be hard to imagine a more complete misunderstanding. The *New Statesman*'s fellow-traveling was always of the "objective," never of the "subjective" kind. All the famous *New Statesman* writers and editors have been sophisticated metropolitan intellectuals, public-school men and graduates of Oxford or Cambridge sharing the liberal ambience of middle-class English society. Elsewhere—one thinks of Weimar Germany or postwar France—a journal of dissent might have been expected to attract social outsiders: an immigrant Jewish *intelligentsia*, a newly emancipated working class. Yet without exception the men who have run the *New Statesman* have come from middle-class Christian homes.

During the 30's, middle-class unemployment in England led—as in Weimar Germany—to a radicalization of the middle-class *intelligentsia* and the secession of this *intelligentsia* from the parent body of the older clerisy. It was to this group that the *New Statesman* appealed. Today, when there is no unemployment, the *New Statesman* makes its main appeal to the underdogs of the professional world—particularly schoolteachers, who are addicted to the paper in very high proportions—and to the spiritual heirs of the disaffected intelligentsia of the 30's.

The *New Statesman* was in effect "objectively" fellow-traveling from about 1935—when Stalin endorsed the new anti-fascist line of the Popular Front—until the middle 50's. In the first phase of this period, the paper was pro-Russian, and strongly anti-German; in the second, it was strongly anti-American, but only mildly pro-Russian. As the cold war progressed, the *New Statesman* drifted more and more into a neutralism which was finally to merge into the militant unilateralism of the later 50's. Under John Freeman, the journal has taken a somewhat more sober course; the anti-Americanism has almost disappeared, and the emotional commitment to unilateralism has been dropped.

But the fellow-traveling of those twenty years is perhaps only the most sensational manifestation of the journal's pseudo-Leftism (though Martin's refusal to publish Orwell's articles on Spain, which we know as *Homage to Catalonia*, will always be a black mark on his reputation as editor). The same mechanism has been at work in home politics. Since the war the *New Statesman* has given its support to left-wing factions within the Labor party—to Crossman's "Keep Left" group, to the Bevanites of the early 50's, and to the young unilateralist movement. On the face of it, of course, the *New Statesman* might seem to be the natural organ of the Labor Left, but the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

militant Labor Left has its own organ: the weekly *Tribune*. Whatever one may say of its views, the *Tribune* gives expression to a powerful faction within the Labor party whose thinking is in harmony with its actions. Orwell, interestingly, felt at home with the *Tribune* (he was its literary editor during the war), as he never could with the *New Statesman,* whose armchair revolutionism seemed to him a species of political humbug.

In the light of Orwell's critique—which is so interesting precisely because it is a critique from the Left—we can understand why, despite its high circulation, and aggressive, polemical style, the *New Statesman* has had very little *direct* political influence. For all their brillance, the *New Statesman's* editorials carry less political weight than those of the *Times,* the *Telegraph,* the *Observer,* or the *Spectator.* The reason is that the *New Statesman* lacks a well-defined base in society, whereas each of the other journals addresses and even speaks for a recognized interest or body of opinion. The *Telegraph's* audience, for example, is traditional-conservative; the *Spectator's* progressive-conservative; the *Observer's* lib-lab or radical-progressive. The *New Statesman's* audience cannot be characterized in similar terms, and therefore, while its editorials are widely read, they are not taken seriously—indeed, their very violence is an indication of their fundamental unseriousness. Between the homebred revolutionary radicalism that Orwell liked in the *Tribune* (though he might not have liked the hysterical neutralism and unilateralism to which it now gives voice), and the progressive reformism of the lib-lab papers, there is no middle ground.

MUCH OF what I have said is truer of the past than the present. The back half of the *New Statesman* has gained a new lease on life under Karl Miller, and is again one of the most serious and responsible literary and intellectual platforms in Britain. The front half has also changed since John Freeman took over, but not nearly so much as the back. Though, under Freeman, it has withdrawn from its involvement in inner party polemics and taken a comparatively realistic line on defense, the *New Statesman* has been disastrously wrong about Cuba (denying well into 1961 that Cuba had come under Communist control); it has been devious about unilateralism (arguing that Britain should give up her independent deterrent, not on moral but on financial grounds); and it has been as crudely anti-German over Berlin as it was once anti-American.

The fact that the *New Statesman* is still going in for such vagaries means that Mr. Freeman has no intention of changing the nature of the paper. He sees himself—and rightly, I think—as the expert administrator of a piece of real estate that is constantly appreciating in value, and he knows as well as anyone that this value resides in the personality created for it by Kingsley Martin thirty years ago. After a pause in the middle 50's, the *New Statesman's* circulation is again rising steeply. Spreading university education is creating in Britain and America, and still more in India and the underdeveloped world, a reserve army of what an Indian economist of my acquaintance unkindly calls "underdeveloped intellectuals." I see no reason why the *New Statesman* should not continue to gain a large share of this market. But to do this it must stick to the formula that Kingsley Martin devised for it. If that unique, exasperating tone were to vanish—if the front half of the journal were to begin echoing the intelligent, critical, sober tone of the reconstructed back half—the appeal of the *New Statesman* for the disaffected *intelligentsia* of the world would vanish too.

Ironically, however, that is exactly the situation the *New Statesman* may well find itself in before long. With the death of Hugh Gaitskell, the paper lost a true and valuable enemy (the animosity was entirely mutual); and with the accession of Harold Wilson to the leadership of the Labor party, it has gained a powerful and dangerous friend. John Freeman has been close to Wilson since they both resigned, along with Aneurin Bevan, from the Attlee Cabinet in 1951. If, as is not improbable, Labor should win the next General Election, Freeman might be asked to join a Wilson Cabinet. Thus, for the first time in its history, the *New Statesman* is very close to the seat of power and therefore to the threat of respectability. In a sense, this is what the paper has always dreamed of—this reconciliation of dissent and conformity, rebellion and respectability. But the realization of the dream would almost certainly undermine the paper's appeal, which depends on a strategy of permanent disaffection. The *New Statesman* has weathered many storms in its fifty-year history, but it is hard to imagine how it could survive the acquisition of political power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OSCAR GASS

SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev & After

In the current decade (1961-70) the Soviet Union . . . will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A., in production per head of population . . . [Later] by the end of the second decade *(1971-80) . . . Soviet society will come close to a stage where it can introduce the principle of distribution according to needs . . . The construction of Communist society will be fully completed in the subsequent period.*

—Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961.

Quantity and Qualities

Among Russian contributions to Western nightmares, the image of the innumerable Scythian horde has its place. So T. S. Eliot, in 1922:

Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked earth
Ringed by the flat horizon only

And perhaps even more revealing is Eliot's quotation, in elucidation of these lines, where the restraint of his own English gives way to the Romantic self-indulgence of another's German: *"Schon ist halb Europa, schon ist zumindest der halbe Osten Europas auf dem Wege zum Chaos, fährt betrunken im heiligen Wahn am Abgrund entlang und singt dazu, singt betrunken und hymnisch wie Dmitri Karamasoff sang. Ueber diese Lieder lacht der Bürger beleidigt, der Heilige und Seher hört sie mit Tränen."**

The Eurasian horde—however swarming and stumbling, drunken and deluded—happens not to be innumerable. Indeed, some time in the next twenty years, it may become less numerous than the people of the United States. The shift has been going on for five decades. In 1913 the population of the present territory of the USSR was about 159 million and of the U.S.A. 97 million—61 per cent. At the beginning of 1963, the respective populations were 223 million and 188 million—U.S.A. 84 per cent. If fertility persists unchanged in both countries, their 1980 populations will be about 278 million and 260 million—U.S.A. 94 per cent. Should there, however, be a modest decline in the fertility of Soviet women, as some demographers think likely,† the American population total might rise above the Russian around 1980. The trans-Atlantic horde would become more numerous than the horde of the endless Eurasian plains.

In this shift, Russian catastrophe was a major factor. In 1914 through 1923, Russia "lost"—including the deficit of births—some 30 million people. For the years of the consolidation of Stalin's power, 1927 to 1939, demographers find an unexplained "excess mortality" of about 5 million. But the catastrophe which imagination cannot contain was the experience of World War II. On January 1, 1959, there were 14½ million fewer children aged 8 to 17 in the USSR than there had been on the same territory twenty years earlier. Where the losses of life were some 30 million in 1914-23, they were about 50 million (including the birth deficit) in 1941 through 1945.

The losses of World War II are reflected in the huge majority of women and the shortage of urban labor. In January 1959 the USSR took census and recorded its population as 209 million. There were then 122 females to every 100 males. Everybody who planned to do some work, however marginal or part-time, seems to have been registered as gainfully occupied. A huge total was accordingly derived—109 million persons (52 per cent of the population, where the U.S. share with civilian or military "work experience" would be about 45 per cent). By the beginning of 1964 the total

This is the second in a series of three articles by OSCAR GASS dealing with the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union under the rule of Nikita Khrushchev and the further transformations that may reasonably be anticipated in the coming years. The first piece in this series (on Russian government) appeared in our November 1963 issue. Mr. Gass is a consulting economist in private practice in Washington, D.C., and a frequent contributor to these pages.

* Quotation in *The Waste Land* notes, lines 368-370, from Herman Hesse, *Blick ins Chaos*. "Already is half Europe, already is at least half of Eastern Europe on the road to chaos, rides drunk in holy delusion along the abyss and sings moreover, sings in drunken hymnal, as Dmitri Karamazov sang. At these songs the burgher laughs offended; the Saint and Seer hears them with tears."

† See James W. Brackett, *Demographic Trends . . .* in *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power,* Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, 1962. Brackett's is a solid, informative study.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian population will be about 225 million. The corresponding number of persons who do some work is likely to be in the range of 115 million.

Women carry the load of the world's work in the USSR far more than in the U.S.A. At the 1959 census, Russian women were 52 per cent of the gainfully occupied (U.S. then 36 per cent). Women were absent from only one category—the armed forces. The schools and hospitals of the USSR are staffed overwhelmingly by women, and farming is dominantly a woman's occupation. Young or old, unmarried or married or widowed, women are the agricultural workers; in 1959, women in agriculture outnumbered men three to two.

Industrialization and the related intensification of agriculture are usually pictured as emptying the rural farm areas of people. Not so in the USSR. Russian urban population outnumbered rural for the first time in 1962. In 1917 the rural population of Russia was 118 million and at the beginning of 1962 still 108 million. In between, it is true, Russia had annexed western territories which added about 16 million to her rural population (and 4 million to the urban). But the broad picture remains. The rural countryside is not depopulated. Russian farms remain crowded—though largely with underemployed women—women who are also, in substantial part, widowed or unmarried.

Labor Training and Job Assignment

Under full Communism, there will no doubt be free choice of education and employment—as of all other things. But the present transition to Communism bears quite another character. While the Party leads, the function of education is to train the labor force for tasks assigned by the State. Primary education (now eight years) is to produce trained and willing hands; secondary education (usually three years) for semi-specialists; advanced education (an additional four to six years or more) for high-grade specialists. How revealing it is that American speech has only the amorphous words "college graduates" and "holders of graduate degrees" where the Russians have the precise word *specialists!*

Russian education is not gropingly academic; it is decisively polytechnic. From the earliest school experience, the student is made aware of the importance of labor skills and of the critical significance to "the new Soviet man" of "fulfilling and over-fulfilling" his work quota. School is no idyl separate from work. Education is largely training for a specific job. For this reason, it is difficult, even at the secondary level, to compare a Russian school with an American one. Mr. Nicholas De Witt, perhaps our best authority on this matter, concludes that, at the secondary technical level:

> The overall Soviet program requirement . . . cannot be meaningfully compared with any counterpart in the United States because of the strong functional emphasis in Soviet training. Better American technical institutes . . . are much more diversified in content than Soviet technicums. The American schools combine under the same auspices several types of technician training programs which in the USSR would be offered separately in individual technicums.

In higher education, the government planner specifies his requirements in meticulous detail. The planner asks that the higher institutions supply him not a Geologist but a geologist code 0104 (a specialist in "exploration and training for exploitation of peat deposits"), not an Electrical Engineer but an electrical engineer code 0603 (a specialist in "electroinsulation and cable technics"). In 1961, there were 303 such code classes of higher-education *specialists*! It was these that higher education was to turn out—each in the planned number. So Moscow speaks, defining the role of higher education, in 1961:

> The plan of training and the plan of distribution of specialists are an organic part of the national economic plan . . . The indexes of plans for the training and distribution of specialists are unified and obligatory for all regional councils of the national economy, ministries and offices . . . The plans of training and distribution of specialists are as directed; that is, every plan gives the quota for councils of national economy, ministries, and offices having educational institutions of students admitted and of specialists graduated in accordance with the planning period . . .

No liberal arts nonsense. The Soviet State spends money for education. It wants value for money. And what it values are *specialists.*

AT EVERY level, the Russian graduate is unburdened of looking for a job. He is directed where to go. The elementary school graduate, however, is in principle free to quit after giving two weeks notice. The *kolkhoznik* remains frozen: he is not possessed of an internal passport and will not normally get one unless he is leaving to go to an officially-approved job.* Graduates of secondary, vocational, and college-level schools are not free to quit. They are obligated to stay where they are assigned, for three or four years. In September 1963, control over college graduates was tightened by providing that no diplomas would be issued on completion of academic studies but only after a further year of successful work experience in the assigned job.

Every person who works for a wage or salary

* See the poignant story of "Peter the Bulldozer," excused by being spoken under the influence of alcohol, in Chapter XII of Fyodor Abramov's *One Day in the "New Life."* This book is not much as a novel, but it is valuable as description of practice and sentiment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must possess both an internal passport and a workbook. Wages and hours of work are fixed by law Penalties for breaches of labor discipline—including withholdings of pay—remain the sole province of management. No worker or trade union may dispute them. Yet there can be no question that the severity of labor discipline is greatly relaxed from Stalin's day. Since January 1957, workers may dispute with management, and eventually appeal to a court, on a variety of important issues, such as demotions, wage classifications, dismissals, sick leave, and severance pay. Moreover, in 1958-60, a 41-hour week was gradually introduced throughout wage employment. A 35-hour or 36-hour week is promised. It is not impossible that the USSR leadership may decide, during the present decade, to lead all industrialized countries in establishing the shortest general urban work week. The domestic and world-wide appeal of such an achievement might be valued above its cost.

Living Standards, Promises and Prospects

Consumption is measured, in the USSR, to include both things bought by individuals and government-financed "communal services" (educational, medical, and many other). The government-financed share accounts for about 15 per cent of the Russian total. Khrushchev has announced that by 1980, when ". . . a Communist society will in the main be built in the USSR," the government-financed share of consumption will be about 50 per cent.

To achieve greater comparability, I add to the usual U.S.A. measure of "personal consumption [illegible] billion of American government spending for education and health. Then the present annual level of American consumption, on a basis more comparable with the Russian, is in the neighborhood of $410 billion. For a U.S. population of about 191 million, per capita consumption is substantially over $2100, in the prices now prevailing. In the same prices, U.S. per capita consumption in 1929 would be over $1,200, in 1913 well over $800.

In relation to American experience, the USSR lives simultaneously in three worlds. In the first world, some 75 per cent of consumption (food, clothing, housing, utilities) continues below the standard of the United States 50 years ago.* In the second, the characteristic contemporary consumer durables—nonexistent also in the United States fifty years ago—are indeed present, but in very small quantities. In the third, education and health services are supplied to an extent which permits argument about their equality with United States levels today. Faced with these three worlds, one is tempted to retreat into the sane skepticism expressed long ago by J. M. Keynes, when he said that the results achieved by statisticians, in comparing economies remote in time or space, have the same order of precision as the judgment of a little girl who, having assiduously studied both Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth, concluded: "Queen Victoria was more virtuous, but Queen Elizabeth was more happy."

Still, we may add something to our understanding if we compare directly first not the USSR and the U.S.A. but the USSR and Norway.† There are striking similarities. Norway has, since 1950, been investing about 30 per cent of her gross national product in fixed capital. (This is probably a larger share than the USSR.) Norwegian personal consumption expenditures in 1962 amounted to only $840 per capita (at exchange-rate values and 1962 prices). Adjustment to add in public spending on health and education would bring total consumption only into the range of $900 per capita. Yet, with $900 per capita, Norwegian standards seem higher, in every branch of consumption except education, than those of the USSR. In regard to food, clothing, and utilities, the Norwegian edge is clear. In housing, it is drastic: Norway reported a room for each person already in 1950, while the USSR still has 2½ persons per room. Per thousand of population, Norway has about fifteen times as many telephones, half again as many radios, and one passenger automobile for each three families—where the USSR has practically none. In health services, the issue is less clear; Norway has a distinctly lower doctor ratio, but infant mortality is below 19 per thousand to the USSR's 35. In higher education the USSR has a decided edge—not perhaps qualitatively but quantitatively.

All in all, it would seem difficult to value the present USSR standard of consumption as high as the one Norwegians were able to secure in 1962 for a per capita expenditure of about $900. Perhaps indeed, so long as one does not take such a figure too seriously, one might set an upper limit for the present per capita value of Soviet consumption somewhere around $850 per annum. A reasonable lower limit might be $650 per annum. The $200 gap does not exaggerate the problem of measurement and uncertainty.

EVEN THE present modest Russian standard of living has only been achieved quite recently. In 1928, Soviet per capita consumption was about $160, in U.S. prices of 1929.** (This would mean

* See the rich chapter of Janet J. Chapman in *Economic Trends in the Soviet Union*, edited by Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets, 1963, and also her own basic volume, *Real Wages in the Soviet Union*, 1963.

† For a well-organized sketch of the Norwegian economy, see the OECD pamphlet on *Norway*, issued in July 1963.

** For this and related information, see the fundamental study of Abram Bergson, *Real National Income of Soviet Russia*, 1961. In some measurements, especially those relating to defense, I think this study too confident, but it is always helpful.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perhaps $275 to $300 in our present prices.) The relationship of this 1928 consumption level to supply at the Czarist peak, in 1913, is disputed. Some students believe the two levels were about equal; others are of the opinion that 1928 was perhaps 10 per cent above 1913. What is clear is that the relatively small Russian urban population (26 million in December 1926) was far better off than the greatly larger (147 million) rural population. The average urban household had a consumption level in 1928 about 1.7 times the rural.

The first Five Year Plan knocked the urban worker from his perch, and the second hardly raised him above the peasant. At the low point, in 1932, real urban wages may well have been below half the level of 1928. Janet Chapman estimates that, even in 1937, when there had been great improvement, real wages (valued in 1937 prices) were only 58 per cent of the wages of 1928. Abram Bergson argues that, in 1937, the average urban factory worker received only about the same real income, per man-year of labor, as did the collective farmer. ("Primitive capital accumulation" in the USSR came out of the hide of the urban worker as surely as from the peasant!) War destruction again pushed real urban wages down to the level of 1932—or perhaps lower. Even for 1948 Janet Chapman estimates real wages at only about 45 per cent of 1928! But by 1960 the real wage level of 1928 had apparently been regained—and the urban population of 1960 was 80 million larger than in 1928.

Consumption rose faster than real urban wage rates. A population heavily rural in 1928—and with the representative rural household consuming about 60 per cent as much as an urban one—gradually shifted its weight to the urban side. Wages being so low, more people—particularly more wives with children—had to work. "Labor force participation" increased from about 54 per cent of all people age sixteen and over in 1928 to about 67 per cent in 1937; in the 1950 shortage of husbands, it even approached 70 per cent. Per family or per capita consumption consequently rose much faster than per worker. The following is the rough outline, where Abram Bergson's laborious computations for 1928-55 are joined with my own improvised guess for the present position.

REAL CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA IN THE USSR
(computed on 1937 adjusted prices)

1928	1937	1950	1955	Opening 1964
100	110	130	175	240-260

Promises and Prospects

The Khrushchev leadership has now promised, with utmost formality, that the USSR will achieve a drastic transformation in its relative economic position, in part by 1970 and sweepingly by 1980.

> The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] will concentrate its efforts on ensuring a rapid increase in the output of *consumer goods*. The growing resources of industry must be used more and more . . . to build and equip enterprises and establishments catering to the household and cultural needs of the population . . . The C.P.S.U. sets the historically important task of *achieving in the Soviet Union a living standard higher than that of any of the capitalist countries*.

This higher standard is to come partly in greater real wages but more in services which the consumer will not buy: ". . . as the country advances toward Communism, personal needs will be increasingly met out of public consumption funds, whose rate of growth will exceed the rate of growth of payments for labor." The utopian rejection of money is made an instrument of authoritarian control. The worker will not get a full money wage and the ability to influence supply through monetary demand. And, of course, there is no significant "free appropriation": the free appropriation of goods and services, in accordance with one's own conceptions of need, is the ultimate utopian fantasy. Instead the State will retain a steadily increasing share of what could be paid out as wages. The State will use this share to produce what it thinks best. And the produce will be allocated—without monetary payment. When half of all consumption is allocated by the State, a Communist society has "in the main been built." When the whole cash wage is withheld, we have arrived at full Communism. Then the worker gets—without any payment—whatever the State chooses to give him.

Authoritarian distribution is gilded with the attractions of equality:

> As the living standard of the entire population rises, low income levels will approach the higher, and the disparity between the incomes of peasants and workers, low-paid and high-paid personnel . . . will gradually shrink . . . . The real income per head of population will increase by more than 250 per cent in twenty years. In the first decade already the real incomes of all factory, professional and office workers . . . will, on the average, be almost doubled, and the incomes of the low-paid brackets of factory and office workers will increase approximately 3-fold . . . . By virtue of higher rates of growth of the labor productivity of collective farmers, their real incomes will . . . , on an average per employed person, more than double in the next ten years and increase more than fourfold in twenty years.

Let us see what this means. The "twenty years" in question are the years 1960 to 1980. The key promise is that Russian "real income" per capita

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will increase by "more than 250 per cent." The words "real income" are clearly intended to mean per capita consumption—both of purchased and communal goods. But Soviet per capita consumption *in 1960* cannot have been evaluated greatly above $600. An increase by 250 per cent would then be an increase to something like $2100 per capita. This was approximately the American level at the beginning of 1963!

NOTHING IN our knowledge permits us to conclude that it is quite impossible that the Soviet Union will achieve the promised "more than 250 per cent" improvement in per capita consumption during 1960 to 1980. And nothing in our knowledge justifies us in concluding that this promised achievement is at all likely. A per capita increase by over 250 per cent in twenty years is an increase at a compound annual rate of over 6.4 per cent. Only once has the USSR achieved something approaching such an advance, for a sustained period. That was in the decade 1948-58, when—due to war destruction—the starting (1948) real urban wage was under half that of twenty years earlier (1928). When this decade of rapid advance was over, the urban real wage was still below what it had been in 1928! In the period 1958-61, the Russian rate of advance seems to have slowed to, very roughly, two-thirds of the rate sustained in the decade preceding. In the twelve years 1928-40, the USSR achieved an increase in consumption *per worker*—urban and rural together—under 0.5 per cent per annum (according to Abram Bergson's measurements). Soviet families cannot now look for an improvement in their consumption through having still more members of the family go to work: that means is already utilized. For the year 1962, the USSR reported to the UN an increase in "real per capita income" of 3 per cent.* An even smaller increase may have been achieved in 1963. At the rate of 1962, per capita real income would increase by about 80 per cent in twenty years, not 250 per cent. Moreover, the Party Program promises a reduction in weekly hours of about 15 per cent by 1970. Under these circumstances, nothing in our experience suggests that it is at all likely that the USSR will achieve an increase in per capita consumption of over 6.4 per cent per annum for the twenty year period 1960 to 1980.

CONJECTURAL MOVEMENT OF USSR AND U.S.A. CONSUMPTION
(per capita, in prices of beginning of 1964)

Time of reference	USSR consumption	U.S.A. consumption
1913	$250 to $300	over $800
1928	$275 to $300	over $1200†
1950	$350 to $400	about $1700
Beginning 1964	$650 to $850	over $2100
Toward 1980	perhaps $1500	perhaps $2800

The preceding table provides a foolhardy sketch of how I think Soviet consumption might rise by 1980. It is *not* a forecast. The USSR value of $1500 "toward 1980" is, in my judgment, maximal. The corresponding U.S.A. value of $2800 is merely the arithmetical consequence of assuming continuance, during the next sixteen years, of the indifferent rate of improvement that prevailed in the previous sixteen; it could be made better. In this image, the USSR toward 1980 stands well below the U.S.A. in 1950. But where the gap today may be expressed, with great crudity, as about fifty years, it would then be within arguing distance of thirty years.

The facts are too gross to be blinked. Strain our eyes forward to the limit, we cannot see the shape of a time when the USSR will be first in the world in the standard of living of its consumers.

Agriculture: A Lagging Sector

In the Party Program of 1961, agriculture occupies a position crucial to all else:

> . . . the task is to increase the *aggregate volume of agricultural production* in 10 years by about 150 per cent and in 20 years by 250 per cent . . . . In the first decade the Soviet Union will outstrip the United States in output of the key agricultural products per head of population . . . . Productivity of labor in agriculture will rise not less than 150 per cent in ten years, and five to sixfold in twenty years.

All this breathes the enthusiasms of 1958. That was the year of bountiful weather, when the USSR harvested the greatest crop of its history, and all Molotovs and mockers stood refuted. High targets were set—a 70 per cent increase in farm output in the Seven Year Plan 1959-65, a 150 per cent increase in the decade 1961-70, and more later. Why not? A 150 per cent increase would leave the U.S.A. behind. But why not bury the capitalist world doubly, beneath a deluge of food? Who would have said that 1965 might come without *any* increase in USSR farm output beyond the level of 1958? And yet, at the beginning of 1964, just that seems not unlikely.

No great volume of labor was scheduled to be withdrawn from agriculture in the decade 1961-70. Output was to rise "about 150 per cent" and labor productivity "not less than" 150 per cent: the farms were to keep their workers. Only in the second decade would urban employments draw heavily from agriculture. Then the agricultural labor force was to be reduced by 40 to 50 per cent.

If it were so, it would indeed be high time.

* United Nations, *World Economic Survey 1962*, Vol. II, *Current Economic Developments*, 1963.

† 1929.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Actual USSR average monthly farm employment is computed* as 38.2 million in 1959. Comparable U. S. farm employment totaled 5.8 million in 1959 and it is now about 5.0 million. We may think of the actually working USSR farm labor force as perhaps six or seven times the size of the farm labor force of the U.S.A.

In the bumper year 1958, this enormous Soviet labor force produced something like 10 per cent of world agricultural output. The U.S.A. produced about 16 per cent.† At U.S. compensations of 1958, the American farm output was valued at $37.7 billion. Some $14.7 billion of intermediate products were used up in producing this output. That left under $4,000 of gross product per American employed in agriculture. In the Soviet farm structure, intermediate product costs are far less weighty. Still it was a very small contribution to the Soviet economy that was made, even in the bumper year 1958, by the 38 million person USSR farm labor force.

In the past decade, agricultural output in the USSR has developed somewhat as follows:

USSR Agricultural Output

Year	Total Output	Per Capita Output
1953/55	100	100
1958/59	142	131
1960/61	135	121
1961/62	138	122
1962/63	141	123
1963/64 estimate	135	116

The purpose of the above table is to illumine the probability of an increase by 150 per cent in USSR agricultural output in 1961-70. As 1964 opens, no part of that increase has yet been achieved. No year of the past five has reached the level of 1958. An increase of 150 per cent in a decade requires a gain of some 9½ per cent annually. For the years 1960 and 1961 and 1962, the USSR reported to the UN increases in "gross agricultural output" of 2.3 per cent, 3.0 per cent, and 1.3 per cent. With such increases, the USSR might again come to a gain of 30 to 35 per cent in a decade. But these increments bear no affirmative relation to the target of a 150 per cent increase in agricultural output in one decade, 250 per cent in two.

It is a great error to believe that the USSR has relied only on dictation, coercion, and propagandist "storming" to achieve its plan of agricultural expansion. On the contrary, the forces of the market have been utilized vigorously. By 1963, the USSR was offering prices, in official procurement, which would have delighted the hearts of American farmers.** At an exchange rate of $1.11 per ruble, the government of the USSR paid lower than U.S. farm prices in 1963 for only one important product—sugarbeets. The Soviet government paid approximately 25 per cent higher than U.S. farm prices for wheat; 35 per cent higher for barley; 35 per cent higher for corn; 50 per cent higher for cotton; from 50 to over 100 per cent higher for milk; double for cattle; triple for hogs; triple for wool; nearly triple for eggs. And these were official procurement prices. The prices received on the free market, for the produce of private plots, were greatly higher. Our information is meager. Yet it is not clear that the farm population of the USSR uniformly came off badly in this year when the Soviet government went abroad to buy some ten million metric tons of grain.

Social and Natural Uncertainties

The USSR has many urban employments in which the value of output is to be appraised at $4,000 per worker, in our prices. But in agriculture the USSR has not been able to sustain an output worth $1,000 per worker, in our prices. In the years 1959-63, the USSR would have been greatly more prosperous if she had bought a large part of her agricultural products with expanded production and export of diversified manufactures, rather than producing these same agricultural commodities with her own labor.

The gravity of the uncertainties affecting the future of agriculture in the USSR is, I think, commonly underweighted, through thoughtlessness or partisan advocacy or animosity. Three propositions seem controlling. First, the shortcomings of recent accomplishment are not to be explained by a neglectful attitude toward farm investment. Second, perhaps even the unsatisfactory social organization of Russian farming—measured by failure to elicit effort and care—will not prove, in the long run, to be the most serious limiting factor. Third, in time it may emerge that nature—acting through climate and water supply—has set the severest limits on what can be accomplished economically in Russian agriculture, within the framework of agronomies and cost relationships known in 1964.

Even strong minds in the West have been beguiled by the tale that the poverty of Russian agriculture is due to neglect of investment on farms. This is error. The USSR has been placing a greatly larger share of its investments on farms than the U.S.A. has done in the 20th century. At

* U.S. Census computations designed for comparability with U.S.A.

† These are American estimates. A Russian authority, V. Starovskii, estimated Russian gross farm output *in 1959* at 77 to 80 per cent of American. But 1959 was already a year of badly inflated Russian farm output data—some believe inflated in the order of 10 to 15 per cent.

** Prices given in *Soviet Agriculture Today*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, December 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the beginning of 1960, Soviet investment on farms, apart from housing, amounted to about 42 billion heavy rubles, some 14 per cent of the total national capital of reproducible fixed facilities and livestock; the U.S. farm share was about 6 per cent. In 1952-58, the USSR placed about 25 billion rubles, some 21 per cent of its total national investment, in the production capital of farms; the U.S. is now placing about 5 per cent. For the Seven Year Plan 1959-65, the USSR again projected about a 21 per cent share for farms. This was to be 49.5 billion rubles. At exchange rate values, this is roughly $55 billion—perhaps nine-tenths of the total present capital valuation of all reproducible production facilities and livestock on American farms! One may suspect the ruble is overvalued at $1.11, in agricultural investment. (Construction and livestock may be expensive, though machinery is cheap.) One may doubt that the 49.5 billion ruble plan will be achieved. Yet the magnitude of USSR investment effort on farms remains impressive.

Reported shortages of farm machinery are not therefore to be denied. They are rather to be understood in the perspective of deficiencies below target "norms" pervasive throughout the Soviet economy. Estimates exist of how inadequate the present USSR stock of farm machinery is to perform required work *at the best times*. Apparently, by now, the USSR has the necessary tractor-drawn plows and perhaps four-fifths the grain combines, but barely three-fifths the tractors and trucks. In this, however, agriculture is not unique.

Where agriculture suffers comparatively greater neglect is in production supplies originating in industry and in utilities. The USSR now (1962) sows about 534 million acres to the U.S.A.'s 300 million. But USSR farming then got only about one-third the U.S.A. quantity of fertilizers. Insecticides and weed killers are apparently so scarce they are not even adequately applied in seed preparation. Russian farms get less than a third the electric power of American farms. They have miserable roads.

But inadequacies in industrial supply to farms are not unrecognized. After the crop failures of 1963, Khrushchev seems even to have begun to worship the god of chemicals and the god's children—fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides. From 15 million tons in 1962, fertilizer production should be raised to 80 million tons—no, to 100 million tons!—by 1970. Fertilizer would then suffice to apply twice or three times the quantity used in the United States. Where this god of fertilizers is faithfully served, Khrushchev promises, bad crop years like 1963 will not come again. Withering drought and killing frost and burning sun will shrink away!

Less measurable deficiencies—in society rather than in supply—may prove more permanently constricting. The USSR may even now be stumbling into substituting the untried worse for the not-entirely-satisfactory better. For example, today the farm family on the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) or *sovkhoz* (state farm) is usually entitled, on condition of performing its work quota in the socialized sector, to a family plot, representatively under three-quarters of an acre. Industrial workers get up to three-eighths of an acre. Naturally, these tiny areas are intensively cultivated. On some 3.3 per cent of the land, private farming produces something like 30 per cent of USSR farm output.* In 1961, the private sector produced 46 per cent of all meat, 45 per cent of all milk, 78 per cent of all eggs, 64 per cent of all vegetables, and two-thirds of all fruit. Where large land areas are essential, socialized agriculture dominates; where care and attention are decisive, the private sector comes to the fore. Yet the very survival of private agriculture is commonly regarded as more than a little shameful by simple-minded Communists. Private farming has lived in the shade of the *kolkhoz*. Now that shade may be withdrawn.

Thirty-five years after the beginning of forced collectivization, there is no longer any reason to regard the failure of the Russian *kolkhoz* as anything less than definitive. Its peasant members of the first generation hated it. Its members of the second generation do not like it: they would gladly abandon it for wage employment on the *sovkhoz*—if they could also preserve their private plots! For the government of the USSR, too, the *kolkhoz* today seems to have become only a second-class *sovkhoz*. Particularly since November 1962, State and Party organization denies the *kolkhoz* any autonomy. Khrushchev personally stigmatized it an abuse that the members of some *kolkhozi* have been allowed to earn more than *sovkhoz* workers. The *kolkhoznik* has been restricted to playing the game, "Heads I lose; tails you win."

The USSR is moving toward an agriculture based straightforwardly on wage labor. The *sovkhoz* is the dominant instrument. The *kolkhoz* imitates and approximates. In 1961 already, the *sovkhozi* employed 6½ million workers and sowed 216 million acres. The *sovkhoz* is a giant farm, averaging 800 workers and 24,000 sown acres. *Sovkhoz* managements are reportedly impatient of private plots for their workers. Let them work harder for the company and less for themselves! Politically, the *sovkhoz* is surely a satisfactory embodiment of authoritarian Communism. But, as an agricultural system, the *sovkhoz* cannot be said to have been tested adequately by five years of upsurge (1954-58) followed by five years of

* See the excellent summation of the facts by A. N. Sakoff in the Food and Agriculture Organization's *Monthly Bulletin*, September 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stagnation (1959-63). Socially and economically, the *sovkhoz* is unproven.

KHRUSHCHEV now says, "Give me the chemicals, and I will give you an agricultural output equal to the American—and greater." The American farm spokesmen say to the USSR, "Establish family farms, and these will give you an agricultural output sufficient—as ours is." Both tacitly assume the USSR is the U.S.A.—only bigger. They are mistaken.

It is not at all clear that the USSR can, by any economical means, become a country of agricultural surpluses and exports, under advanced industrialization. The experience of Holy Russia is nothing to the point. Certainly the USSR cannot become a country of agricultural abundance by copying the U.S.A. Khrushchev tried the copying. In 1962, he achieved USSR planting of 91.5 million acres of corn—a much larger area than the U.S.A. has planted in corn since World War II. But in 1962 the U.S.A. harvested 3,644 million bushels of corn grain, while the USSR harvested disaster—about 450 million bushels of grain and the rest a mess of silage and green fodder. The corn would not ripen. The USSR is too cold—not just in 1962 but generally.

The USSR is a northern, cold country. Its southland Crimea is as far south as Minneapolis. In the north and west, where there is water, there is little sun. In the south and east, where there is warm sun, there is little water. Those Asian provinces which may be mistaken for southland have bitterly cold winters and a short growing season. Akmolinsk in Kazakhstan has an average growing season of only 129 days. Even Kharkov, in the Ukraine, has a frost-free growing season of only 151 days. Almost everywhere, farm work must be compressed into a few months. The areas to the south and east are particularly prone to dangerous May-June drought. All the "virgin and disused" lands have rainfall of great irregularity, averaging under 16 inches.

The USSR gets yields of grain, per acre, about half those of the U.S.A. But Professor D. Gale Johnson has shown that these USSR yields are equal to those of the U.S.A. *for areas of comparable climate* (parts of the Dakotas, Wyoming, Montana, and Nebraska). These are areas where U.S. agriculture has also achieved no increase in grain yields, at least since the 1920's. Three decades ago, C. F. Marbut concluded:

> Russia has nothing corresponding to three of the most productive regions of the United States—the Mid-Latitude Region [south of the Great Lakes region], the Corn Belt, and the Cotton Belt, all of which have been of tremendous importance in the production of the agricultural wealth of the United States.

To achieve agricultural abundance, the USSR must carve out a new agronomic path, quite distinct from that of the U.S.A.

In general, economic studies do not yield understanding of great value in scheduling macroscopic economic changes, extending over decades and involving increases of 150 per cent or 250 per cent. No reasonable man—whether steeped in economic studies or contentedly ignorant of them—would repose any great confidence in a judgment regarding when, if ever, the USSR will achieve that 250 per cent increase in agricultural output which the Party Program of 1961 apparently regards as indispensable to attaining the 1980 threshold of Communism.

Energy Industries: A Leading Sector

Priority for energy development is a central tenet of Soviet policy. In 1952-58, nearly 21 billion new rubles are officially reported to have been invested in the energy industries. In 1959-65, energy is to get 38 billion rubles—some 34 per cent of all industrial investment. The Party Program of 1961 announces:

> Electrification . . . is the pivot of the economic construction of Communist society . . . [and again] . . . the Party is guided by Lenin's great formula: *'Communism is Soviet Power plus the electrification of the whole country.'*

One may demur. For libertarian Communisms, with their principles of freedom from coercion and free appropriation, electrification would be only another piece of machinery. But in the authoritarian Communism that emerged from the Russian revolution, the worship of some piece of machinery became a needed refuge. The god must come out of the machine; he certainly had not come from Bolshevist political action! Electrification then became a cherished symbol for the transition from the human past (continuing as mere present) to the utopian future (beyond human scarcity and conflict). When electrification was *complete,* the future would be present.

The Party Program of 1961 placed the decisive moment high: "The annual output of electricity must be brought up to about 900,000-1,000,000 million kwh by the end of the first decade [1970], and to 2,700,000-3,000,000 million kwh by the end of the second decade." The American competition promptly played up. In January 1962, the Federal Power Commission issued a new electricity forecast (its fourth and highest in four years) indicating that American consumption in 1980 would be "nearly 3 trillion kwh." The implicit 1961-80 investment in American electric power (including generation and transmission, but not distribution) is in the general area of $90 billion. The Russian program is physically about a third larger.*

* See the valuable report, *Recent Electric Power Development in the USSR,* U.S. Department of the Interior, 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ELECTRICITY: ACTUAL AND OFFICIALLY FORECAST, USSR AND U.S.A.

	Installed Capacity (millions of KW)	Supply Total (billions of kwh)	Supply per Capita (kwh)
USSR			
1961 actual	74	310	1,420
1970 forecast	200	900-1000	3,900
1980 forecast	600	2700-3000	10,300
U.S.A.			
1961 actual	198	879	4,780
1970 forecast	351	1,670	7,800
1980 forecast	597	2,994	11,500

The above table—and especially the USSR entries for 1970—must, however, immediately give pause. The key economic assertion of the Party Program of 1961 is: *"In the current decade* (1961-70) the Soviet Union . . . will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A., in production per head of population . . . ." How is this possible? There is no major area of production—unless it be weapons—to which the USSR gives higher priority than to electric power. Yet the USSR does not even propose *for 1970* to equal the per capita employment of electric power that the U.S.A. had achieved already—and which every newspaper reader could know the U.S.A. had achieved already—in 1961, when the Party Program was published. It is therefore quite impossible that the slogan of surpassing the United States, by 1970, in per capita production, could have been believed, by any qualified person, when it was first enunciated. Nevertheless Khrushchev was still repeating this slogan vociferously in November 1963. With what disrespect the Russian Communists treat their own people and their own Party Program!

Soviet progress in electric power installations and output continues to be impressive. In the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, Russian output was about 370 billion kwh (net), while American was 971 billion kwh (net). There is nothing in this experience incompatible with the USSR achieving an output of electricity in 1970 somewhere in the range of 55 to 65 per cent of the U.S.A. But there is also nothing in it that bears an affirmative relation to surpassing the United States in per capita production by the 1970 target date.

Coal, Natural Gas, and Petroleum

Coal mining is the least advanced of Soviet energy industries. In 1961, the official "production cost" of the average metric ton of Standard Coal* in the USSR was equivalent to about $12.40; the corresponding U.S. mine-head value was about $4.85. Yet the USSR plans to expand coal mining greatly, while relocating it to the east and substituting open-pit and hydraulic extraction extensively for underground shafts. Where output was equivalent to 373 million metric tons of Standard Coal in 1961, it is to be 928 million in 1980.

For 1962, output per man-month in Soviet coal mining was officially reported as 45.6 metric tons of fuel—bituminous, anthracite, and lignite, as occurring. For 1980, productivity is planned to reach 140 metric tons. But United States coal mining output is *now* about 300 metric tons per man-month of 21 working days. USSR productivity is now not so much as a sixth of the American, and even for 1980 the Russian miner's output is not planned to be so much as half the American's at present. (Moreover, the USSR plans that some 500 million tons of her coal in 1980, of a total of 1,200 million, will be the low heating value lignite.) How then is the Soviet Union to pay the highest real wage?

Despite large proclamations, coal output has grown only about one per cent per year during the present Seven Year Plan. In the Soviet economy, certain sectors—agriculture, consumers' industries, housing—have traditionally been the ones where the impact of underperformance is concentrated. An over-scheduling of potential—a shortage of labor, of materials, of management skills, etc.—must work itself out in deficits in some places. These have been the chosen places. Even in a priority sector, like energy, there may be subdivisions where failures are allowed to pile up. For the present Seven Year Plan (1959-65), perhaps also for later time, coal mining seems to have been designated a dumping ground of failures.

The greater emphasis being placed on oil and gas is indicated by the investment Plan.

USSR INVESTMENT IN ENERGY INDUSTRIES, 1952-65 (in billions of new rubles)

	Officially reported actual investment 1952-58	Planned investment 1959-65
Coal	6.1	7.8
Electric power stations	7.5	12.9
Oil and gas	7.2	17.3
Total	20.8	38.0

NATURAL GAS may well be the fuel through which the Soviet authorities hope to compensate for their underperformance in coal—by 1980. Natural gas "production cost" is officially reported under 50¢ for the thermal equivalent of a metric ton of Standard Coal. Even if we adjust Russian accounting to our own (adding in geophysical and exploratory costs and a return on capital), this cost

* Standard Coal: 7,000 kilocalories or 27,780,000 btu per metric ton.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is unlikely to pass $1.50. This is a differential to conjure with, in relation to coal at $12.40.

Shortage of natural gas (or of oil) in the ground will not hold up Russian development. The American oil industry, speaking through its National Petroleum Council, has stated*:

> Considering that the favorable [oil and gas] area for the USSR is considerably greater than that of the U.S. . . . , petroleum production levels in the USSR will not be limited by geological factors for many years. [And with respect to the official 1980 goals] . . . such goals appear consistent with the announced plans for prospecting and drilling and are not unreasonable in view of the probable oil reserves of the USSR.

Transportation will be the limiting factor for Soviet use of natural gas. Transportation means capital. Russian accounting (for instance on the Stavropol-Moscow 32-inch line) would suggest a cost under $3.00 for a movement of 2000 miles of a quantity of gas equal in thermal value to a metric ton of Standard Coal. Gas would then arrive cheaper than coal over an enormous area. But to attain this cheapness, one must first invest great amounts of capital in pipelines.

Russian natural gas production in 1962 of about 2.65 trillion cubic feet (U.S. 13.88 trillion) is now less than that of the U.S. two decades ago. Nevertheless, the Russian natural gas production target for 1970 is about 80 per cent of U.S. production in 1962, and for 1980 it is even some 75 per cent more than U.S. production in 1962! Moving these quantities of gas would require huge pipeline investments. Between 1942 and 1962, the U.S. built more than 100,000 miles of interstate gas pipelines (20 inch to 36 inch) at a cost of about $9 billion. By a strange coincidence, the USSR does plan to lay just some 100,000 miles of gas transmission lines in 1961-80, and one third in diameters much larger than the U.S.A.—40 inch, 48 inch, and 56 inch! From analogy with the Gazli-Sverdlovsk line, scheduled to be completed in 1965 at a cost of over 500 million new rubles, the Russian gas transmission program for 1961-80 might be guessed to cost something in the range of $15 billion to $20 billion.

No doubt, the USSR can achieve such a natural gas program. No doubt, it can also make satisfactory big pipe and big compressors—though it has not yet done so. The problem is not qualitative. A great country can, in time, accomplish any limited technical goal to which it gives sufficient priority. The problem is quantitative. Can the natural gas program be accomplished *together* with all the other things planned to be done? That is still quite unproven.

PETROLEUM is a favored child in the present Seven Year Plan. Crude production is to be doubled; refining capacity is to be doubled; oil pipeline length is to be tripled. Further, after the attempted U.S. economic blockade of Cuba, something was added: self-sufficiency is to be achieved in tankers. In this seven years, oil gets three-quarters of the investment in oil and gas. Oil investment comes to over $2 billion a year.

A dollar invested in Russian crude production yields far more oil today than a dollar invested in the same activity in the United States (though not more than in the Middle East). By Soviet accounting, which omits all the costs of finding the oil and all return to invested capital, the "production cost" of crude oil in the USSR now averages 50¢ per barrel; moreover, the cost is declining. By Western accounting, Russian crude oil would cost substantially more. Nevertheless, we may calculate from the physical facts that, in comparison with the U.S.A., crude oil is cheaply won in the USSR.

In refining, the shoe is on the other foot. No one in the U.S. oil industry is quite able to understand how the USSR can spend so much on refineries and get so little. Refining capacity is to be increased from 2,400,000 barrels per day in 1958 to 5,000,000 in 1965. (U.S.A. 1963 capacity 10,100,000.) The USSR has budgeted 3.6 billion rubles, roughly $4 billion, for this expansion. But the USSR builds refineries that are relatively primitive in equipment and product range, such as have been constructed recently in Western Europe at costs not over $600 per barrel of daily throughput capacity. For new refineries of this character, the USSR has budgeted about $1,750 per barrel! Apparently, even within a leading sector, there are still large areas of backwardness in Russian industry.

Petroleum transportation is another such area. In 1958, some 68 per cent of all Soviet oil still moved by rail. There were only 8,900 miles of petroleum pipelines. (U.S. had 95,000 miles trunk lines plus 50,000 gathering.) By 1965, the USSR proposes to have built another 19,700 miles of oil lines, including several very large ones. The showpiece is the great Comecon line of some 3300 miles, the largest in the world, running from the rich Volga-Ural oil fields to the Baltic and to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Both its total network and its initial 40-inch section, taking off some 740,000 barrels per day, will be a spectacular First for the Communist world. It means more than shooting for the moon.

Given friendly export markets, the USSR may well surpass the U.S.A. in crude oil production after perhaps another ten years. The table below indicates the substantial—but not pre-eminent—growth the USSR has already achieved.

* *Impact Of Oil Exports from the Soviet Bloc*, 2 volumes, 1962. This is a partisan brief but carefully done and richly informative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, 1949-63
(in thousands of barrels per day)

	1949	September 1963
USSR	660	4,200
Other Communist	130	400
U.S.A.	5,040	7,510*
Middle East	1,440	6,880
Other	2,040	7,310
Total	9,310	26,300

By the standards of the great world oil trade, the USSR is not yet an exporter of the first rank. In 1962, her net exports were less than 850,000 barrels per day, of which less than 495,000 went to countries outside the Communist bloc. USSR exports to all non-Communist countries were less than one-fourth of the imports of the U.S.A. alone. In its most saturated non-Communist market, Western Europe, the USSR accounted for only 8 per cent of net imports. In Japan, the USSR accounted for only 6 per cent. Four countries—Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran—together exported *seven* times as great a quantity of oil as the USSR exported to all countries, Communist and non-Communist.

PROBE AS one may, it is not possible to find even one major division of this leading sector—the energy industries of the USSR—which seems likely to meet the standard of the Party Program of 1961: to surpass the U.S.A. in per capita production by 1970. In later times, some individual surpassings are not unlikely, for example in petroleum, where U.S. supply already includes 20 per cent of imports. Every man of good will must hope for such surpassings in some products. The USSR is so far behind in its lagging sectors.

Trade and Economic Warfare

Whoever studies, for the first time, the commodities that make up present Soviet exports to the industrial West (now approaching a total value of $1¼ billion annually) is in danger of reaching two quick conclusions: first, he has happened, by mistake, on the exports of the Russia of the Czars; second, the Russian economic planners are insane. The first conclusion is easily found to be in error. The second lingers.

The exports of the USSR to the industrial West are almost entirely raw materials, fuels, foods, and semi-manufactures (such as cotton fibres). Fuels are about 25 per cent; forest products 16 per cent; foods (principally grain) 14 per cent; ores and metals also 14 per cent; then come textile materials, furs, and lesser products. Some of the metal specifications would have been unfamiliar in the days of the Czar; otherwise these exports could have been sold by Holy Russia. And, in exchange, the USSR purchases from the West: more than 40 per cent machinery and equipment; 9 per cent steel pipes (for those long oil and gas lines); 12 per cent other finished steels; also copper, wool, and synthetic fibres. The USSR's imports, from the industrial West, are just what a less-developed country characteristically buys, when it is hot on the road of industrialization; the USSR's exports are the kinds of things such a less-advanced country characteristically sells.

In business channels close to Russian trade, the responsibility for this peculiar composition of Russian exports is argued both ways. On one side it is said that the Russians know nothing about how to sell exports. "They are hit-and-run sellers." They have good machinery, good equipment, very cheap, undoubtedly competitive. But they have never begun to do a selling job remotely comparable, for example, to what the Japanese do. They are unwilling to advertise, to establish continuing local agencies for service, to take responsibility for supplying parts. "They want to sell a boat-load of lumber, a tanker-load of oil, a consignment of raw skins or furs, take their money and run." But, on the other side, it is argued that the Russians must sell *anonymous* commodities. Nobody in the West, it is contended, will outfit his shop with Russian lathes or Russian microscopes, however good and cheap. Wheat and wood and oil carry no names. Of course the Russians sell crude materials—even those in which they have no comparative advantage. They are selling in unfriendly markets. Even petroleum, which is among their most advantageous exports, encounters trumped-up hostility.

But the hunch that the Russian choice of commodities for export may be largely traditional, passive, and irrational is not easily suppressed. Nothing we know of Soviet pricing or planning serves to allay this hunch. Instead it gains reinforcement from examination of the continuing weight of agricultural commodities in Russian exports.† We are not now in the Russia of the Czars, with a four-fifths rural population. We are in a dominantly urban society, proven in industry and unsuccessful in agriculture, where food is so expensive that it absorbs half the total value of consumption. Is it rational that the USSR has, in 1955-62, derived about a fifth of the total value of its exports from sales of agricultural products? These are indeed products which were comparatively abundant and cheap in Holy Russia, but they are scarce and dear in the USSR which today exports them. About 45 per cent of the value of these agricultural exports has been grain, flour,

* Additional domestic supply: 1,090,000 barrels per day of natural gas liquids.

† A convenient assembly of the facts is *Soviet Agricultural Trade, 1955-61*, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS—Foreign—47, June 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and bran; about 30 per cent cotton, wool, flax, and other textile materials; about 9 per cent animals, meat, and dairy products. Nothing of what we know generally of Soviet pricing and planning suffices to set aside the hypothesis that, in continuing to buy imports with her agricultural exports, the USSR is securing these imported commodities by one of the most expensive of alternative routes.

Even more striking, perhaps, is the comparatively trivial role of machinery and equipment in Soviet exports, both to the Communist bloc and to the rest of the world. In 1961, total USSR exports of machinery and equipment were $965 million, while imports were $1,739 million. The U.S.A. exported roughly eight times as great a value of machinery and equipment, Western Germany six times, the United Kingdom five times. The USSR did not even supply machinery for the industrialization of the East European bloc; on the contrary, she imported from Communist Eastern Europe some $1,245 million of such goods and supplied only $459 million worth. They were furnishing investment goods to industrialize the USSR; she was selling them fuels, raw materials, and foods! Such capital goods as the USSR has sent abroad have gone largely under political arrangements, to supply "complete plants." In 1957-60, while the China aid program continued, fully 45 per cent of all machinery and equipment exported by the USSR went to China alone. Capital goods supply to China is now insignificant. "Complete plants," shipped under political arrangements, still occupy a large share of the small volume of capital goods exports of the USSR. Now, however, these few plants go to Cuba, Egypt, India, and Eastern Europe.

PROMINENT among policy obstacles to the expansion of Soviet trade with the Western industrialized countries is the program of economic warfare sponsored, most determinedly, by the government of the United States. Already in March 1948 the cold war had become sufficiently hot for the U.S.A. to institute export licensing on the sale to the Communist bloc of commodities or services "strategic" to industrial development, as well as to warfare. Generally speaking, an effective embargo is now exerted on shipments from the U.S.A. to the USSR of special metals and materials, machinery, and equipment for metal working, for chemical production, petroleum refining, electrical control, power generation, transportation, precision instrumentation, rolling mills, large compressors, large diameter pipe, etc., etc. If preventing commodity trade between the U.S.A. and the USSR is the measure of success, this program of economic warfare has been brilliantly successful. In 1962 (by U.S. figures), exports to the Soviet Union were only $15.3 million and imports $16.2 million. The U.S.A. had two per cent of the weight of Western Europe in USSR trade!

USSR TRADE WITH NON-COMMUNIST AREAS, 1962
(in millions of dollars)

Area	USSR Imports	USSR Exports
U.S.A. and Canada	$ 23	$ 20
Western Europe	834	867
Finland	196	167
Latin America	375	475
Middle East	116	202
Asia and Far East	428	365
Total (including others)	$2,087	$2,220

Appreciating that an American embargo would have little strangulation power if the Soviet bloc could continue to buy elsewhere with comparative freedom, the U.S.A. took early initiative to draw its NATO allies and Japan into cooperation. In January 1950, in Paris, the Consultative Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was created to act as an instrument of economic warfare. COCOM has no treaty basis. Its determinations create no legal obligation—except to the extent any state chooses to embody such determinations in its own legislation or administrative practice. Even a cooperative member, the United Kingdom, which had itself an extremely long list of commodities prohibited for export to the Communist bloc,* regularly refused to enforce COCOM views in which it had not concurred. Nevertheless, from 1950 to 1953, while Marshall Plan funds were flowing and as the Korean war continued, exports to the Communist bloc *were* successfully held down. After the death of Stalin and with the truce in Korea, this economic warfare gradually lost determination. The COCOM embargo lists were shortened in 1954, and they have been shortened again repeatedly. Mr. Frederic L. Pryor has constructed a volume index of supply to the Soviet bloc by the non-Communist world. While, as he suggests, some contraband probably escapes recording, his index does reflect the effective holding action through 1953 and the subsequent reversal.† By 1959, European controls denied comparatively little. Only the United States continued the embargo without substantial relaxation.

Next perhaps only after Stalin's mockery of a Peace Movement, with its embellishment by Picasso's doves, there has been no greater hypocrisy in the recent history of Communism than its invocation of a universally beneficient international trade, free from all taint of economic warfare. When Stalin turned against Yugoslavia, he

* See Board of Trade Journal, Aug. 11, 1961, *Consolidated List of Goods Subject to Embargo for Soviet Bloc and China.*

† See his penetrating study, *The Communist Foreign Trade System*, 1963, which however hardly goes beyond 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and his satellites imposed a total economic embargo. When Khrushchev decided to maximize his pressure on China, he precipitately withdrew committed technical services and capital goods. When the USSR decided to give more demonstrative support to Nasser, it broke a petroleum supply contract with Israel and denied compensation for the breach. Very probably, the USSR leadership attributes much Western trading with the Soviet bloc to foolish, short-sighted capitalist money-grubbing and to such disorganization in the non-Communist world as, in Communist eyes, marks a decadent social order. The USSR, for its part, has employed economic warfare wherever this warfare was thought to be of advantage, and the USSR will no doubt continue to do so.

Communist practice is, however, no sure guide to effectiveness, still less to wisdom. Even effectiveness alone is not easily tested. The present economic warfare is no mere pinprick. Yet it probably has only a very limited impact on the immediate Soviet ability to wage war. Its drag is on economic development, and there probably more on general resources than on particular bottlenecks. The Russians, by now, have the technical skills to make almost any particular commodity that is made elsewhere, in time. At this level, general financial constraints may be more inhibiting than specific trade controls. If the USSR could now borrow $20 billion or $30 billion in the West, those added resources would overcome many difficulties. They would substitute for time. And, in a competitive race, that is the great substitution. But particular scarcities are also inhibiting. Clearly the Russians greatly desire free access to the technology of Western chemical industries. Clearly also the USSR wishes to be able to buy freely just those things the international oil industry would deny her: large diameter pipe, rotary drilling rigs, drilling bits, large compressors, etc. Certainly a country that can send manned satellites around the earth can also make good, big steel pipe. After experimentation, in time. The USSR would like to save time. Should it be assisted to develop faster?

Relaxation of Western economic warfare against the USSR, where rationally determined, reflects a recognition, an accommodation, and a wager. The recognition: after economic warfare as before, the USSR will have the capacity to destroy a large fraction of humanity. The accommodation: a Western society of many states and sub-societies has not the conviction of implacable, insurmountable enmity which alone would unite it in total economic warfare, sustained—as it would need to be—decade after decade. The wager: perhaps foregoing economic warfare *may* induce some marginal good will; perhaps economic collaboration *may* help challenge the false image of malicious enmity; perhaps greater prosperity *may* help set the stage for a more peaceful outlook.

When the wager seems implausible, risky, or even foolhardy—and there are many such times—economic warfare comes again into vogue. And then those who have not, all the days of their lives, taught implacable enmity (to Japan, to Germany, to Carthage, to the USSR) are that time's fools.

The End of Exploitation?

The Khrushchev principate has promised the people of the USSR that they will pass over the threshhold into Communism, by 1980, through the door of abundance. The schedules for the arrival of this abundance were, I suspect, irresponsibly established, in a mood of febrile propagandist self-glorification. The resulting promises of surpassings, rashly dated, will—in all reasonable probability—not be honored. In the current decade, 1961-70, the USSR will not "surpass . . . the U.S.A. in production per head of population." In the years to 1980, the USSR will not accomplish ". . . the historically important task of achieving in the Soviet Union a living standard higher than that of any of the capitalist countries."

It would be inane to occupy ourselves now with predicting what may happen after 1980. (Even economic predictions for 1970-80 are generally of little value.) The future is ours to make, not predict. Important to us, however, for the shape of the world in which we will live in these next years, is the fact that the Soviet Union—though heavily armed and heavily investing for tomorrow's abundance—will apparently continue, for the present, to be a strikingly poor country, in the standard of living of its people, by comparison with Northern and Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.A. We in these "Western" countries shall be living already in our comparatively abundant today, they in the USSR still meagerly and always preparing their tomorrow.

And yet, in larger historical perspective, where the arrogance and vainglory of princes and premiers and presidents fades to insignificance, the USSR will be a rich country. Until a half-century ago, no society had ever existed among men which had the capacity to supply *all* its people a quantity of goods and services which would be valued, in our money, at $1,000 per capita. None had ever been able to supply *every* family of five persons an annual income which would be valued, in our prices, at $5,000. But the USSR could do this now—in as few years as it would take to accomplish the changeover—by beating some swords into plowshares and by foregoing some investment in tomorrow for a gain in the fullness of life today. By the standard of what all the generations of man have called poverty, the USSR is now in a position to abolish poverty.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poverty, not scarcity. Gargantua chose, for the Order of Thélème, the rule "Do what thou wilt." But he endowed the Order lavishly, so that no member had to earn a livelihood, and he rigorously selected those who would be permitted to enter. No general human society can live by such a rule—not a society that can supply each of its members the equivalent of $1,000 or $2,000 or $5,000. For every society which must provide its own economy, goods and services are scarce; they involve cost: to have one thing, it is necessary to forego another. No general society can permit each individual to take according to his own interpretation of his needs; partiality in self-judgment reaches too far for that. Desire outruns supply, and not only in a society infected with a supposed unique ethos of "possessive individualism." This side of the earthly paradise, God—and not Satan or Thomas Hobbes—first declared the permanent unbalance between human desires and possessions.

For many individuals, in all economies, supply necessarily involves work—the exertion of effort not because it is instinctive or itself pleasurable but out of desire for the goods and services to which work-effort is a means. Here Buddhism is wiser than the materialistic utopian anarchisms; it pursues the overcoming of scarcity not by increasing supply but by transforming the personality which demands. And Buddhism identifies the adequate transformation with Nirvana. There the unbalance of desire with attainment is corrected by the extinction of the individual human center of consciousness. And an economist must agree: if scarcity is to be done away with, this is the one promising path. Otherwise we must be reconciled to living as mere men—with scarcity and with some tension of unfulfilled desire.

Official doctrine under the Khrushchev principate does not promise that Communism will end scarcity. Here Khrushchev is more reticent than some other Marxists. In politics, he does promise the gradual ending of "the State" because he is willing to rename the coercive apparatus of society "Party." In economics, he borrows the libertarian anarchist (and Marxist) slogan of distribution "to each according to his needs," but he then stands the slogan on its head: not each individual but the Party will be the determiner of needs. Nothing else would be reasonable, since the Party is the one possessor of adequate "consciousness." Indeed "The Party is the brain, the honor and the conscience of our epoch." Outside this Church too, there is no road to salvation.

But after Khrushchev has subverted the older Marxian positions, both on coercion and distribution, he comes forward boldly to claim their full credits as an enemy of *exploitation*. Thus, early in the Party Program of 1961: "Communism accomplishes the historic mission of delivering all men from social inequality, from every form of oppression and exploitation. . . ." Later in the text, the Program is so overcome with its own enthusiasm that it even finds no need to wait for Communism; the great deed of ending exploitation has already been done: "Socialism has solved a great social problem—it has abolished the exploiting classes and the causes engendering the exploitation of man by man." And, lest we misunderstand, the Program repeats didactically and italicizes: *"Capitalism is the last exploiting system . . . ."*

How far this Party bombast is from the sobriety of the aphorism which comes to us from reflections matured in the Poland of the 1950's: "Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man. Socialism is vice versa."

Exploitation is, of course, not an economic concept—except in the limited sense of *use*. In every society men necessarily use one another, though minds may be too inert to be self-conscious regarding the process. (There have also been Liberals who imagined they were defining exploitation as an economic concept because they held that a factor in production is exploited only when it is paid less than it would receive under "perfect competition." Here the institutional arrangements of perfect competition are posited as natural, and only departure from this natural model is then characterized as exploitative. But to place one's major institutional premises beyond question does not advance understanding.) *Exploitation* is inherently an ethical concept. To exploit is to use unjustly. A society which describes itself as having passed beyond exploitation is claiming to stand beyond injustice. Where Party or State are taken, in the Hegelian idiom, to reflect the march of God in the world, moral insensitivity may become so great as to permit such a claim to be advanced. Then we are in the world of Khrushchev.

The older Marxisms would have found it a bitter irony that, having already done away with exploitation, Khrushchev has still to deal with inequality! The USSR remains a society of great differences in income, as can be seen from its sharply tilted wage and salary scales and from observation of divergences in modes of living. But that strangely obscurantist country does not publish comprehensive information on the distribution of individual and family incomes by size, and this is the kind of question in which impressionism will not carry one far. Specialists in the Soviet economy may have opinions on whether Soviet income is more unequally distributed than American. I do not. In any case, Americans generally have no serious idea of how unequally income is distributed in their own country. Popular equalitarian blarney substitutes for knowledge. In fact, the richest fifth of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American families have incomes about ten times as high as the poorest fifth.

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME IN THE U.S.A., 1961

	Mean Income	Comparative Size
Poorest Fifth	$1,603	100
Second Fifth	3,805	237
Median Fifth	5,665	353
Next-Highest Fifth	7,829	488
Richest Fifth	15,678	978

I do not know whether the Soviet distribution is more equal than this. But it is clear that much which is said in substantiation of the idea that the Soviet system has achieved greater equality is quite unsound.

For instance, the USSR has not overcome unemployment; it has merely, since 1931, abolished unemployment compensation. Tens of millions of rural persons, whom the USSR census lists as "gainfully occupied," are in fact unemployed for many months each year. The Soviet economy neither brings industry into the *kolkhozi* nor pays unemployment compensation when it is impossible to do farm work. Similar disregard for the poorest is suggested by the low level of the Soviet minimum monthly wage, 27 rubles in the countryside, and 35 rubles in urban employments. The dollar value of this monthly wage of $30 to $39 compares unfavorably with relief payments in more solicitous societies. In medical care, the poorer Soviet citizen certainly fares better than his counterpart in the U.S.A. But the USSR is not more generous in social security outlays. For 1958, Abram Bergson has computed total USSR social security benefit payments at about 10.4 per cent of all Russian household consumption expenditures. But in 1958, in the U.S.A., government transfers to persons *plus* employers' contributions to pension and welfare funds were 10.8 per cent of U.S. personal consumption expenditures. Due to the fact that the USSR does not pay unemployment compensation, "social security" does not weigh more heavily in the Russian economy than in the American. These are matters in which subjectivism is hard to overcome, but I do not think that either the USSR or the U.S.A. can fairly be described, in the 1960's, as societies bent with concern for their poor.

Class IS ANOTHER headache for the Khrushchev ideologists. They cannot even make up their minds concerning how many classes are to be acknowledged officially in the USSR! In general, they opt for two classes—workers and peasants—and these two "friendly," in distinction to the unfriendly classes that characterize all previous human history. But to insist that the USSR has only workers and peasants is just too silly. What of Comrade Khrushchev, his Party lieutenants, Army officers, police chiefs, and bureaucrats? What of doctors, professors, factory managers, directors of railroads, and heads of department stores? All these are taken care of. They are not a class. They are "intellectuals," and then not a class but something less reprehensible, a "stratum." This stratum has emerged temporarily from the workers and peasants, and it is destined soon to be submerged again in one great non-class, under Communism, when all work "with hand or brain" will become indistinguishable!

But the official Soviet cant of class, stratum, and non-class does not conceal genuine popular concern. Class is an important aspect of Soviet society, and not only as reflecting differences in work, authority, and income. Class exists also in its more disturbing facet—where the position of parents bears great weight in determining the position of children. Troubled concern over this class phenomenon of the generations seems sincere, deep, and widespread in the USSR. It is not being suppressed. And the presence of this concern works as a leaven—one of the most heartening features of contemporary society in the Soviet Union.

Soviet high policy has been formulated hitherto under the inspiration of a melodramatic imagery of history and human responsibility. For such melodrama, what happens *in between* is of little consequence. The people of the USSR may starve under Lenin; they may be worked to death in Stalin's concentration camps; they may live cramped and meager lives even under the milder principate of Khrushchev. These in-between things hardly matter—so long as all comes right in the end. "The achievement of Communism in the USSR," says the Party Program, "will be the greatest victory mankind has ever won throughout its long history." History as experienced up to now—history with conflicts—will come to an end. The felicity of mankind will be assured.

These modes of thought have not yet progressed beyond self-important historical melodrama to the more rational perspective which Leopold von Ranke expressed in the simple phrase, "Every period is immediate to God." An older book says it better: "Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine . . . ." What was grasped firmly by an ancient theism, should not—in a different imagery—be beyond the reach of a modern naturalism. No generation is given the power or responsibility to insure felicity to all who come after, though ours may be able to blight the earth for many of its successors. A mark of the growth of a rational temper of mind in the USSR will be increased concern for determinable presents and less concern for remote futures—remote beyond constructive reach and correspondingly beyond responsibility.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BERNARD ROSENBERG

NEW YORK POLITICS & THE LIBERAL PARTY

EVER SINCE 1944, when the Liberal party, but recently a minority within another minority party, delivered 330,000 votes for Franklin D. Roosevelt, it has been a force with which New York politicians of every stripe have had to reckon. A Republican Speaker of the State Assembly, if he covets the governorship—and who knows where that might lead?—will seek Liberal party endorsement as eagerly as his Democratic opponent. This little party, then, has power. Much of it is visible (and not only during election campaigns). As for that part of its power which is not visible, Liberal leaders like Alex Rose (vice chairman of the party and otherwise president of the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union) and Ben Davidson (executive director of the party since its inception) protest that their best work must be quiet and informal. The influence they bring to bear cannot, they claim, always be publicized—for fear that office holders will be embarrassed and the party's influence thereby lost.

As with the many victories for which Liberal spokesmen take too much credit, there is nevertheless something in what they say here, and the "pros" from President Johnson on down know it. In New York City, in Albany, and in Washington, they listen respectfully to the Liberals. Whether the Liberals say enough is another question, but that their voices are heard, if not always heeded, is certain.

How did all this come about? Why is it that the Liberal party of New York has survived to celebrate its twentieth anniversary, when the several Labor parties, the Progressive party, the Epic Movement, the Farmer-Labor party, the Commonwealth party, and the Socialist party—to name only those recently singled out by Ben Davidson—have all gone into eclipse?

The chronology, at any rate, is clear. In 1936, the American Labor party came into being, spawned officially by Sidney Hillman and David Dubinsky of the two big garment unions, together with some ex- , quasi- , and demi-socialists and other "progressives." We have it from William B. Hesseltine, a close student of third-party movements in the United States, that "In the 1930's New York unions and the Social Democratic Federation which had split from the Socialists, formed the ALP for the thinly-veiled purpose of keeping Roosevelt from swinging too far to the right." This version is not inaccurate, but it tells less than half the story, for the prime mover in forming the ALP actually seems to have been James Farley, who can hardly be said to have had any interest in keeping his chief from swinging to the right. Consummate strategist that he was, Farley understood, and so did Roosevelt, that an indeterminably large number of votes could be scooped out of New York in the year FDR was seeking his second term, by the simple expedient of creating a party through which people loyal to Roosevelt but hostile to the Democrats could vote for him.

At its point of origin, then, the ALP was centered more on helping Roosevelt at the polls than on pushing him in any direction. Presently, however, the Communists saw and seized an opportunity to penetrate the new party. They met with little resistance from Hillman or Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers who believed then, and for too long thereafter, that it was possible to work with the Communists. Dubinsky, Rose, and Davidson knew better. By the time they saw their New York County branch in Communist hands, they were ready to withdraw. It had taken the C.P.U.S.A. eight years of bitter struggle to complete this little coup, whose success had fateful consequences for American politics at least until 1948.

The Liberal party was born in 1944. There were fewer midwives than the ALP had in 1936, but all of them stood in resolute opposition to the Communists, who have never again given them any trouble. (Indeed, the problem today is how to prevent *Republicans*, and to some extent, Democrats from infiltrating and dominating several clubs in upstate New York—while it is the Reform Democratic movement that is bedeviled by attempts at Communist takeover!) Ideological bal-

BERNARD ROSENBERG, a new contributor, is professor of sociology at City College. A member of the editorial board of *Dissent*, Mr. Rosenberg writes frequently in its pages on matters of social and political interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

last, such as it was, came from a unique source, Columbia's Teachers College, which imparted a peculiar coloration to the party that has not yet disappeared. John Dewey lent his name and gave his blessing to the Liberals, and his disciples, John Childs and George S. Counts, each subsequently a state chairman, did likewise, in addition to devoting their services. (With interim exceptions, the chairman has always been a gentile, apparently on the principle that guided Freud when he selected Jung, *his* gentile, as president of the International Psychoanalytic Society.)

Childs presided over a committee charged with drafting the original Declaration of Principles in 1944. The general objective spelled out at that time was to fight reaction and corruption in both big parties, to promote the liberal wing of each, to steer clear of Stalinism, to help win the war, and to work steadily toward a basic political realignment. New York-based though they were, Childs and his colleagues strove to establish a national perspective. The Liberals' first political act was to nominate Roosevelt, whose name now appeared three times on every New York ballot. Democratic regulars, Popular Fronters (through the ALP), and dissident anti-Communists (through the Liberals) could all cast votes for the same man—votes which some would not have cast at all under auspices repugnant to them. Candidates ever since have seen the advantages inherent in this situation. Albany, still in the hands of a lopsidedly rural conservative legislature, could destroy the Liberal party, instead of just harassing it, by abolishing dual and multiple designation, but cooler heads (sometimes those of Republican governors) have prevailed against all ultra-conservative attempts to legislate the Liberals to death. There is every reason in the Eastern megalopolis for Republicans to save the Liberals from upstate hatchet men of their own party. New York City, for all its multifariousness, belongs to the Democrats, which means that few, if any, Republicans can realistically hope for election to municipal office without Liberal support. Neither are a Republican's chances very bright for statewide and national office unless the Liberals give him their seal of approval. Thus, both big parties stand to benefit from, and therefore put up with, a third party they could easily suffocate.

UP UNTIL the ALP was dealt a fatal blow in the humiliating defeat of Henry Wallace in 1948, the Liberals struggled with uneven success to differentiate themselves from their parent organization, and running behind it, remained a fourth party. They did, however, become legally established as a fixture on the ballot in 1946. State law requires that for this privilege a party must poll at least 50,000 votes in a gubernatorial election. Despite a relatively poor showing with a lackluster candidate in 1962, the Liberals have never had any real trouble in surpassing that figure.

The year 1945 was a crucial one, more for what did not occur than for what did. By then, Wendell Willkie had strayed so far from his Republican confreres that, although he had been their most recent standard bearer, they had not even invited him to the national convention of 1944. It struck the Liberals that if Willkie could be persuaded to run for Mayor of New York on a Fusion ticket, they might have a man in the mold of La Guardia who would continue to do battle against Tammany Hall—and much, much more. Liberal overtures were made to Willkie; he was said to be interested; and after a second conference with Childs, the political wheels were set in motion. The Liberal leaders who conceived this scheme thought, probably with good reason, that Willkie could have won New York City, and that his victory might just have started a revolution reverberating through the country.

How so? Here the public record is fragmentary, though the publication of Willkie's correspondence with FDR may some day fill in the tantalizing lacunae. We do know that both men were greatly dissatisfied with their parties, that they were drawn by personal and political bonds to each other, and that their talk about founding a nationwide third party was serious. Presumably, even after Roosevelt's death, Willkie's imagination was stirred by the prospect of winning an impressive victory in New York and subsequently organizing the broader movement; also, it was the Liberals' golden opportunity. But a few weeks after having more or less agreed to run, Willkie died, and the steam went out of all these ambitious plans. It has never been restored. Comptroller McGoldrick of the La Guardia administration seemed willing to be a mayoral candidate, but he equivocated and finally declined the nomination. That left the Liberals with Jonah Goldstein, a Democrat acceptable to the Republicans, who bore no special relation to the Liberal party and who ran so poorly, garnering a mere 123,000 votes, that several Liberal leaders thought of giving up the ghost. But following a six-month respite from practical affairs, a period set aside for a comprehensive review through a "listening committee" of officers who, at open hearings, heard conflicting arguments from spokesmen of local clubs, they decided to persist against heavy odds in an uphill battle which could only yield slow progress. And they also resolved that they would henceforth be more careful and circumspect in approaching candidates.

The crisis of 1945 produced new financial problems, for many of those who like to support a winner and have no other basic commitment, dropped away with the Goldstein debacle. To run

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a political party is no paltry matter: it takes an enormous amount of money. The authorized version is that "liberal and labor forces" supply the necessary backing for the Liberal party. But mainly, one surmises, these "forces" boil down to the Hatters and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.* In any case, funds materialize and fairly expensive operations are undertaken even between campaigns; as of this year, the Liberal party's headquarters, previously rather shabby, are almost elegant, a new series of radio broadcasts has been launched, and more organizers are hard at work upstate. The party is growing—despite dips and rises, its relative proportion of state votes has increased every year since 1946. There is now much less talk than in late 1961 of merger with the Democrats, sloganized as "reappraising the Liberal party's role." That phrase, set afloat after Mayor Wagner had allegedly broken the back of Tammany Hall, has been discarded in favor of "continued independence."

Independence sometimes signifies repudiation of Democratic and Republican candidates in favor of a Liberal who runs all by himself, and sometimes, detachment from Tammany and support for a progressive Republican. The Liberals pursued this latter policy in 1949 when they endorsed Newbold Morris for mayor, passing their old ALP rivals for the first time, and besting Vito Marcantonio, a formidable vote-getter. Morris lost the election by a small margin, declaring that if the Republicans had done as much for his cause as the Liberals, he would have won.

The next such expression of local independence, and by far the most successful one to date, occurred in 1951. That year Rudolph Halley received 583,000 votes on the Liberal line as an independent candidate for President of the Council of the City of New York, and defeated two hacks, the Democrat Joseph T. Sharkey, and the Republican Henry J. Latham. In 1950, before proportional representation was abolished (and the Liberals are agitating to have it restored), two Liberal city councilmen had been elected. But neither their presence nor that of Halley changed the municipal scene in any significant way. The truth now universally admitted is that the Liberals embraced Halley without inquiring about his politics, just as the ADA—a non-party organization parallel to the Liberal party, and as flexible—found itself boosting General Eisenhower for President soon after World War II. Halley had sex appeal at the polls: millions of people knew him as a TV personality, a tireless chief counsel of the Kefauver Crime Commission who could be a forceful interrogator of criminals. The Liberals—who saw their chance to capitalize on a public image—were just as disillusioned as the rest of us when Halley turned out to be a political cipher. Nevertheless, when they ran him for mayor in 1953, he made an impressive showing. The year before, Dr. Counts, whose fame was somewhat more limited, had also scored impressively as the Liberal party's independent candidate for U.S. Senator—with about half a million votes. These results delighted the Republicans as much as they sobered the Democrats. From now on, no one could seriously doubt that the Liberal party had veto power, that it often occupied a pivotal position, and that it could prevent the big parties from heedlessly nominating men it considered unacceptable.

Although the moderate exercise of that power has in general proved more welcome than not to political bigwigs, it has naturally annoyed others —especially those of the reactionary right. The result has been the formation of yet another party in New York state, the Conservative party, which has deliberately modeled itself after the Liberal party, and which, by virtue of a surprisingly big vote for its gubernatorial candidate in the 1962 election, now has a permanent place on the ballot. Already Republican office seekers soliciting Liberal endorsement do so at the risk of losing Conservative support. If these tactics work, the two fringe parties are bound to neutralize and eventually force each other out of business. It will be interesting to see how the Liberals meet this challenge of the reverse mirror image.

FROM THE beginning they have had to meet other challenges, those built so solidly into our system that to survey them is to wonder how any minority party can ever be established in the United States. State law, made and administered by Democrats and Republicans, is ingeniously designed to prevent political competition, and if it fails it can still be used most effectively to stifle a minority party. When the law proves inadequate, moreover, there are extralegal techniques available to men who, if no other recourse avails, do not hesitate to use them. At the precinct level, politics is still a dirty business.

Obstacle number one for a new party in New York State consists of petitions—sheets of paper on which fifty valid signatures must appear for each of sixty-two counties. Any signature may be challenged for any number of reasons, ranging from incorrect form or the use of initials to out-and-out fraud, and if a single name is successfully challenged, all others on the same sheet are thrown out. As might be expected, the petitions of an unwelcome minority party are examined with a microscope. Thus, a dedicated functionary like Ben Davidson knows his people should start ring-

* In talking to a top official of the union who expressed amazement at what he regarded as a major political *tour de force*, viz., the Liberal party's continued existence, I attempted to raise a moral question by asking, "Haven't you had to pay a heavy price for survival?" His spontaneous response was: "A price? You should only know how much it costs us."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing doorbells at 6:30 A.M. to make sure that for every fifty signatures needed they will collect two hundred and fifty. With much experience behind him, Davidson in '44 had his party's petition volumes locked in a safe and had guards stationed around the safe. And when the petitions went to New York and then to Albany for processing, they went under police protection.

A resourceful leader of a third party, if he has a pool of volunteer workers, can overcome this obstacle—only to find that the path before him is still strewn with mines. The Liberals today must contend with physical intimidation, threats to livelihood (and worse) from racketeers and gamblers, a type by no means confined to New York City but likely to pop up in towns like Utica and Hudson. The underworld, no more a respecter of American party labels than Lord Bryce, is as active in Republican territory upstate as it is in Democratic urban centers. Liberal organizers, then, have their hands full. On top of all this, new bills are introduced into the State Legislature virtually every year with a view toward making life impossible for the Liberals. The election laws get more complicated, further technicalities are added, a greater percentage of signatures is proposed, extra committeemen must be added in every county.

To their great credit, the Liberals have fought back, refusing despite continued frustration and harassment to shut up shop, and we have them to thank more than anyone else for the possibility of electoral dissent in New York—a possibility that hardly exists in most of the other states. We have already seen why the two major parties tolerate the Liberals—it is by and large to their advantage to do so. But when the advantage looks dubious, when, for instance, Republican legislators find their posts in jeopardy, pressure invariably mounts to destroy the Liberal party, and at that point only a deal can insure its survival. Curiously, such a deal may involve an assertion of independence. When is independence not independence? When the Liberals agree to run a man of their own instead of throwing their support behind a particular Democratic candidate where a Liberal endorsement might tip the balance against his Republican opponent. Maneuverability is thus taken away from the Liberals in exchange for the privilege of being. So much has to be surrendered—in the interest of fighting good fights on other fronts. What are these other fights? And where are the other fronts?

Reflecting on such questions, the party's top tactician finds it ironic that he and his friends, who started out to change the world, have now come to stand for nothing more radical than "old-fashioned honesty." There is no doubt that the hope of municipal reform gave the Liberals their greatest impetus, and sustains them even now in a city whose people have every reason to be cynical about politics. Gus Tyler, intellectual leader of the ILGWU and a devoted Liberal, believes, for instance, that his party's primary function is to purify the Democratic party. If the Liberals' *raison d'être* is indeed to establish honesty in local government through the reconstruction of a corrupt old party, their work—as Lincoln Steffens, who knew all about the cyclical nature of reform and corruption, would have said—is cut out for them on a permanent basis.

Yet one wonders how the Democrats can be purified by a party, one of whose principal agents can announce, all unselfconsciously, as he did to me, "We have proved that there is nothing wrong with opportunism." Or again, and verbatim, "There is this paradoxical situation, you see: at times we have to make a coalition with crooked Democrats, at other times with reactionaries." No one is held in greater disdain by the Liberal hierarchy than your political purist who would stand aloof from compromising coalitions. Such a man is impractical, visionary, utopian, unfit for the rough and tumble of politics. Liberals contend that by compromising, by eschewing intransigent idealism, by renouncing sectarianism and embracing realism, they are able to get things done. Mindful, then, of its splendid aphorism—that politics is not just a matter of arithmetic but also of algebra—what can be said from a "realistic" point of view about the Liberal party? Does it stand up well when judged not by its roots but by its fruits?

MUCH HAS to be credited to the positive side, however ambivalent one's general reaction may be. In many cases, Liberals have forced the Democratic party to raise the caliber of its candidates. When they choose to be a counterforce in local and state affairs, their impact can be mildly beneficent. Each year the party draws up a state program (largely the handiwork of Louis J. Merrell, who is widely respected for his thoroughness and competence) which addresses itself intelligently to every major issue before the state legislature. Assemblymen and senators of both parties use this program and find it helpful to them in their deliberations. Apparently they have also welcomed, or have not greatly resented, an annual legislative conference at which specialists from inside or outside the party ranks present their views in Albany. (The conferences still take place, but now in New York.) Liberals did yeoman work in opposition to a power grab of the St. Lawrence and Niagara Rivers, helping to salvage 50 per cent of the power for public and cooperative use which would otherwise have been handed over to private capital. Their big gun on this issue was Adolph A. Berle, Jr. (a founder of the party, at present Honorary State Chairman, his warm friendship for and public support of Governor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rockefeller in 1962 notwithstanding). The Liberals pioneered in Albany on the question of consumer protection through Averell Harriman, the governor they considered very much their man (when he was not Carmine De Sapio's). Most recently they contributed to the campaign against Albany's relentless effort to impose tuition fees on students of the city colleges of New York. Their presence has been felt in the state capital under three governors: Dewey, Harriman, and Rockefeller. They can be relied on to make an occasional dent, "to have a detail here and a detail there adopted," as Davidson has put it.

The Liberal record, apart from a few serious blemishes, is, well—liberal, unexceptionable and unexciting. The Liberals favor rent control; they drafted the legislation which brought it into being; and since it lapses every two years, their representatives must testify that often at meetings where landlords assemble by the carload and the busload. Liberals have been active in urban renewal, in the economic integration of housing, in fostering disability and unemployment insurance, reapportionment, civil rights, medicare. They believe in doing good by their lights, which are those of the New Deal. They are never more than a baby-step ahead of the Democratic platform; sometimes they may even lag behind that platform or behind those charged with implementing it. And it is here, in the Liberal party's relation to the program of the Democrats, that we come to the negative side of the ledger in assessing its role from the "realistic" point of view.

A third party in the earliest American tradition, that of John Randolph who broke with both Jefferson and Hamilton (choosing to be neither a Federalist nor a Republican), is literally a "third something," a *tertium quid*. We have had a great profusion of such parties. In evaluating them retrospectively, the student of American politics rarely points to how long-lived many of them have been. Yet the Liberals' greatest pride is that after two strenuous decades, they are still there, a hard fact which strikes them as proof of their success. Can it be that nothing fails like such success, and that for a real *tertium quid* nothing succeeds like excess?

In 1932 the Socialist party offered a program far to the left of either big party, and a million voters who were counted, as well as something like another million who were not, cast their ballots that year for Norman Thomas. Newly installed in office and confronted with a great depression, the Democrats quickly acceded to every "minimum demand" made by Thomas, thus stealing his thunder and that of his party. Although there are other weighty reasons for the decline of the Socialists, none is more important than the fine showing they made in 1932. For this showing could only frighten the big parties into adopting a large part of the Socialist program and rendering the Socialist party itself superfluous. Thus it is that Thomas, the perennial Presidential candidate, can look back on the performance of a major historic service. Will Dubinsky or Rose ever be able to enjoy a similar satisfaction? So far, there is no sign that they will. The Liberals are too ready to remain a satellite party, they suffer from too much timidity to advance many of their own strongest convictions, and they are too fearful of excess, of proposals that may be "premature" or "unrealistic," to flutter the dovecots in any serious way.

Liberal leaders will tell you that their go-slow attitude derives in part from the sophistication they acquired as trade unionists. In collective bargaining you can't reach for the moon: give a little, take what you can, bide your time till the next round of negotiations, and above all, don't expect too much. But this philosophy, which can be questioned even as applied to the American labor movement, is simply not proper to a third-party movement whose purpose is to prod the big parties into taking the kind of action their own inertia keeps them from taking. A pressure group that is not actuated by some sense of urgency, which does not make outlandish demands, and refuses to ask for much more than it can reasonably expect to get, ceases to be a pressure group. Not only that, but it ceases to be attractive to its most important potential constituency—the intellectuals.

New York has tremendous intellectual resources, a nucleus of scholars and artists who are chronically troubled about the remediable ills in their environment and in the world at large. Among them are many of the non-voters who stay at home on election day, not out of apathy, but because they see no decisive difference in policy between the two big parties. Such men could probably be drawn into a real third party where they might freely air their views, unfold alternatives to the prevailing consensus, and generate new ideas. Early on, intellectuals like Adolph Berle and Reinhold Niebuhr did enlist in the Liberal ranks, but no notable addition has been made in the last ten years. As the party evolved along conventional lines, and "practicality" overwhelmed "idealism," many intellectuals came to feel that they were no longer entirely welcome, and the consequence has been a certain anemia in the party's approach to the political issues of the day.

THE CURRENT state chairman of the Liberal party is Professor Timothy Costello, who teaches industrial psychology at the New York University School of Business Administration. He has no office, nor even a desk at party headquarters, yet he is fairly *au courant* with party affairs. For Costello, the Liberal party is "the cutting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edge of the Democratic party," an agency by which "forward-looking concepts are fed into the larger community," and "electable as well as desirable candidates" can be brought to the fore. Liberals, with or without the capital "L," are living, he says, off the fat of previous generations. Times have changed and that fat affords very little nourishment. What, then, can replenish the supply? The answer, according to Chairman Costello, is applied social science. But is it? After all, large and, by any earlier standard, astronomical sums are being spent to study social problems in America—crime, delinquency, suicide, mental disorder, drug addiction, marital discord—and if anything, there has been a steady increase in the magnitude of these problems. On the other hand, since 1954 and the so-called sociological decision on desegregation (and would it not have been better if the Supreme Court had based the decision on legal or moral grounds instead of on problematic psychological data?), there has been a virtual moratorium on research in race relations accompanied by unparalleled progress in the direction of integration. Insofar as Costello's favored technique, conflict resolution, does work, it is more often than not an instrument used by management to manipulate workers. The truth is that social science will not do as a substitute for hard ethical and political judgments.

Timothy Costello is concerned about disarmament. He sees some merit in the unilateral initiatives idea, and has talked it up, but without striking a responsive chord in his party. Of course, there are Liberals with a more pronounced streak of pacifism, notably the Reverend Donald Harrington, successor to John Haynes Holmes at New York's Community Church. Harrington, however, was rapped on the knuckles this year by Albert Margolies, until recently a Liberal publicist, for allegedly favoring unilateral disarmament—which he denies—in the party's official publication. In this area, as in nearly all matters pertaining to foreign policy, the party has simply followed the Kennedy administration (which, in Liberal eyes, is even absolved of any responsibility for the disastrous Cuban invasion), and will now probably follow Johnson.

The Liberals are convinced that but for their support, Kennedy would not have captured New York and would therefore not have been elected President. In an election whose outcome was so close, any bloc may make such a claim. Some skeptics, indeed, may find Norman Mailer's whimsical argument as persuasive as that of the Liberals. (After the Democratic Convention of 1960, Mailer mistook Kennedy for a hipster, and said so with enthusiasm in *Esquire*. He figures that perhaps a million people read the article, of whom a sizable number—enough, possibly, to have made a decisive difference—were influenced by it. Why not?)

In any case, the late President appreciated Alex Rose's help more than Norman Mailer's: Liberal party leaders had (and have) a calling card to the White House, and in general—being representatives of organized labor as well as spokesmen for a political party—they have no trouble whatever in reaching the decision-makers. The question is, what do they do with this disproportionately large voice of theirs? Melancholy observers fear that the answer, for domestic almost as much as for foreign policy, is: nothing really, at all.

Theoretically, the Liberal party favors "democratic economic planning" today as strongly as it did twenty years ago. The term does not frighten members, many of whom still regard themselves as socialists, even if they exemplify Norman Thomas's famous remark that he knows lots of people who are still socialists—*very still*. Still or not, however, they can hardly be indifferent to the ills of our economy. Their primary allegiance is to the working people of New York, a large percentage of whom suffer from underemployment, poor pay, inadequate relief, and all the miseries attendant thereon. The garment industry, for example, is plagued by runaway shops and the spectre of automation. If, as is all too possible, the needle trades should get into a condition similar to that which has come to plague coal mining, New York City will have a massive new problem on its hands. The Liberal party could begin addressing itself to that problem now, seeking some kind of solution as a model for the national economic planning it supposedly supports. But one's guess is that the national administration will come forward with a program for dealing with automation none too soon, and yet well in advance of any proposals the Liberals will find to make.

So, too, in the field of civil rights, where the Liberals were both passive and uncritical of the Kennedy administration instead of acting as a goad and a counterforce from the left. For several months before the Negro March on Washington, for example, the President was expressing public doubt about the advisability of such a march, holding to the line that "these matters are best settled in the courts, not on the streets." The Liberal party, which has no racist wing to pacify and one of whose better-known members is James A. Farmer, director of CORE, took no stand on the March. Finally, Kennedy reversed himself, under pressure from Negro leaders. Only then did the Liberals feel free to act on their best impulses by endorsing the March and organizing a delegation to join it in Washington.

So much for the state and national scenes. What about the third major arena in which the Liberals play a role—New York City? There, alas, the party is as overcommitted to the Wagner administration as it is to the Democratic adminis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tration in Washington. The Liberals' electoral exertions on behalf of "Fighting Bob," as Rose dubbed him in 1961, were most effective. They helped him make a clean break with the Democratic bosses, De Sapio, Buckley, and Sharkey. Although it is still unclear who rejected whom, and how much, the break did occur, and Wagner won a notable primary by attacking Tammany Hall, with signal assistance from the Liberal party and yet another union group, not heard from since, the Brotherhood party. Even before Wagner's re-election, on September 27, James A. Wechsler, editor of the New York *Post* and a Liberal party sympathizer, commented:

> Political writers have held funeral rites for New York's Liberal party on many occasions, but it has invariably lived to fight again.
>
> Now it is conceivable, however, that the end is in sight—not because of a crushing defeat but because of a famous victory. The new political circumstances created by Mayor Wagner's rout of the machine-men in the Democratic primary create the real possibility of the Liberal party's merger with both the Democratic reform movement and the large labor bloc represented in the newly-formed Brotherhood party.

Despite such talk, and more that came later, the Liberals decided against formal dissolution of their party. Instead they became deeply committed to Wagner, professing to see a great difference in the mayor before and after election day of 1961. Previously he had been a prisoner of the bosses; now he was a free man, and the Liberals had figured prominently in his emancipation. How is the new Wagner better than the old Wagner? His champions affirm that he works hard: "He has to. Decisions that used to be made in Tammany Hall now have to be made in City Hall." But the big change, they say, is a vast improvement in the quality of his appointments. Not a few of these appointments, perhaps a hundred, from judgeships on down, have gone to Liberals. This is novel—patronage going to a third party—but there is nothing inherently sinister about it, especially since in almost every instance the Liberals who have been appointed are good people, much to be preferred over the usual appointees.

All the same, grave questions must be raised. Wagner will not be mayor forever. He may run for the U.S. Senate (or the vice-presidency) this year, and in that event, one of his lieutenants, a man like Abraham Beame or Paul Screvane, will be the likeliest Democratic candidate for mayor. With such a big sprinkling of quondam county chairmen and other Liberal party personnel in Wagner's official family, will Liberals ever be able to oppose any member of that family? At least one voluble Liberal, Stuart Scheftel, is afraid that they may not. Scheftel came to the Liberal party as a Fusionist, and a Fusionist he has steadfastly remained. He doubts that New York, where, he estimates, illegal gambling constitutes a two-billion dollar a year industry, can ever be anything but a "payoff city" under Democratic rule. Accordingly, two years ago, Scheftel became the only insurgent in the Liberal party's twenty-year history. He declined to accept Wagner, his old school chum and a man he personally likes, as the Liberal nominee for Mayor, and entered his own name in the one important primary the Liberals have ever had. The attempt failed for lack of petitions, but Scheftel still refused to support Wagner. Lately things do seem to him to have picked up a bit in City Hall ("Bob's more energetic these days"), but he is disturbed by Wagner's appointment (with Liberal support) of Louis I. Kaplan to a judgeship after the New York Bar Association and the Citizens Union found Kaplan to be unqualified. In Scheftel's opinion, the Liberals have a bright future on the local scene if they stick to their original purposes. To betray them again, he thinks, is to risk extinction. Is he right? An acid test will be coming very soon, and it remains to be seen whether the Liberals will be able to summon up the resources to fight the Democratic party with a Fusion ticket such as Rose, with all his political wizardry, could put together and whose triumph could well have political consequences far beyond the bounds of New York City itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OBSERVATIONS

REMEMBERING JEWISH HISTORY

Alfred Kazin

ALTHOUGH JEWS ARE always much concerned with "history"—in the sense that traditionally they expect much of it—very few Jews, in my experience, know very much about their own history even in modern times. When I was growing up among East European immigrants, I discovered that despite the wealth of reminiscence about the old country, the speakers usually had little *information* about the immediate social background of their lives; they were usually so vague on names, dates, and circumstances in their own family history that I decided that those who had *"yichus"* seemed really to be proud of their memories, not of any unusual achievement in the family. Why was it, I wondered, that even the pedants with a passion for "facts" not merely knew so few *facts* about the history of the Jews in Russia and Poland, but were astonished by the effort to locate some?

In the wake of Hitler, momentous efforts have been made by archivists to preserve the memory of East European Jewry; even during the war, as we learn every day, heroic efforts were made by Jewish leaders in Poland to keep records of their doomed world and of its last struggles. But these represent the spiritual agony of a few unusually responsible people. Among American Jews it is a fact, as Professor Uriel Weinreich wrote recently in the *Columbia University Forum* of his effort to create a cultural atlas of East European Jewish life, that ". . . when it comes to things Jewish, vague familiarity with the emigrants' world still qualifies as expertise; pedantic professors and critics finicky about other subjects here tolerate sentimental knowingness in lieu of knowledge . . . . How many admired raconteurs of Jewish stories can step up to a map and point out the birthplace of their parents?" No doubt much of the ignorance even of their own family history is a cultural necessity for American Jews, and can be matched in the convenient blacking-out of painful or demeaning associations with European poverty that is found among all descendants of recent immigrants. Yet whatever the motivation that American Jews may have for being imprecise about their parents' past, I think that in this respect, at least, they are perpetuating the East Europeans' own lack of historical objectivity and information. The Russian Jews, most of whom lived in the Pale of Settlement and often had nothing in common with the Poles and Russians themselves, not even a language, must be an extreme example in history of a collective or group identity sustaining and enforcing its separateness. And so profound was the effect of both this separateness and group experience that an inner consciousness obviously took precedence over its civic relations with the "outside world," and through the intense family life, the only institution trusted by East European Jews, pressed itself into the feelings of the next generation.

Jewish history has become internalized in Jews. The more deeply Jewish a person was in Eastern Europe, the less he knew about what was actively happening around him. A Yiddish writer once said of a student studying the Torah that he

> has roamed as far and as wide as an ancient who has outlived the years of Methuselah! He has been in Mesopotamia, in Canaan, in Egypt, in Persia and Medea, in Susa its capital, and in multiple other lands as far as India and Cathay; also the wilderness and the desert has he frequented, and there he has hearkened to many marvelous things . . . . of a sort which to all other people are an incomprehensible mystery; but among Jews it is a common everyday event. Only with Jewish children does it transpire that they sit day and night rooted to one spot, not knowing what is happening roundabouts, what they need learn to do in order to live among people . . . . All thoughts are in another world, in other epochs; they are oblivious to the world right under their noses and devote themselves wholly to that which transpired long ago, for which eyes and the other crude human senses are not so much needed as an acute imaginative faculty—a stark naked soul—devoid of body, devoid of life itself; . . .
>
> Shloimele has only been born here; he is not exactly a native but resides somewhere over there . . . . His times are beforetimes, his world is another . . . .

Their ancient or sacred history replaced for the Jews their own worldly history. Religious indifference to the "world" was encouraged by the fact that theirs was obviously not a Jew's world. Yet even when, as in this country, Jews in the mass no longer thought of themselves as participating in *sacred* history, their inner group-mindedness has had the effect of dulling their historical awareness about themselves. It has made them more objective about the condition they share in common than about the facts of this condition—which, as facts in social history must, make

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discriminations and render a group less common-minded about itself. In this country, for example, the German Jews, earlier arrivals and more quickly assimilated into middle-class American patterns than many descendants of East Europeans are even now, had attained a conscious genealogical sense of their own history which emphasized the contrast with the lack of historical-mindedness about themselves so often found among East European Jews. For East Europeans, in fact, any effort to search into the ascertainable "facts" of their social condition in the ghetto was regarded as a challenge to the solidarity of the family as well as to the inner loyalty of the group. While the children of the immigrants were often unwilling to look into the past precisely because they wanted to break with it, the immigrants themselves uneasily recognized that "history" threatened the connection with their children.

GIVEN THESE difficulties, books like Moses Rischin's *The Promised City: New York's Jews, 1870-1914** (which came out in 1962 and which I have just been reading) are noteworthy above all for their rarity. And given the particular historical-mindedness in every direction that it requires, the exacting labors in the history of New York City itself and on the Hebrew and Yiddish materials of the period that are the prime basis of his book, it is not likely that so scholarly a work on just this subject will be done again. Mr. Rischin, who begins with a survey first of "old New York" before the great wave of Jewish immigration, then of the condition of East European Jewry just before its momentous encounter with the city, goes into many forgotten corners in order to bring home the immediate historical background of most American Jews. Here is the world of the old Russian Pale, where the Jews were literally "captive"; and side by side, the vanishing old Knickerbocker New York, the world of the lower East Side, the struggle in the Jewish community between "Germans" and "Russians"; the Enlightenment, the reform movements in the New York of the 80's and 90's that so often came to focus on the tenements and sweatshops of the East Side, the rise of the Jewish labor movement, the essential part played in the American socialist movement by Jews. Anyone who wants to get at the historical facts about Jewish life in East Europe can learn a great deal from Mr. Rischin's accounts of the founding of the Jewish Labor Bund in 1894 "in an obscure valley in Vilna" ("the first attempt to organize Jews for secular independent political activity"), in his moving documentation of the misery of the East European Jews (in Galicia, five to six thousand Jews regularly died of starvation each year), in his description of emigration procedures (Jews had to steal over the old Russian frontier into German territory, and usually sailed direct from Bremen or Hamburg, at a cost of thirty-four dollars, some "for a saving of nine dollars travelling by way of Liverpool").

Only a handful of East European Jews benefited from overseas ties, for they came from regions which had little direct trade with the United States. Poverty was so acute on the Lower East Side that in 1888 two hundred immigrants were shipped back to Europe on cattle steamers; a report of the period states that among the pushcarts on Hester Street, "every conceivable thing is for sale, chiefly candles, dried fruit, and oilcloth; and the yolk or the white of an egg, or a chicken leg or wing, or an ounce of tea, coffee or butter is not an uncommon purchase." The struggle for existence, as it used to be called openly in those days, comes home to us in the fact that in 1899, within the Eighth Assembly District, 2897 individuals were engaged in 182 different vocations and businesses. Yet between 1899 and 1914, an estimated 66 per cent of gainfully employed Jewish immigrants possessed industrial skills. They were usually the predominant group among the city's hat and cap makers, furriers, tailors, bookbinders, watchmakers, milliners, cigarmakers, tinsmiths, and often as much as half of the tanners, turners, undergarment makers, jewelers, painters, glaziers, dressmakers, photographers, saddle-makers, locksmiths, butchers, and metal workers in other than iron and steel. They ranked first among immigrant printers, bakers, carpenters, cigar-packers, blacksmiths, and building-trades workmen.

SOME items in Mr. Rischin's history are now just quaint, like the early reluctance of Russian immigrants to train for the bar because of their distrust of government, or the dress factories where work was regularly interrupted three times a day for prayer, or such exotica of the period as the Max Hochstim Association of white slavers. Mr. Rischin says that at the end of the century, the majority of patients at Mount Sinai Hospital were already East European immigrants, but that no doctor of this background was as yet admitted to the staff. And citing the statistics that are often more chilling than any naturalistic novel of the period, he brings home the incredible pressure of numbers on the old Tenth Ward, "the most densely settled spot in the city," where in 1890 there were over 523 inhabitants to an acre, and by 1900 more than 700. He describes the old "dumbbell apartments," and quotes from a magazine article of 1888 a description of "great prison-like structures of brick, with narrow doors and windows, cramped passages and steep rickety stairs. They are built through from one street to the other with a somewhat narrower building con-

*Harvard University Press, 342 pages, $7.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necting them . . . . The narrow court-yard . . . in the middle is a damp foul-smelling place, supposed to do duty as an airshaft; had the foul fiend designed these great barracks they could not have been more villainously arranged to avoid any chance of ventilation." The summers were particularly horrible. The tenement inhabitants, "bred in colder and dryer climates, writhed in the dull heat. Added to the relentless sun were the emanations from coal stoves, the flat flame gas jets in lamps, and the power-producing steam boilers."

AGAINST "conditions," the messianic force of Jewish radicalism sometimes beat in vain. The *Forward* was founded in 1897 at a meeting where workmen filled collection plates with "love offerings" of prized pocket watches, watch chains, and personal jewelry. Abraham Cahan said: "If ever there was a paper supported by the holy spirit—upon holy inspiration—it was ours." The *Forward* greeted the new Rand School as "the socialist yeshiva . . . . where the rabbis and teachers of our movement" were being trained. In "Yiddish New York," says Mr. Rischin, humanitarianism, brotherhood, and the socialist-Jewish faith in progress so flowed together that "to the holidays of the Jewish calendar were added Labor Day and May Day, the Fourth of July and the exciting weeks before Election Days . . . . Each passing year recorded the forward march of progress, the anniversaries of the French Revolution and Paris Commune, and the martyred assassins of Alexander II. At home and closer in time, the Haymarket victims, the Hazleton and Colorado miners, Moyer, Haywood, and Pettibone, and the Children of Lawrence, aroused an instinctive philanthropy, compassion, and identification. When in August of 1908 anti-Negro violence reached a climax of blood-letting at Springfield, Illinois, the Yiddish dailies responded with banner headlines and editorials ringing with indignation and disbelief, terming the riots 'the Pogrom in Springfield.'"

On the part of "old New York" itself, one of the most telling reactions was the surprise of Police Commissioner McAdoo that Jewish children had so austere a childhood. "Think of it! Herbert Spencer preferred to a fairy story by boys and girls." Mr. Rischin does not touch on the liberating effect that the old East Side had on the *literary* imagination of the time. Lincoln Steffens of California said that he felt about the ghetto as other boys felt about cowboys and the Wild West, and John Reed of Oregon was proud that within a block of his house was "every adventure in the world." Henry James's outcry in *The American Scene* against Jews crowding up the Lower East Side is well-known. But quite apart from James's usual haughtiness on the subject (which reflects the prejudices of his British circle and is in such contrast to his brother William's open views), the Lower East Side *was* Henry James's old stamping ground. It is a pity that Mr. Rischin, in dealing with the effect of the mass Jewish immigration on the mind of old New York, emphasizes the reactions of reformers like Jacob Riis and Hutchins Hapgood more than the remarkable testimony of writers like Stephen Crane, among other reporters of the subject.

But of course Mr. Rischin's subject is not so much life on the East Side as it is "the search for community in New York between 1870 and 1914"; the group approach, so planted in the instincts of Jews that it can become a barrier to historical curiosity, has here provided a suitable subject for a scholarly history, just as nowadays the group makes a convenient subject for sociologists and psychologists, who can make relevant generalizations about the quality of life in the group without having to labor at historical demonstration. By contrast with so many facile and vague findings in "social science," Mr. Rischin's book stands out by reason of its sobriety and its valuable factuality.

YET at the same time, no one could possibly call this book a work of historical literature. It is stilted in style and on occasion so clumsy in expression as to be virtually unintelligible. These seem to me not so much barriers to literary creation as they are symptoms of a limited approach to Jewish history. In order to be this much of a scholar in Jewish history, the historian will now be absorbed in his subject to the point where he becomes uncritical of it. Another way of saying this, and one that Jewish writers in this country recognize, is that the sympathetic participation in Jewish history that gets a writer to deal with so much human material that is strange and even repellent to other people also forces him to justify everything in it. The continuity of Jewish experience is too wonderful, if not simply too miraculous a fact to be done justice to in secular history; so secular history ignores what is really interesting about Jewish history and central to it, the perpetuation of an idea, its spiritual loyalty, and turns the subject into the history of a *people* only, the group, the clan, the tribe, the Jews. In the interests of this group—I am speaking here of the writing of history, not of one's feelings as a Jew—the historian makes the hero of his story a "community." When you read the history of a "community," whether it is the gushing and indiscriminate history of the Jewish community in . . . , Arkansas, or so scholarly a book as *The Promised City*, you become aware of how many intellectual passions and loyalties are smoothed out and become undifferentiated by the fact that the hero of the story has become a "community"—a term that is suitable to a scholar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly project but is too broad to permit the necessary modulations and ultimate interest of history as literature.

ALFRED KAZIN *is a well-known literary critic. His autobiographical study,* A Walker in the City, *has become one of the classic portraits of the Jewish immigrant milieu.*

* * *

FREE WILL (AGAIN)

Henry David Aiken

FOR A DECADE and more, the most active school of philosophy in English-speaking universities has been the "linguistic philosophy" that stems from the later writing and teaching of Ludwig Wittgenstein. An assumption hitherto basic to members of the school has been that traditional philosophical problems and controversies derive mainly from deep-lying misconceptions and consequent misuses and misapplications of "ordinary language." Ordinary language, it is argued, provides the inescapable matrix of all significant expression and thought. This does not mean that one is never justified in departing from its rules—for example, through metaphorical extension, *ad hoc* contextual stipulation, or systematic redefinition. But such departures from the customary usages of words, however necessary they may be on occasion to the purposes of the poet or the scientist, are nearly always obfuscating when introduced into philosophical discussions. For unlike poetry, philosophy is not a form of free imaginative literature, interesting to us on its own account; nor, despite the pretensions of some of its professors, is it a science whose terms and distinctions are of necessity closely tied to well-developed experimental practices and operations. Whatever else it may be (and perhaps one of the essential features of philosophy is the fact that its practitioners eternally disagree about what it is and what it is for), philosophy, first and last, is talk. But it is talk which somehow always feeds on itself and seemingly makes no egress from the "universe of discourse" into the surrounding world of things and of actions. The hallmark of a philosophical argument, so it is said, is that it is never won, and of a philosophical problem that it is never solved. As one critic of linguistic philosophy succinctly puts it, philosophy, from this point of view, is simply "the pathology of language." Or, to adapt to present purposes a striking phrase of Wittgenstein himself, in philosophy language is not working but "idling."

It has been the business of linguistic philosophy to explain how this is so, the hope being that once the philosopher understands the source of his perplexities, his "mental cramps" will disappear—along with his philosophy itself. And in fact, the implication, never far beneath the surface, is that through the therapy of linguistic (or conceptual) analysis, philosophy, conceived as an academic subject or discipline, will, like the socialist state, gradually wither away and die.

Such a view of philosophy and of the role of linguistic analysis, although it understandably scandalizes the school philosophers, is nothing new; it is only northeast from the positions of Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* and of Berkeley and Hume before him. All of these philosophers regarded most of traditional metaphysics, including what Kant called "rational theology," as a bone-yard of conceptual antinomies and paralogisms. And they all took it upon themselves as philosophers' philosophers to help in the removal of this litter. Hume's celebrated analysis of the free-will problem provides a case in point. "I hope," said he, "to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words." Hume then sought to show that the whole problem of "liberty and necessity" is factitious, the consequence of a radical failure on the part of muddle-heads to distinguish clearly the meanings and to take account of the proper domains of application of the main terms of the controversy. A free act, says Hume in effect, is not causeless, but, rather, a consequence of volitions and choices made by the agent himself. When (as we say) a person does what he wills (or chooses), then he acts freely and is, to that extent, a free agent. Correspondingly, a person is not at liberty and his behavior not free when what happens to him is owing, not to any volition or choice on his part but to some external force beyond his control. But clearly, freedom from external control does not in the least connote an absence of causal determination; on the contrary, a wholly uncaused movement, being something that occurs at random, is precisely not an action for which anyone can be held responsible. Therefore, not only do the essentially ethical conceptions of free and responsible action not entail that of an uncaused and unpredictable happening, but in fact they are inconsistent with it. Thus, if one means by "determinism" simply the principle of universal causation, according to which every state of affairs, including every human action, desire, and choice, has in principle some assignable cause, then determinism is inconsistent, not with free will and free action, but only with the possibility that something may happen for no reason at all. Indeed, as Hume pointed out, the shoe is on the other foot: for it is the indeterminist who, in renouncing the belief that human conduct follows from something

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"durable and constant" in human nature, is precluded from holding anyone responsible for his "actions" and hence from viewing him as an agent, free or otherwise. Law, government, education, even religion all depend upon the firm assurance that men act from assignable motives and for determining reasons; once that assurance is destroyed, the fabric of human intercourse and of civil society is torn beyond repair.

Such has been the position of many philosophers, including Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer, who pride themselves on their respect both for logic and for the prerogatives of scientific explanation. Significantly, the younger linguistic philosophers, judging by the contributions to *Freedom and the Will**—a recent collection edited by D. F. Pears, and including pieces by such distinguished writers as Stuart Hampshire, Iris Murdoch, P. F. Strawson, and G. J. Warnock—find it much too simple. For one thing, it offers no clear or sustained account of the meanings of the key terms of the free-will problem. Eschewing metaphysical make-believe, how are we to construe such "complex and problematical" notions as those of efforts and acts of will; for that matter, what, if anything, is "the will" and in what circumstances can we be said to exercise it? As Professor H. L. A. Hart indicates in his acute discussion of "Acts of Will and Legal Responsibility," the idea of an act of will provides no independent criterion of responsible action; indeed, it seems hardly more than a misleading stand-in for the variegated criteria actually applied in deciding what actions are *not* responsible. Much the same is true in the sphere of morals. An action is said to result from an act of will when someone can be held responsible for it. But there is no single standard for such an act to which appeal must be made in deciding when this is the case. Nor, evidently, can we establish what standards of non-responsibility are to be adopted merely by a nicer scrutiny of "the facts" of human behavior. For the exigent question remains: what sorts of facts are to be judged relevant or decisive in such matters? This, plainly, is a problem of evaluation which in our time has become increasingly difficult and unsettled.

HOWEVER, it is not just the terms of the free-will controversy that are, or have become, problematical. The very meaning, or point, of the doctrine of "determinism" seems increasingly unclear. For instance, in the preceding redaction of Hume's analysis I employed the crucial phrase "in principle" in formulating what I there called "the principle of universal causation." But, as Mr. B. A. O. Williams points out in his excellent opening essay, "Freedom and the Will," very great difficulties "surround the slippery phrase 'in principle.'" Under what conditions, if any, could we know that in principle every event or action has a cause or that its occurrence is predictable? Moreover, how, if challenged, could the meaningfulness of the principle of determinism be established? It is, apparently, no sort of scientific hypothesis, for no one has ever managed to state the observable test-conditions for its falsification. Whatever happens, the determinist may stick to his belief that "in principle" it can be explained; nor can the indeterminist make anything of the occurrence of unprecedented events, for he is in no position to deny that the oddity which he imputes to them is owing merely to limitations of his own experience. Perhaps, as some of the contributors to *Freedom and the Will* rather mincingly suggest, determinism (whatever its proper formulation should be) is less a verifiable theory about the nature of things than a "program" which (I take it) may be desirable or undesirable, realizable or unrealizable, but not true or false. From this point of view, the questions at issue become: (1) what sorts of plans and practices does the program of "natural" science commit us to, especially within the sphere of human behavior? and (2) whether this program, to the extent that it is realizable, is consistent with the practices involved in moral judgment, agency, and responsibility.

Here it may be too much to hope any longer for a knock-down demonstration either of logical consistency or of inconsistency. One reason is that the terms in which the two programs are framed may no longer have the clarity necessary to such a demonstration. However, logical inconsistency is not the only kind of conflict in which rival (if they are such) doctrines may involve us. For example, it may turn out in practice that the attempt to carry out one program would make it practically difficult or in certain instances impossible to carry out the other. Or, as the program of scientific explanation, including the diagnosis and prognosis of individual or group behavior, is carried through in ever increasing detail and range, it may be that the image of man as a responsible and free agent will come to seem inconsequential.

The contributors to *Freedom and the Will* do not discuss these questions in any detail; nor do they make clear just what is involved in conceiving of determinism as a program. And in general it must be reported that their discussions, although stimulating, are too often impressionistic and inconclusive. Moreover, they frequently exhibit precisely the same propensity for unsubstantiated and what I shall call "tendentious" generalization which the linguistic philosophers have rightly criticized in the works of their predecessors. For instance, in the lively fourth chapter, a symposium on "Determinism," the participants (Warnock, Strawson, and J. F. Thompson) debate the concep-

*St. Martin's Press, 136 pp., $3.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tual relationships holding between what may be called "the language of action" (which, at least for most academic Americans, is misleadingly referred to here as "the language of psychology") and "the language of events and processes" (which they speak of as "the language of physics"). Now two of the contributors, Mr. Strawson and Mr. Warnock, appear to think that the language of action (which essentially involves such characteristic concepts as reasons, intentions, choices, and responsibilities) is not only distinct from the language of events (which, in the human sphere, permits us to speak only of bodily movements or changes) but also largely, or wholly, independent of the latter. Thus, according to Mr. Strawson, not only do accounts of human actions involve a systematically different "vocabulary" and call for a wholly different "dimension of explanation" from those in which (as he puts it) we may discuss "particular bits" of human behavior in terms of "moving parts," but indeed there are no "effective correlations" whatever between the two. Hence, as I understand him, physical determinism, according to which all human as well as non-human behavior is explainable in terms of purely "physical laws" (whatever they come to) can never logically "impinge" upon any question about action and choice and therefore free will, since such questions are statable entirely in terms of the language of action (or as he calls it "psychology"). But no careful examination or account of either the vocabularies or the "dimensions" of explanation in question is offered. In fact we are left completely in the dark as to the respective, and presumably divergent, *functions* of the two forms of expression and explanation. Granted that "psychological" explanations have nothing to do with "physical" ones, what difference would it make to our lives and to the conduct thereof if we simply dispensed with psychological chat altogether? To this pressing question Mr. Strawson offers not the vestige of an answer.

On the other side, Mr. Thompson contends that if we assume "unlimited success in physical explanations of physical movements," then it is "by no means clear . . . that people in general would . . . find [the point about absence of correlations between descriptions of actions and descriptions of physical movements] an adequate defense against [physical] determinism." From his point of view, moreover, only scientific investigations could show whether there are "effective correlations" between what is asserted in "psychological terms" about human actions and what is said in "physical terms" about the movements or changes of human organisms. Unhappily, Mr. Thompson, in his turn, offers no clue as to the way in which such an investigation might proceed, so that his contention, which Mr. Strawson finds palpably absurd, can, at this stage, scarcely even be called a "program." Nor does he offer any evidence in support of his speculation that "people in general" would take Strawson's view about a total absence of correlations not only to be an inadequate defense against determinism but in fact a virtual "surrender" to it.

Like Mr. Strawson and unlike Mr. Thompson, I do not think that "correlations" made between statements about actions and statements about purely physical processes can be accounted for exclusively by the procedures of physical science. And this for the reason that it is no part of the function of physical science, as such, to decide what is to be done, to specify or ascribe intentions, to assign responsibilities, and the rest. But like Mr. Thompson and unlike Mr. Strawson, I find it quite fantastic to suppose that there can be no correlations, positive or negative, between statements made in the two "languages" (this we should remind ourselves, is just a manner of speaking; they are in reality merely distinguishable functions of the one familiar language all of us habitually use in the conduct of our affairs). What would be the consequence for our conduct itself if our thinking about human actions were disengaged from any possible reference to the physical movements or changes that often serve as essential evidences for the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of actions of a certain sort? Imagine a killing attended by no physical changes in the body of the victim! And then imagine the effects upon our moral and legal practices if such changes were always declared irrelevant in attempts to establish the guilt (or innocence) of putative killers!

One does not have to be a materialist, whether metaphysical or analytical, in order to acknowledge that our actions cut, and are meant to cut, a swath in the material world. To hack and to saw, to build and to mold, to form and to fashion, to do and to make something admittedly involve more than the modification or transformation of the sheerly physical aspects of things; but they also, inevitably, involve that too. Mr. Strawson strikes me here as the linguistic counterpart of a metaphysical dualist whose logical bifurcation, if resolutely adhered to, would result in practical futility. As the old Greek philosophers more wisely saw, realization of even the most ethereal of aims or "final causes" involves some assignable "material cause" as well. The most impalpable gesture requires the movement of a muscle, and, as Spinoza long ago perceived, a completely immaterial God would, by that very fact, prove to be inconsequential and inactive. For the linguistic philosopher, interested in the logical issues of determinism, the salient, arguable questions are not whether the language of action and that of physics represent two irreducibly different ways of thinking about the human condition, but what assignable roles these languages have in the cus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tomary movements of human thought and conduct; not whether these roles are in principle correlatable, but how they are in practice correlated and to what assignable ends. To these questions, I am sorry to report, none of the present contributors makes a trace of an answer.

IN HIS concluding "Postscript," by some margin the best piece in the book, Mr. Williams briefly considers some of the bearings of psychoanalytic theory, and the forms of "determinism" commonly thought to attend it, upon the problems involved in the free-will controversy. He also mentions, without comment, the highly important fact that many contemporary theories of behavioral and experimental psychology (he might also have included many theories in the so-called social sciences) "seem to aspire to a physicalist basis, and hence not to be very ultimately psychological [sic] . . . ." Unfortunately he does not consider the effects of such theories upon our work-a-day understandings of such concepts as cognition, motivation, learning, emotion, and mind itself. Whether through explicit physicalist redefinitions of such terms or, more informally, by virtue simply of more and more extensive and resolute use of methods of analysis and verification similar to those employed in the physical sciences, the so-called "behavioral sciences" are in process of acquiring conceptual schemes that at least appear analogous to those prevalent in the former disciplines. Particularly in England, where psychology and "social studies" are only grudgingly given the title of "science," the success of such schemes is arguable. But there can be little doubt that our going psychological concepts, first pulled out of shape by psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists, and then hauled and mauled by novelists, critics, and historians, now form a kind of linguistic no man's land where it is next to impossible any longer to be sure of one's logical bearings.

But it is not only the behavioral and semi-behavioral sciences of man that play hob with the language of mind and action. So also do the unprecedented products of modern technology, including computers, automation, and missiles; and so, too, do the incalculable effects, human and otherwise, of modern government and industry, modern war and war-prevention, modern art, and, not least, modern ideology, totalitarian and otherwise. Who, any longer, really knows what to *say* about our modern human and sub-human "doings"? And what are the "proper" words in which to say it? I suspect that one of the primary reasons for the increasing strangeness of so much contemporary imaginative literature and drama, social criticism, and existentialist philosophy and theology is precisely the fact that the familiar, fine, secure old "world" of human agents and actions, obligations and responsibilities, intentions and principles, is simply falling apart. Quite literally, we hardly know what to say and think about one another and so how to take one another; likewise, we hardly know what to think about ourselves and so what to make of or do with the primordial philosophical dictum "know thyself." What the devil does it *mean*?

These points have been highlighted with particular poignancy in recent months by the well-nigh intolerably perplexed and ramified discussions of the Eichmann trial and the "problematic" literature that has grown up around it. As these discussions, like those concerning "the bomb," illustrate, even the merely linguistic aspects of the free-will problem have become deeply, inescapably "moral" and "metaphysical." Or I at least, in order to humanize them, have an uncontrollable impulse so to call and to dignify them. But of course the knife cuts both ways. For until we can decide how we ought, or want, to talk and think about the Eichmanns (both dead and alive), their leaders, their victims, collaborators, accusers, and judges —and until, therefore, we are able to decide whether it any longer means anything to us to speak to each other about such queerish entities as their choices, actions, intentions, and guilt—we will not know what our "sentiments" about them and their neo-gothic doings really are. Either way, we must *decide*. And either way, both ways, the problem concerns the emerging image or, if I may use an overworked but still serviceable word, archetype, of the talking animal himself.

One thing at least is certain: we can never return to the halcyon philosophical days of David Hume, not so much because he was simple-minded, but because we no longer speak the same language. What language, then, do we speak? When we have answered this question, or rather when we know at last what sort of question it is, we may find that the free-will problem is a bit more manageable than it now seems. Meanwhile, we philosophers must ask what happens, in such a changing linguistic world as ours, to a philosophy whose only wisdom, even about language itself, is the dictum: "Ordinary language is correct language; cleave to it and forget your metaphysical agonies." For ordinary language, or at least the vital parts of it that pertain to the life of the mind and of conduct, is increasingly an enigma, a conundrum, and an oracle.

HENRY DAVID AIKEN *is professor of philosophy at Harvard. His series of essays, "American Pragmatism Reconsidered," on Peirce, James, and Dewey appeared in* COMMENTARY *(August-October 1962).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAILER'S CAMPAIGN

THE PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS. By NORMAN MAILER. *Putnam. 302 pp. $5.00.*

Reviewed by MIDGE DECTER

NORMAN MAILER'S *Presidential Papers* is a collection of much of his occasional writing of the last few years. There are the epic essays on the 1960 Democratic convention and the first Patterson-Liston fight; some poems; a couple of interviews, one real, one imaginary; a chapter from a novel in progress; some columns done for *Esquire* and COMMENTARY; a speech delivered in debate with William Buckley; and a few assorted sundries. The pieces are of varying lengths, intensities, and postures, held together by the kind of introductory comments Mailer originally fashioned for *Advertisements for Myself*. Unlike the earlier collection—which spanned many more years and several turnings in his career—the *Papers* are all products of a single and ever-intensifying preoccupation: that vision of men and society for which Mailer has (not entirely arbitrarily) pre-empted the name of existentialism.

The book, like so many of its author's public performances, will not fail to outrage (and all the more since the assassination of President Kennedy). For one thing, because it is exactly that, a public performance. Mailer is a writer who has not for one moment allowed his contemporaries to forget the impulse to seduction by exhibition that trembles beneath the written word. But more important, I think, is that throughout the *Papers* Mailer's cheekiest and gaudiest moments are precisely his most serious ones; he therefore cannot be taken seriously except in his own way on his own terms—which is a form of tyranny that few writers are not either too timid or too well-mannered to impose.

Consider the shocking liberty of these pieces. Norman Mailer sets out to define the application of his existentialist notions to politics; this definition is extracted and formulated out of his own writings; and the whole thing is then consecrated to the education of the President of the United States. What is more, his address to Mr. Kennedy is undertaken in no mere spirit of fun—with little of that ebullience which derives from the new dispensation to make clean sport of public affairs—but for the purpose of being listened to and even wielding some influence. He has himself photographed for the dust jacket seated on an old-fashioned platform rocker; even this is only half a joke, one can see it in his eye—he has considered the position. And taking for himself the ear of the President, what does he offer? The gleanings of three years' insistent and child-like spiritual adventuring, which involves him in considerations of the nature of God and the Devil, magic, violence, cancer, and excrement. What impudence!

To judge from past responses, however, what most of Mailer's confreres are apt to find being violated here is not their sense of the sanctity of John F. Kennedy (though now, of course, that too) but rather their traditional commitment to what should be the sanctity of *Norman Mailer*. Those liberties of his that have always been most violently objected to are not the liberties taken at the expense of public propriety and responsibility but the ones that threaten certain hard-earned pieties of the literary community itself. The truth is that a writing man may with impunity act out just about anything in relation to the society out there—complacency, cynicism, destructiveness, even criminality—anything, that is, except a simple desire to be implicated in its power.

THE trouble with Norman Mailer as a literary figure, then, is that he is always, in the radical sense of the word, so unruly. No sooner is he settled among us at peace, holding our major concessions to his talent and achievement and promise, than he is off again, setting up the next test of his personal strength—and of our willingness to venture. For where he goes he must take everyone, must have confirmation, assent, bigger and newer concessions. When he should be gratified, he turns out to be restless; when he is engaged in what would go down as interesting play, he turns out to be in dead earnest, demanding of us an answering dead earnestness. When he should above all be consolidating his position as a Leading American Novelist, he announces that he is running for President, or Mayor of New York, or whatever. He is, in short, an altogether untrustworthy citizen of the Republic of Letters.

One always speaks of him this way, as a figure, a citizen, instead of merely as a writer; it is really impossible to separate the two. Nor does Mailer himself do so. He gives over his personal gestures and his prose equally to the judgment of the age. For what he is seeking at every moment is the *effect*, the visible effect of his power to create new possibilities, to work what he has called "a revolution in the consciousness of my time." Therefore everything about him is made to matter: not only his books and pieces and poems, but his discoveries of mood as well; or that he beat William Buckley in debate and the New York *Times* failed to record his victory; or that he had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

divined a victory for Patterson in the sixth round, who never even made it through the first; or that he had on a certain occasion not been smoking; or that, to take the matter about as far inside as it can go, some of the body cells had probably expired as a result of a given spiritual onslaught. Now it would not be politic to ignore the fact that such pressure on the material of experience can also be called by a simple, ugly, clinical term. But clinical terms are not so much beside the point as beneath it. For the real point is not that Mailer defines a world over which his being is sovereign, but rather that he risks finding all the dimensions of the real world in himself. He is to be the social microcosm—and thus our voluntary scapegoat for weaknesses and corruptions and inadequacies. This is not a modest or endearing ambition. Its stakes are murderously high. But on the other hand, were Mailer to win, he would win all.

IT IS important to remember about Norman Mailer that though his gestures can be foolish—in the sense of being wasteful, disruptive, misplaced—they are almost never without the grace of consciousness. (As it often works out, he comes under indictment for just those aspects of his behavior and attitudes that he himself finds it necessary, for the sake of what he would assert, to expose. I am thus-and-such a kind of fool, he says, and those who cannot really bear his disorderliness tend to accept at face value this offering of his self-irony.) The closest he has ever come to being utterly graceless is in his piece on Jackie Kennedy. He tells us that after the appearance of his essay on the convention that nominated her husband, she sent him a letter, clearly full of praise. In his answer to her he announced that he was contemplating a work on the Marquis de Sade, and later tried to explain this egregious blunder on grounds of inaccurate sociology. But when a gentleman tries to interest a distant, beautiful, and famous lady in *his* interest in the Marquis de Sade, he is obviously making love to her. And in Mailer's case the love he was making—just like the whole misbegotten impression he presented of the lady in the first place—was merely the expansion of some feeling of pleasure with himself. It was unintelligent of him not to know that; he deserved her silence.

But such lapses are rare. Considering the particular fates chosen for tempting by this man, and the number of temptations offered them, it seems something of a miracle of the spirit that they are so rare. He manages, for instance, to swagger through his introductions, propose solutions to the problems of juvenile delinquency and capital punishment, discuss his hatred of masturbation, analyze the cause of cancer, or even mount a poetic attack on the book reviewers of *Time*—all without making himself look the least bit prettier. He distances himself from nothing, and he withholds nothing. In the shattering account of his almost diabolically perfect louse-up at the famous Liston press conference, one comes upon the denouement—Mailer, a parched beggar, finally wringing one moist "I like this guy" from the world champ—knowing that no matter what his pose of the moment, he will never allow one to be deceived in him. Whether or not he is making a revolution in the general consciousness, he has, perhaps alone in this country, succeeded in investing public unruliness with a serious style. At the very least, then, he may effect a permanent improvement in the manners of radicalism.

The seriousness with which he faces up to his personal demands on this society—and with which he is therefore able to count their cost to the soul—is not merely a matter of bravery (though it is a measure of the corruption of thought and feeling just how brave a man has to be to get down to things so self-evidently simple as wanting to be a member of a world championship). Partly Mailer's daring has to do with something not, I think, sufficiently taken into account about him, and for which *The Presidential Papers* brings massive evidence. And that is how *American* he is. By "American" I do not mean anything literary-metaphysical. I mean quite simply that he owns America. He unquestioningly and unambiguously belongs here; and the whole country gives itself up to him in a range of natural assumption and reference that seems, in its ease and artlessness, quite unavailable to the rest of the special community he inhabits. The America of the essay on Kennedy is not a thought-out or striven-for place but an experienced one, geographically, socially, and culturally. It is a country which by virtue of its solidity, rather than its abstractness, lends itself to subtle analysis—and by the same token, to real subversion. Probably a lot of this has to do with the fact that Mailer as a very young man experienced an enormous American-style success, virtual movie-stardom. But whatever the reason, one thing is clear: he has not the slightest doubt, and therefore needs not the slightest justification, of his right to be important. He calls himself an existentialist, but he is no snob of existences. If he is alienated (sanctified condition), it is an alienation from within, the kind one suffers in relation to one's family rather than to one's neighbors. The difficulty, of course, is that his own family has the power to make even the soberest and most mature of men misbehave. But on the other side, no one can have more power than he to hit them where they live.

THIS FREEDOM to take for granted the terms of his own culture without flinching has made of Mailer a very earnest man. He forever takes one by surprise with his earnestness. It is a quality not much associated with sophistication or subtlety: passion, yes, and even a capacity for murderous reduction—but not the kind of dogged, megalomaniacal earnestness that was meant earlier by the word "childlike." In this book, for example, the Devil, plastic, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cancer, his three main symbols for the totalitarianism he maintains is threatening to swallow up man's being, are not interesting or illuminating metaphors for evil; they are the actual, material conditions of evil. The God described by Mailer as dependent for his continuing sovereignty on the strategic successes of his human troops is the living God in Mailer's firmament. The waste that results from people's inability to make heroic acceptances and undergo heroic assimilations is—their excrement. At least half of *The Presidential Papers* is taken up directly, and the rest indirectly, with relating these conditions to a varying group of subjects (one should really say objects): from Fidel to birth control to Hasidism: sometimes with blinding brilliance; sometimes with great wit and spirit; sometimes with the kind of clumsiness that comes with bearing down too hard on one's words and being too solemn in one's soul. Only a very reckless man would be in such a hurry to convert his images into new categories of thought. And only a very generous one would leave it so obvious where these categories do and do not work.

I think it is safe to assert that Mailer will not, at least in his own terms, win all. No one less than a major philosopher could succeed in synthesizing what are so far only the bits and pieces of the revolution he means to achieve. And Mailer is no philosopher: his "philosophy" is poetry, requiring always his discrete and precise perceptions of the moment to persuade us. Partly from intellectual brashness and partly from a novelist's habit of thought, he is in the end not sufficiently respectful toward the history of man's difficulties with the problems raised in this book. When he writes discursively of the possibility that there are extranatural connections between natural phenomena, for instance, he manages only to convince us of how sincerely he believes in them. But when he works his willingness to consider the power of magic against something he has actually seen or known—when, in short, he acts the observer he supremely is—he is able to provide all the evidence needed for the truth and rightness of his own sense of things. His COMMENTARY column on dread and the absolutely breathtaking description of Patterson's defeat are examples of how Norman Mailer can illuminate those things on heaven and earth our philosophy has not lately bothered to dream of. The man in the state of existential dread and Floyd Patterson are not appropriate figures for a universal discourse, but they are, inescapably, one's fellow Americans. Whatever else Mailer may have failed to do, he has, by a grand fidelity to the character of his own perceptions, given these men's experience a necessary new dimension. If he has not earned the right to deal with the universe, natural or otherwise, no one is currently telling us more about the United States of America.

RISING EXPECTATIONS

INVISIBLE LATIN AMERICA. By SAMUEL SHAPIRO. *Beacon. 180 pp. $3.95.*

Reviewed by KEITH BOTSFORD

I SEE a grim period ahead, in which all good Americans, God save us, are going to have to worry about Latin America as we were once taught to worry about the starving children of China. There are people who sincerely believe that the southern part of our hemisphere is the key to the world's future. Without going as far as Mr. Bundy—who (when asked why he thought Latin American Studies was a second-rate field in the United States) once disconcerted a Harvard audience by answering that he expected it was because South America was such a second-rate place—I think we are, thanks to Cuba, greatly exaggerating its importance. Latin America has become like an unfaithful mistress to a middle-aged man, the test of our potency.

As Mr. Shapiro rightly points out in his useful little guide to economical and political Latin America, we once had the illusion of omnipotence; and now, though some of our legislators and a strong delegation at the White House are not aware of it, we no longer wield the same power, or on the same basis. We are feeling the chilling fears of advancing age: we begin to worry whether we are presenting ourselves well and whether we're generous enough, or whether the young lover will carry off the bride. If you want to know exactly why we're suffering these pangs of doubt, fear, or loss, and how we feel them, from a liberal, fair, and objective point of view, Mr. Shapiro's book is an excellent though very brief guide. It avoids the dullness of the academic centers of Latin American Studies and the bias of most journalism on the subject. In addition, it has a pleasantly modest and sincere tone. Mr. Shapiro is young and ardent; he believes what he says and has the good scholar's virtue of so ordering his material that the reader who does not know much about the continent can absorb and profit from what he says.

Basically his theses are two. The first is taken from his title, itself derived from that eminent Colombian German Arciniegas: the key to Latin America is its dormant mass, the sleeping volcano on which, unaware, unheeding, and complacent, the precarious superstructure of civilization that is Latin America rests. This mass is poor, abused, and exploited and some day, if we do not take up our version of the White Man's Burden, it will do us all in. His second thesis is that United States foreign policy toward Latin America, due in major part to business pressures, has been singularly blind and obtuse, not to speak of uncouth, immoral, and profitless.

WITH NEITHER of these theses could anyone quarrel. The first is an observable fact; the second a national shame. His argument is clearly stated in a series of essays

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on representative Latin American nations, classified according to their degree of political development. These are, with the countries he has chosen to illustrate them: conservative regimes with some degree of political democracy —Peru; new liberal regimes—Venezuela; revolutionary regimes—Cuba and Bolivia; and post-revolutionary regimes—Mexico. An opening chapter of classification and background and a closing chapter with modest and sensible proposals for American policy complete the book.

A number of minor errors should be noted in passing. Some are due to dating. Thus the Venezuelan land reform is slighted on the basis of its achievements by the end of 1961—750,000 acres of land distributed—when a more recent figure shows 2,000,000 *hectares*. Others are due to haste, or to the fact that no one can know everything about Latin America, such as Professor Shapiro's acceptance of Mexican mythology in calling Zapata an illiterate sharecropper, when he was neither one nor the other. Still others are due to a rather indiscriminate sympathy with liberal causes, such as his defense of the Stalinist thug Siqueiros; or to a misplaced faith in such figures as A. A. Berle, Jr., or Juscelino Kubitschek, the former holding the world's record for wrong-headedness on Latin America and the latter being only slightly better than a high-grade grafter.

A final category, like his summary dismissal of Theodore Draper's thesis on the middle-class origin of the Cuban Revolution, is really more a question of debatable issues than actual mistakes. The Cuban rural problem, for instance, is far from solved, as a glance at René Dumont's fascinating and tantalizingly brief study of the problem in *France Observateur* shows. The adherence of the peasantry to the regime has been paid for with privileges—escape to the city—for those found worthy. In fact, the whole chapter on Cuba—I am aware how sensitive the issue is—is not entirely satisfactory. Though I would rather have Mr. Shapiro's passion and sympathy than the reams of hysteria which fill the popular press, I still cannot bring myself to value human liberty so lightly in the scale against material improvement in the lot of the masses, or to believe that dictatorship is a *necessary* transitional step in social change. Here I think Mr. Shapiro errs in overestimating the importance of a solution to the *rural* crisis in Latin America. In the United States, the most advanced nation in the world, until well into the New Deal, a large part of the rural population was both ignorant and poor, truly cut off from the material and cultural benefits enjoyed by the rest of the population.

MUCH more fundamental is the fact that for all its sympathy for the plight of Latin America, the rather moralizing frame of reference and the strong flavor of right-mindedness make this a curiously (North) American book. No one who was not a *yanqui* could place the emphases so exactly where Mr. Shapiro has placed them, on economics and politics, and so completely omit every other aspect of Latin American life and culture. It is true that his intention was primarily to describe a "situation" and not to find the *reasons* for this situation, but I persist in believing that the one cannot be understood without the other.

The continent had, in the 19th century, its great men and its great visions. It faced the future as we in the United States did, with noble ideals and devoted servants of these ideals, like Sarmiento and Don Pedro II of Brazil; it had riches untold, frontiers to be explored. Somewhere in the passage to the 20th century, one half of the American dream collapsed. Why? The argument is usually made that Iberian blood and culture, language and religion were inadequate to the task; that geography prohibited it; that slavery and miscegenation diluted it. But surely these are simplistic answers. Some of the weaknesses of this book involve similar ones.

I have space to mention only one such weakness, Professor Shapiro's good, liberal, anti-military prejudice, which I share. But we are both *gringos*, and our military and their role under our constitution, their composition, and a thousand other factors are totally different from those found in most countries of Latin America (*not* the Dominican Republic, let it be said) where the military are a middle-class elite with a historical tradition and a definite and well-understood role to play in their societies. More thoroughly and more objectively trained than any other defined group in the nation, they were never designed for warfare, but for use as a force of internal stability. They have traditionally been a means of ascension within the society and reflect, *grosso modo*, the same tensions and political tendencies as the middle class in general: with this difference, that they are less patient with the inefficiency, corruption, demagoguery, and instability of the civil regimes, because they, unlike any other group in the nation, can do something about it. If we want to understand Latin America, which shows many signs of incipient Nasserism, we have to take this phenomenon into serious consideration within its own context.

Not wishing to end on a sour note of dissent, let me add that I would not make this plea for a little deeper thought if I did not think that Mr. Shapiro showed every sign of being able to undertake it, and if I did not believe that a little more intellectual discernment and a little less "reporting" on the uneasy masses ("quiescent volcanos," "restless millions," etc.) were not greatly overdue.

A HARD LOOK AT LABOR

THE STATE OF THE UNIONS. By PAUL JACOBS. *Atheneum. 303 pp. $5.00.*

Reviewed by LEWIS A. COSER

PAUL JACOBS is one of the handful of labor reporters who write with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a sense of intimate knowledge. He was for many years a union organizer and official and remained in close touch with the labor movement after leaving it to become a journalist. Of late he has been in charge of the trade union project of the Fund for the Republic. Few men are better qualified to write a full-scale study of the "state of the unions" today.

But this book, unfortunately, is not such a study. It is instead a loosely sewn collection of unrevised articles which originally appeared in *The Reporter,* COMMENTARY, *Dissent, Harper's,* and in booklets issued by the Fund for the Republic. Hence, those unions that happen to have been topical in recent years, like the Teamsters and the ILGWU, are treated quite fully. Others, such as the United Automobile Workers and the white-collar unions which seem to be at least as important for the future development of the labor movement, receive no attention at all.

Along with being lopsided, Jacobs's coverage is also dated. "Dave Beck, president of the Teamsters," writes Jacobs, "whose job Hoffa is sometimes charged with coveting . . ." Well, that was in 1957 and Hoffa has had the job for several years. You read that, "Jimmy Hoffa is forty-three years old," and wonder whether he is really that young, before you realize that he is nearly fifty now. And so it goes through most of the book. When Jacobs speaks of "last summer," he may be referring to any summer since 1956, and when he refers to someone "now awaiting trial," the chances are good that the man has long since been either sentenced or acquitted. And if it is irritating to read that Hoffa is "ninth vice-president" of the Teamsters on page five, it is downright annoying to be given the same information fifteen pages later. But the main source of annoyance is the thought that a writer with Jacobs's ability to provide us with a full and astute assessment of the current labor movement should offer instead such a hastily concocted one. It is precisely the incisiveness of observation and the sureness of touch displayed in a number of these essays which make one most deplore the sketchiness of the whole.

Jacobs is at his most incisive when he takes issue with the pious platitudes which pass for analysis among most liberal labor writers. He delights, for example, in showing that if "bad" union leaders, such as Hoffa, run their unions in a dictatorial manner, many "good" union leaders, such as David Dubinsky, do likewise. In his superbly irreverent essay on Dubinsky and the problems of the ILGWU, Jacobs charges that its aging elite of Jewish officials are unresponsive to the needs and desires of its Negro and Puerto Rican rank and file. Jacobs's ability to draw blood is testified to by the fact that he was subsequently attacked by professional Jewish liberals and a variety of union "pork choppers" as an enemy of labor and, even, as an anti-Semite. Similarly, Jacobs's unfashionable views on the breakdown of the traditional collective bargaining process caused Clark Kerr, who was acting as chairman of the advisory committee to the Fund for the Republic's trade union project, to dissociate himself from Jacobs's report. In it, Jacobs argues that government intervention in the bargaining process will inevitably increase in the future and that the old forms of labor-management relations can no longer cope with the problems posed by automation and structural unemployment. Jacobs has come a long way from his days as a young radical organizer in the 30's, but he has not lost his impatience with the received pieties shared by the labor establishment, its liberal allies, and most academic "labor relations experts."

IF MUCH of Jacobs's commentary on the labor movement is highly critical, it also is informed by a sympathetic attachment, if not always to the officers then to the members of the unions. His essay on restrictive practices, featherbedding, and makework in the newspaper and airlines industries not only illuminates highly technical issues such as the dispute over the "third and fourth man" in jet aircraft cockpits, but also makes one aware of the human concerns and issues which lie behind the union's demands. Jacobs's awareness of the problems of the underdog also distinguish his discussions of the migrant workers and of the Negro's relations with the labor movement, and serves to redeem these otherwise rather dated studies; he is equally moving and effective when he writes about the denial of democratic rights to a handful of rank-and-file reformers within the International Association of Machinists.

IN THIS LAST essay, Jacobs also manages to raise a number of disturbing questions about internal union democracy and the rights of union members. These questions are further explored in a fine review-essay of *Union Democracy,* a study of the International Typographical Union, by S. M. Lipset *et al.* Jacobs criticizes the general tendency to regard this union as a kind of model because of its high degree of internal democracy. He notes that the Teamsters Union has probably improved the lot of its members to a greater degree than has the ITU. Could it be that the ITU has paid a high price for its internal democracy? Furthermore, the ITU functions as a highly conservative and even reactionary force in the community, while some of the unions that have been providing a strong progressive influence, such as the ILGWU, are run in a highly dictatorial manner. In other words, if the ITU furnishes one type of model, the ILGWU furnishes another. How, then, should one judge between them: is internal democracy necessarily preferable to overall impact and effectiveness?

Jacobs's toughmindedness is particularly evident when he shows, in a manner reminiscent of Lincoln Steffens's pioneering work on corruption in city politics, that it serves very little to wax indignant at the lawlessness of particular unions or union leaders and to ignore the fact that such practices usually reflect social and economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conditions prevailing within the industry. Steffens once wrote: "You cannot build or operate a railroad, or a street railway, gas, water, or power company . . . without corrupting or joining in the corruption of the government. You tell me privately that you must, and here I am telling you semi-publicly that you must." Jacobs similarly suggests that much of the highfalutin moralizing of men like Robert Kennedy about racketeering in the Teamsters and elsewhere bypasses the real issue. The morals of many managers of trucking companies are by no means superior to the morals of many Teamster officials, and, in fact, the corruption that the moralizers attribute to the acts of particular individuals often turns out to be the result of the occupational mores common to a whole industry. The exclusively moral emphasis quickly loses sight of the structural conditions which generate evil in the first place.

Though Jacobs's repeated mention of his radical past can become a little awkward and tiresome, it remains true that this experience helped to shape his present concerns and methods. He owes to it at least part of his capacity to move from particular observations to informed generalizations; he also has preserved the radical's concern for the victimized and his close attention to the mechanics of bureaucratic power. Above all, he has carried away from the 30's a commitment to the cause of social justice, which moves him to question the ways in which Robert Kennedy has waged his vendetta against the Teamsters well beyond the limits of the legally permissible. Jacobs finds that Hoffa's rights have been violated and ends his examination of the evidence with a plea of hardheaded and genuine eloquence: "Although I have nothing in common with Hoffa, the union leader, Hoffa, the citizen is me. His rights are the same as mine and require the same protection."

This is Jacobs at his best, a man who writes about the unions and their leaders with a toughness, fairness, and sense of perspective which cut through the journalistic cant and academic expertise that make up so much of the current discussion of the labor movement. One hopes that the next time he will produce the more comprehensive and coherent study of the unions that is so badly needed today.

SUCH WERE THE JOYS

THE SCIENTIFIC INTELLECTUAL. By LEWIS S. FEUER. *Basic Books. 441 pp. $10.00.*

Reviewed by JOHN MADDOX

FOR DECADES now, but especially since the first Sputniks went into orbit, the slogan, "Science Can Be Fun" has been used by teachers and others of missionary bent to attract the interest of indifferent children and even to persuade fully grown adults that they should keep up on such matters as the Expanding Universe or the Second Law of Thermodynamics. It is a curious slogan, for its wording suggests that everybody knows in his heart that science really stands for something altogether different. And, indeed, there is hardly a Congressional hearing at which some pundit does not avow that science will lead us to prosperity, or immortality, or victory in the cold war—but hardly to fun. So it is refreshing that a book has been written which sets out to prove with scholarly sobriety not merely that science *can* be fun but that, in its origins at least, it was hardly anything else.

More formally, the thesis of Professor Feuer's book runs as follows: "The scientific intellectual was born from the hedonist-libertarian spirit which, spreading through Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, directly nurtured the liberation of human curiosity. Not asceticism, but satisfaction; not guilt, but joy in human status; not self-abnegation, but self-affirmation; not contempt for one's body and one's senses, but delight in one's physical being; not the exaltation of pain, but the hymn to pleasure—this was the emotional basis of the scientific movement of the seventeenth century."

This constitutes a very proper challenge to the standard assertion that modern science sprang from the ascetic doctrine of the Protestant Reformation. The trouble is, however, that Professor Feuer's eagerness to uncover traces of the hedonist-libertarian spirit in the history of science and in the doings of scientists leads him into frequent exaggerations and occasional absurdities of his own. His demonstration, for instance, that the austere Newton was really a hedonist at heart demonstrates only that Professor Feuer would not be daunted by a demand to prove that Falstaff, say, was really an ascetic. Similarly, the argument that the anatomists (led by Vesalius) could openly undertake the systematic dissection of the human body at this point in history only because of a secular decline in the tyranny of Oedipal guilt may have a grain of truth in it, but not nearly enough to make a half-truth. It is also somewhat comic to see what use Professor Feuer makes of the well-known fact that some (but not all) of the founders of the Royal Society of London frequented the Restoration coffee-houses. In these meeting-places, he writes, "The hedonistic movement had found its symbolic beverage."

This invocation of the teetotaling hedonists of the 17th century raises the question of just what the hedonist-libertarian spirit could consist of, but Professor Feuer does not have a clear answer. He says that hedonism implies freedom from guilt, and that libertarianism means independence of character, but these definitions are pretty vague and remarkably limited as descriptions of human behavior. People, even when they are scientists, are more complicated than that.

The important failing of this book, however, is historical rather than psychological or scientific. In spirit as well as in time, the new science was part and parcel of the Renaissance and cannot be separated from it. It is, after all, no more remarkable that Copernicus

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should have made the first attempt to describe the solar system as it really is than that Chaucer should have begun to write about people as they really are. To single out science, as Professor Feuer does, and to put forward a separate and special explanation for the scientific aspect of the Renaissance, is to do violence to the spirit of the time. What right have we to suppose that the 16th and 17th centuries were also riven into two cultures, but had not the wit to invent Sir Charles Snow?

These qualifications are important because they affect our assessment of what science is for, and our expectations of what it can (or cannot) accomplish. The sting in the tail of Professor Feuer's argument (labeled "Epilogue" in the book) is the assertion that in the last few decades there has been "an erosion of the classical ethos of science." Scientists, he says, have abandoned their traditional optimistic (and, by implication, humanistic) outlook, and have taken to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other such things. At the same time, the pleasure of scientists in their own achievements has given way to guilt (on the Oppenheimer pattern) or at least to ambivalence.

Like the historical analysis that takes up most of the book, this is an impetuous over-simplification, ignoring, for one thing, the essential distinction between science and technology. Science is an ordered body of knowledg whose successes are cumulative, stacked on top of each other like bricks in the structure of a house, while technology, on the other hand, is capricious. Society chooses what it wants and technology delivers it—as, in the last few decades, it has delivered the polio vaccine, color television, and the atomic bomb. Both science and technology are shot through with a kind of optimism, science allowing that increased knowledge with no utilitarian considerations must somehow improve the human condition, technology limiting itself to the claim that it can transform society, for better and for worse.

So far as science is concerned, it is true that there have been alarming signs recently that scientists are losing sight of the basic ethic of their calling—the ethic which asserts that understanding is an end in itself, whether it makes people happy or miserable, and whether it yields real benefits or not. Granted that science has, of late, been making more promises in the real world than it will be able to keep; that it has become unhealthily dependent on the expectations of its patrons—industry, the military, and those of us who would like not to die of cancer; that there is too much second-rate work being done, and far too much that is third-rate. The remedy for such maladies, however, is to be sought not in science itself, but in the universities and patronage committees where quantity is stressed over quality.

Technology, also, is in a bad way, but it is mischievous to blame the scientists (or the technologists) for this, and it is humbug to say, as Professor Feuer does, that the creation of nuclear weapons and their continual development amount to an "erosion of the classical ethic of science." The existence of nuclear weapons is an indication of the failure of nations to conduct international affairs sensibly and most certainly not of the extent to which science may be supposed to have forsaken the "hedonist-libertarian spirit." Since the dropping of the very first bomb, scientists have been as uncertain as laymen over the virtues of nuclear weapons, a division which persists in the present disagreement about whether or not to race the Russians to the surface of the moon. Certainly it is hard to believe that this particular technological enterprise would have been undertaken at all if the politicians had not decided that its accomplishment is necessary for the prestige of the West. Society, and not science, calls the technological tune, and hence society, and not science, must take responsibility for what technology does or does not do.

Professor Feuer is most misleading, then, in suggesting that science is an autonomous phenomenon that derives its s
self-contained and
ing force. Many ot
genuine enough, but i
reasonable to hope that they
dispelled by some change of h
within "science," as it would be
society to deal with the problems of international finance by hoping for the discovery of new gold fields, rich enough to put more money into international circulation. Just as the world must learn to regulate such matters as fishing rights off coastal waters, or the size of its population, so must it learn to regulate technology. It is not science that needs an infusion of the "hedonist-libertarian spirit"; it is society at large.

DE GAULLE AND AFTER

THE TRIAL OF CHARLES DE GAULLE. By ALFRED FABRE-LUCE. Translated by Antonia White. *Praeger. 270 pp. $4.95.*

A MODERN FRENCH REPUBLIC. By PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE. Translated by Anne Carter. *Hill & Wang. 192 pp. $3.95.*

Reviewed by J. G. WEIGHTMAN

BOTH THESE BOOKS—one a political fiction, the other a political blueprint—deal ostensibly with the future. The first looks forward to an unspecified date when General de Gaulle, having fallen from power, is brought before the French Senate, sitting as a court, to be tried for crimes against the state. The second starts from the assumption that the Gaullist regime can be no more than an interlude in French history, an accident associated with the General's personality, and must inevitably be followed by some new system that all good democrats should be busy working out here and now. However, only Mendès-France is really thinking about the future. Fabre-Luce is supposing a future collapse in order, once again, to rake over the unsatisfactory embers of the past. He could have little or no place, for instance, in Mendès-France's vision

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

...olic. Nor has he ...is own; as an unre... ...inist, he is committed ...petual reassessment of the ...ears, because he refuses to be ...t on the scrap-heap of history. Those moments of supreme choice are now fading into the distance, but Fabre-Luce repolishes his arguments to show that the options he preferred, although perhaps strategically wrong, were intellectually and morally justified. As one might expect, "The Trial of Charles de Gaulle" is also "The Defense of Alfred Fabre-Luce."

The book is banned in France, much to the delight, I imagine, of Fabre-Luce himself. I had the pleasure of reading it in Paris in 1962, at Christmas, and I must say it was rather fun to be handed the precious volume, wrapped in a newspaper, in the entrance hall of a hotel and then to return it, again by hand, to a secretary sitting in a little back room in a street significantly named *rue Monsieur le Prince*. The ban was a comic blunder on the part of the Gaullist authorities; as Fabre-Luce himself pointed out in an interview, all the criticisms he makes of the President have been voiced at some time or other in the French press. And—what is more interesting—the book can be read as a grudging tribute to de Gaulle by someone who, in slightly different circumstances, might very well have been on his side.

De Gaulle is not humiliated in the book; he is represented as refusing to utter a word, since he considers himself to be above all such contingencies. Fabre-Luce has even been criticized by anti-Gaullists for ending the story just before the Court pronounces its verdict; his hesitation probably arises not from chicken-heartedness but from a genuine uncertainty about his attitude toward the General.

THE indictment, although very wittily expressed, is on familiar lines. Going back to the beginnings of de Gaulle's fame, Fabre-Luce argues that the General's reputation as a military expert is based on misunderstandings. He was in favor of tank warfare, but did not foresee the combination of tanks and dive-bombers which accounted for the German success. He wanted to create *une redoute bretonne*, i.e. to defend Brittany against the German invader—a policy which, if it had been accepted, would have led to still greater disaster. His famous saying: "France has lost a battle; France has not lost the war" was borrowed from Duff Cooper. The one expedition entirely under his control—the attack on Dakar—was a complete failure. The whole creation of the Free French Movement was of doubtful value because it split the French nation, whereas Pétain's armistice gave the Allies a valuable breathing space and inveigled Hitler into making a mistake.

De Gaulle's postwar maneuvering and resignation are hardly mentioned; Fabre-Luce jumps almost directly to the circumstances of the return to power in 1958, and here, of course, he has little difficulty in showing how the General, with extraordinary skill, played one side against the other and was carried back to the Elysée through the combined efforts of mortal enemies, all of whom thought he was their man. Ultimately, de Gaulle owes his return to the supporters of *l'Algérie Française*, who were willing to risk civil war for their cause and to whom he gave definite encouragement. He has betrayed them and, by granting independence to Algeria, has signed away part of the national territory he was more or less pledged to defend. He is a monster of self-centered pride, who is prepared to make any sacrifice to his bloated ego.

This is all true enough but, as one reads the book, different conclusions can appear almost equally true. De Gaulle may have been wrong about technicalities, but his stand, as a symbol of resistance, was no doubt an essential element in the Allied war effort, whatever the confusion he made between the French nation and his own personality. His tactical duplicity in the months and years preceding his return to power in 1958 is undeniable; can he be blamed for it, when he himself has repeatedly stated that such duplicity is an essential weapon of the statesman? He must be given credit for using his unique personal position to bring the Algerian War to an end, while avoiding civil strife. For him, political action is an expression of his megalomania, yet, to do him justice, one must admit that he has progressed. From his early writings, he could have been expected to develop in the direction of the unintelligent, semi-fascist Right, and this is precisely the part of French opinion that he has at once flattered and defeated. Fabre-Luce, although he is on the Right too, cannot be called unintelligent, and it is clear that he senses, with something approaching admiration, how complex a figure Charles de Gaulle is.

IT IS nevertheless obvious that the personal rule of one man, whether he is complex or not, is no substitute for the normal "breathing" of a country through its representative organs. France had difficulty with her breathing, so her democratic lungs were collapsed and General de Gaulle's ample chest is left to swell for the whole nation. While accepting this situation a shade too lightly, almost as if it were a kind of accidental lull a country is entitled to from time to time, M. Mendès-France is concerned to take advantage of it to sketch out a plan for the new France which should follow de Gaulle's withdrawal from public life and which will be neither like the Gaullist regime nor like the France of the Fourth Republic. His proposals are based on the impressions he collected during a tour of France in 1961, when he discussed the nation's problems with some hundreds of individuals in all walks of life. He examines each department of the national activity and makes rational suggestions for its improvement. His most important proposal, no doubt, is that centralized economic planning should be carried much further,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though with far greater flexibility in regional development.

I can find nothing to quarrel with in the book as a statement of aims; it is lucid, unprejudiced, all-embracing. Why, then, should it be rather depressing? The reason probably is that it has the brightness and slickness of a confident academic exercise. De Gaulle is in power through a welter of all-too-human psychological causes; Mendès-France devotes part of the leisure thus provided to writing a neo-Cartesian discourse on the ideal political arrangement of the country, but has little or nothing to say about the viscous density of human psychology which governs all political change. He showed considerable political realism during his short spell as Prime Minister; it is a pity there is no detailed realism in this book to give us genuine hope for the future.

THE UNDERCLASS

CHALLENGE TO AFFLUENCE. By GUNNAR MYRDAL. *Pantheon. 172 pages. $3.95.*

Reviewed by BEN B. SELIGMAN

BEFORE I start to talk about this wonderful little book—wonderful because it speaks bluntly of fundamental issues—I want to get some things off my chest. I am disturbed by the cavalier manner in which several recent works of similar intent have been treated in the press, and even in these pages, by some of our sophisticated economists. Here we have an economy that by all accounts is far from being a roaring success—a growth rate which barely manages to stay even with the population explosion, several million unemployed, an insulated defense sector that takes the best talents in our society, and an underground of invisible men and women whose pittance of earnings barely allows them to subsist. But when a few writers try to tell us why or to offer reasonable utopias (are utopias always so unreasonable?), the sophisticated response appears to be little more than a gravelly grunt disguised as semi-scholarly criticism.

Thus Edward Hollander, chairman of ADA's executive committee, is so dazzled by the dynamism and resilience of the American system that he finds David Bazelon's trenchant analysis of the paper economy* merely an undignified case of intellectual nose-thumbing; Paul Samuelson, the nation's leading economist and a top Kennedy adviser, admits that he is utterly bored whenever he hears of the West Virginia miners; and Robert Heilbroner, who really ought to know better, is impelled to characterize Robert Theobald's proposal for a guaranteed social minimum income as an Indian rope trick, mainly because the latter failed to plot in fine detail how that scheme might be achieved. What these economic sophisticates seem to be saying is, "Yes, the poverty and high-level stagnation and the futility of the new technology have been exposed. But enough of that. Let us go on to the standard Keynesian remedies and not stoop to argue off-beat ideas to correct the flow of an economic cornucopia, which though a bit erratic and admittedly pointed in the wrong direction, nevertheless yields some small quantity for those shoved aside."

If this is indeed to be the new debate on economic issues which now baffle the best of minds, I shudder to think of the treatment that may be accorded Gunnar Myrdal's latest book on America, *Challenge to Affluence*. In fact, Heilbroner already has told this eminent Swedish economist that we do not need any advice, and one can almost hear other Keynesian epigones exclaiming: "Who is this stranger in our house who criticizes its structure?"

HOWEVER, like a number of other observant visitors from de Tocqueville to Bryce to Keynes himself, Myrdal knows more about our house than most of us do. His most famous work is, of course, *An American Dilemma*, the classic study of our race relations in which he revealed the tragic
action in its full
sity. Few American
been capable of handli
ating subject or were even
to do so. In addition to this rem
able study, Myrdal's contributi
to contemporary economics has already assured him a permanent place in the pantheon of great economists. In his theoretical work he has exposed the impossibility of building a pure social science that imitates physics or astronomy in being devoid of value judgments. Much to the consternation of his academic colleagues, he has shown that political attitudes cannot be excluded from so-called first principles and that positive propositions in social science—those which seek to elucidate a set of consequences from *a priori* statements—invariably disguise a normative bias.

Myrdal's vast experience during the past four decades—as professor, member of the Swedish parliament, cabinet minister, economic planner, bank director, international civil servant, and author of a forthcoming massive study of Southeast Asia—has made him into a cheerful pessimist who can visualize with full clarity the contours of the good society and at the same time explain in technical detail why the policies of the powerful nations of the West are invitations to doom. About a year ago, I attended an off-the-record meeting in Washington to which Myrdal had been invited to speak. A large man, with deep alert eyes, he entered the room, sat down, and without waiting for the chairman's introduction, he pounded the table and exclaimed: "What *is* the matter with you American economists? Your country is in trouble, real trouble, and you spin delicate theories in the air!"

The ideas which he then proceeded to throw at us have been brought together in *Challenge to Affluence*. The central one is that the American economy is undergoing serious structural change. Curiously enough, this upsets some liberal economists who are so devoted to orthodox Keynesianism that they see tax cuts and interest-

* See COMMENTARY September, October, and November, 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

.n as the only cure
.ls. Further, because
writers have argued
.mployment stems mainly
. the laziness of our youth and
.e unwillingness of unemployed miners to move to the West Coast, liberals have been reluctant to consider the structural case at all, and in fact have often denied that it exists. This strange game in political economy—avoiding problems because your opponent is talking about them—is practiced not only in official Washington and among its academic advisers, but in the unions as well. This is surely self-defeating, for the evidence on structural change is quite persuasive and by no means supports the conservative position.

Rapid expansion is, of course, essential for a viable economy. But it will not by itself reduce unemployment to manageable proportions, since increases in productivity and automation tend to destroy the more common kinds of work, and to create more esoteric, and fewer, jobs in their place. As Myrdal demonstrates, these new jobs call for higher education: contemporary unemployment afflicts mainly the uneducated. As time wears on, the latter will increase in number, and lacking any genuinely massive corrective measures, they will become an army of unused and unusable persons—an "underclass" as Myrdal calls them. This is a structural problem created by the changing character of industry itself. Plants move to new locations; some industries grow, others decline; even in a single industry, the company mix may be shifting. The unemployment that this creates exhibits less and less of a temporary "frictional" character. It contributes to the "underclass" which is already forming in our society, an increasing body of unemployed who have been out of work for so long that they are too discouraged even to look for jobs. Though uncounted and virtually invisible, this group recently has been estimated to number over a million and a half persons. Should the economy begin one of its periodic momentary spurts, then some of these long-term unemployed may be absorbed, but the climb will have to be extraordinarily vigorous and of enormous magnitude to draw back all those who are still capable of working.

WHAT THEN are we to do? The program Myrdal suggests is familiar enough and much has already been written about it—education, retraining, slum clearance, housing, urban transport, area redevelopment, expanded public services. All this is essential. So is a good fiscal environment. However, in Myrdal's view, and I believe he is right, the latter alone would be insufficient. Even the postwar explosion in effective demand was rooted in a structural change imposed by the war economy. Hence, tax cuts and other fiscal measures need to be supported by a much greater educational effort and by a vastly expanded program of public improvements. Will it be done? Here Myrdal has some doubts, for the President, he states ". . . will not ask enough, and in any case, not get Congress to accept more than a very minor part" of the measures required.

Yet characteristically, Myrdal refuses to be discouraged. Since the poor of America are inarticulate and in politics can speak only in a whisper, if at all, he urges those with stronger and clearer voices to speak for them. If they do so consistently, then even the "underclasses" will discover one day, as did the Negro, that attention must be paid to their complaints. That is what many of us in Washington are doing—speaking as loudly and clearly as we can. And that is why I resent the defeatism of the politically despondent and the closed minds of the economically sophisticated, both of whom will dismiss Myrdal's profound strictures as so much gab from a Dutch uncle and assert that change of this magnitude is too difficult to accomplish. Those of us who must work and watch in Washington think differently, otherwise we should do our writing elsewhere. We don't mind having Myrdal tell us where we fail, for he knows where we succeed. He also knows that the high-level stagnation we have suffered in the last dozen years will progressively destroy these successes if it continues unchecked. In short, we respond to the legitimate concern he expresses in this book, one that is worth a much closer reading than it is likely to receive in some quarters.

THE SENSE OF FACT

TIME OF ARRIVAL AND OTHER ESSAYS. By DAN JACOBSON. *Macmillan. 198 pp. $3.95.*

Reviewed by GEORGE P. ELLIOTT

TOWARD THE END of "After Notting Hill," one of the essays in this collection, Dan Jacobson makes the observation quoted below. It suggests the quality both of his prose and of his intelligence; but, more than that, it indicates the quality of *character* which distinguishes his essays. Among social-literary commentators, clean prose, sound essay construction, and genuine intelligence are not so hard to come by. Honesty is—that stubborn, Orwellian honesty which is the best of Britishness.

> The liberal hears his own words, distorted and magnified, coming from the lips of people he distrusts and despises. And he conceives a disgust for his own words. He never hears any words but his own; and yet when he looks around he sees that under the words of fairness, kindness and tolerance, there breed unchecked all the old rancours and hatreds and meannesses; all the old lusts for violence. So he turns away, stops his ears altogether, talks about something else.
>
> I happen to believe that there is an element of health in this turning away; that "apathy" is a political weapon that the authoritarian bullies of all kinds are finding it hard to turn to their own purposes; that fatigue and indifference in a time like the present can be positively restorative. But the one thing we cannot afford to be indifferent about is our sense of fact. If we retain our sense of fact, our words might yet regain their meanings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Well, Dan Jacobson's words retain their meanings, in no small part because he is not indifferent to his sense of fact—which is to say less modestly, he strives to be true to what he knows.

This honesty is the source of the special excellence of the six essays which are about books or writers. Like any good critic, he is true to his experience of reading the books he is taking about. But this aesthetic experience concerns him less than the life experiences which the books deal with, the moral qualities of the characters (the books he has chosen to write about are prose fiction or autobiography), most of all the truth of the author's vision. The last two points Jacobson makes about *Huckleberry Finn* are critically sound, but they are especially interesting because they are characteristic of himself as writer. He insists on the goodness of Huck and Jim as people; and he insists that their life on the raft is no escape from "sivilization," as Huck the narrator says, but that

> the relationship between the two on the raft demands from them both the sacrifices which civilization demands from us all, and which we frequently find most burdensome to make: it demands mutual responsibility, self-abnegation, and moral choice.

In a first-rate essay on *The Great Gatsby,* he argues that Fitzgerald was able in that one book to transcend his limitations because in Gatsby he created a figure who, like himself, nobly dreamed an ignoble dream. Jacobson then pays Fitzgerald the highest *kind* of tribute in his power to pay. After asserting that the physical details of characters' behavior "are somehow weightless and incoherent unless they are allied to a passionate preoccupation with the social depths which the details both reflect and imply," Jacobson continues:

> Fitzgerald's eye and ear were acute, and when he was fully engaged by his subject, as in *The Great Gatsby,* he was able fully to project his perceptions, in a way which, more than that of any other modern American novelist, helped to make the United States a country that not only is, but can be seen to be, a place of continuing habitation. Fitzgerald could not live in it, but others can, with greater understanding of themselves, because he tried to.

In an essay on James Baldwin written in 1961, Jacobson gives Baldwin's rhetorical skill its due and more than its due, and then puts his finger, reluctantly, almost apologetically, on the moral weakness of Baldwin's position.

> Instead of analyzing the consequences of Negro powerlessness, or speculating about the kinds of power [Negroes] may hope to win for themselves, he too frequently contents himself with making moral appeals, or with issuing warnings. The warnings, God knows, are justified; the appeals are indeed those of reason and intelligence and compassion. But does he believe they will be listened to? Does he *really* believe it?

Had the essay been written after *The Fire Next Time,* perhaps Jacobson would have been a bit less gentle and have spelled out the implication of his argument. Perhaps he would have pointed out that the effect, and presumably the intention, of Baldwin's blaming rhetoric is to paralyze American whites in their wrong, to sink them in stagnant guilt. For the worst possible deeds are those of the unjust despot, as Socrates argues in *The Republic,* and the most wretched of men must surely be, not the victim, but the unpunished and unforgiven criminal. In *Gorgias* Socrates says:

> It is for projects of this kind [seeing to it that a criminal remains unpurged of his crime] that rhetoric seems to be useful, since I really can't see any great utility in it for a man who doesn't intend to do wrong, if indeed it has any use at all.

Jacobson says he is qualified to comment on Baldwin's argument because, being both a white South African and a Jew, he has experience of power both as persecutor and as persecutee. His double role has a. standing, but it is n it. What is essential is of imagination easily with scope of men as gifted as ei Jacobson or Baldwin—that and th scrupulous exercise of conscience in preserving a "sense of fact."

But Jacobson's strength also sets his limits. Speaking of Kafka's limitations, he suggests his own.

> If we set against any of Kafka's fables the fable of "The Grand Inquisitor" from *The Brothers Karamazov,* we have to grant Dostoevsky a kind of nobility as a writer which Kafka is altogether without. Dostoevsky's fable has the nobility of true protest, of true rebellion, of a spirit trying to beat through the walls of its own limitations, instead of merely walking around within the walls and examining them minutely, fanatically, even lovingly, having lost all hope of reaching the world outside itself. The most one can say about Kafka is that his fidelity to the nature of his own experience is astonishing.

Now Jacobson is no Kafka, either in the strangeness of his imagination or in the rigidity of his limits; he is not obsessed. But just as one can say of Jacobson too that his fidelity to the nature of his own experience is amazing, so one feels that he too is held within the walls of that experience and that fidelity. But he is not trying to beat the walls down, like Dostoevsky, nor has he exactly lost hope of reaching the world beyond. It is more that he reaches *out to* the world beyond, trying to understand it. When he reaches too hard, he writes less than well. A not very important form of this yearning reaching is an occasional suggestion of incantation in the prose, in the manner of the prophetic Lawrence. One can feel this coming on when the sentences take to beginning with *And* too often. The other way he reaches too hard is much more important, but so endearing that it would be a shame to inveigh against it; besides, sometimes it succeeds. He loves to generalize. In an earlier book, *No*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son generalizes. sometimes wisely, d States on the evi- year in Palo Alto tanford on a creative ellowship—a town and an pation which provide shaky oundations for many generalizations about America. In an essay called "Zion Revisited" from the present collection, he says:

> Jews have always been in the very center of the cultural and social and religious history of Western civilization.

The inaccuracy of this claim is so breath-taking (who was the Jew of Athens?) as to render it harmless, no more than irritating.

Indeed, granted this generalizing propensity of his, the extraordinary thing is that many of his large statements are illuminating and exciting. However, most of those that ring true are not so much generalizations rationally abstracting from data as intuitions darting from the obscure depths of Dan Jacobson out into the world. It is in these sudden intuitions that he reaches out beyond his own experience freely and finely, though not for long at a time. He has just arrived in London from South Africa.

> And even on that first walk I saw how fine, how subtle, how eccentric, the faces of the English were. Each face seemed to carry within it the shadows, the suggestions, of innumerable others which had neither come to the surface nor been entirely lost.

It is worth noting that, when he reaches inwardly and outwardly at once and shows us a flash of truth, he speaks in strong, quite plain language. His weakness for incantation is suggested in that first, unnecessary, but here harmless *And*.

THE LAST quotation comes from the title essay, which is both the longest and the best. In it he explores and shapes his experiences during his first few weeks in London. The gifted provincial fresh in the capital—this is one of the set themes of fiction and autobiography. I do not know of a better treatment of it anywhere than Jacobson's in this essay. The writer represents the youth as arriving with the naïve hope that London will marvelously change him *right away*. Instead, it seems not to change him at all. The youth sets out to explore London, in the course of which he makes some of that great and hideous city and its great and powerful past his own, part of himself. The youth does not realize as the writer has known all along, that he has been exploring himself as well and that the city has been quietly changing him. Under the writer's quiet, tactful supervision, both the youth and the reader have been moving to a revelation of this change. One lovely anecdote both accomplishes this and completes the essay formally. He recounts coming home one day so distracted and full of care that he failed to spend the gram of imagination it would have taken him to see that a little girl had need of him; indeed, so preoccupied is he that he does not at first realize that her cry for help is addressed to him. To be sure, because he realizes almost immediately how he has failed her (though not quite soon enough to repair the damage), we are assured that he has not been hardened out of recognition. Moreover, because it is the man himself who shaped the anecdote, we know that, though the great cities harden the heart, Dan Jacobson's heart will not be hardened against others finally.

There is no sense of limitations in this essay. The formal limits are harmonious with the limits of the experience represented; but more, exploring London turned out to be an experience of the right size for him. Discovering London, he could discover himself without falling among glittering generalities or seductive rhythms. For him, another man's book is too narrow a realm for this double exploration to be perfectly satisfying, just as such great and pressing social issues as the race problem are too vast (as they have proved too vast for every other writer of the age). Indeed, huge issues cannot be handled as such except by philosophers or historians. In literature, they must be no more than a condition against which a writer presents his more manageable subjects. They must be dealt with indirectly because they are out of proportion to any man's shapable experience. Jacobson says something like this on the second page of the essay.

> In a way, the area the city as a whole covered did not come as such a surprise to me, partly because I could not, and still cannot, grasp it: it is beyond reckoning, beyond the widest span of one's imagination.

If this is true of London and of himself, how much more true is it of the social issues which he knows are of great importance but whose workings in his experience have not always mattered as much as lesser things. Yet, that he strives to grasp what is beyond imagining is not the least of the reasons one honors him so highly and reads his essays with such pleasure.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

MIDGE DECTER, *a frequent contributor to* COMMENTARY, *has also written for* Partisan Review, Harper's *and the* New York Review of Books.

KEITH BOTSFORD, *a young novelist and critic, has spent the last few years teaching and working in Latin America.*

LEWIS A. COSER, *professor of sociology at Brandeis and an editor of* Dissent, *is the author of* The Functions of Social Conflict.

JOHN MADDOX *is science correspondent of the Manchester* Guardian.

J. G. WEIGHTMAN *teaches French literature at King's College, London.*

BEN B. SELIGMAN'S *article on "Disarmament and the Economy" in our May 1963 issue attracted wide attention.*

GEORGE P. ELLIOTT *is the author of two novels,* Parktilden Village *and* David Knudsen, *and a collection of his essays,* A Piece of Lettuce, *is scheduled for publication this spring.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Geography of INTELLECT

Nathaniel Weyl and Stefan Possony



"Strong stuff; a compelling, if controversial, report."
—VIRGINIA KIRKUS

An important breakthrough to the study of human intellect in races and peoples. A highly interesting and readable book, it interprets for the layman those findings that give scientific support to a theory of history which includes such factors as climate, social and religious institutions, governments and beliefs, and radiation that shape man's brainpower.

The "How" and "Why" of man's most precious resource and the resource most critically in short supply on a global scale: *human intelligence:*

- How was man made?
- How can modern man avoid following Periclean Greece, Imperial Rome, Post-Inquisition Spain and Islam into "the graveyard of civilization?"
- How can current rates of technological progress be maintained and increased?
- How have nations and races developed creative intellectual minorities?
- Why and how has the Jew made the greatest contribution to the total intellectual life of the modern world?
- How and why are races, peoples, and classes unequally endowed?
- How and why do genetic factors play a major role in the rise and fall of civilizations?
- Why is there a dearth of brainpower among tropical races?
- How and why can intellectual testing shed light on the hereditary differences between races and groups?

About the authors

Nathaniel Weyl is author of *The Reconquest of Mexico, Treason, The Negro in American Civilization,* and many other books dealing with social issues. Educated at Columbia University and the London School of Economics, he is a fellow of the International Institute of Arts and Letters.

Stefan T. Possony is director of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. He was educated in Europe and at Princeton University's Institute of Advanced Study. He has taught at Georgetown University and the University of Pennsylvania. His biography *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary* has been published this year by Henry Regnery Company.

At Local Bookstores or direct from Publisher $7.95

Published by REGNERY

14 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago 4, Illinois

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NTRODUCED ADAM
O KNOWLEDGE

w Make
The Best Of It

Introduce your friends to.....

Commentary

INTRODUCTORY 2 ISSUE SUBSCRIPTION $1

Name .....
(please print)
Address .....
City/Zone ..... State .....
GIFT CARD TO
READ: FROM .....

Name .....
(please print)
Address .....
City/Zone ..... State .....
GIFT CARD TO
READ: FROM .....

Name .....
(please print)
Address .....
City/Zone ..... State .....
GIFT CARD TO
READ: FROM .....

Name .....
(please print)
Address .....
City/Zone ..... State .....
GIFT CARD TO
READ: FROM .....

- additional names can be added on separate sheet
- for 12 months subscriptions use the insert card bound into the magazine

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANY 3 BOOKS FREE



☐ **132. DICTIONARY OF SLANG & UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH** *by Eric Partridge.* Defines the "secret" words not in regular dictionaries, including colloquialisms, argot, slang, cant, Americanisms, catch phrases, nicknames, vulgarisms, "four-letter words," etc. The new revised and enlarged 5th edition — *1,376 pp., 50,000 definitions totaling 1,400,000 words, 9½ x 7 x 2½ inches.* [*Published by Macmillan Co.*]
PUBLISHER'S RETAIL PRICE $16

WE WILL GIVE YOU...

- **ANY 3 BOOKS FREE**—even if one of your choices is this $16 Dictionary!
- **PLUS 1 OR MORE OTHER BOOKS** for only $2.95 each *regardless of regular retail prices up to $10 or more!*
- **PLUS $2.50 BONUS VOUCHER** for each and every book you buy later. These $2.50 *Bonus Vouchers*—which may be applied immediately, at any time, toward other books of your choice—are given *in addition* to massive *outright discounts* on books offered by The Mid-Century Book Society, which has been called "America's most rewarding book club." You receive at least one $2.50 Voucher for each purchase—even on the many books offered to members in the low $3 to $5 range. Other books often earn *more* than one voucher.



- **SAVE UP TO 90% NOW.** New readers may thus save up to 90% *now*—by joining the Society *at this time.* While you need take only one book at the introductory *extra-discount* price, the more you take the more you save.
- **PLUS STILL ANOTHER FREE BOOK** [See coupon below] if you remit *now* for each book you take at the extra-discount price for new members.
- **CANCELLATION.** *Either*—return all these books after 2-weeks' free examination, without cost or obligation. *Or*—take only two more books during the coming year out of hundreds to be offered.
- **THE MID-CENTURY MAGAZINE FREE,** bringing you advance reviews of new books published each month—with informed recommendations of books to both read and *keep* [no fall-apart paperbacks] in every subject-category—books for pleasure, profit, reference . . . for the many interests, needs and appetites of America's "New Renaissance" readers . . . the best *novels, non-fiction, reference works, biographies, art books, histories*—and many more.
- **PROFIT SHARING:** Because the Society can order books in large quantities, it shares profits with members through sensationally *lower prices* plus the *Bonus Book Vouchers.* Members can thus buy first-run books—in publishers' regular cloth-bound editions for their permanent libraries [not cardboard-bound "cheapies"]—for less than throw-away paperbacks cost!
- **BECAUSE** many of the books offered in this announcement are in short supply, fulfillment of this offer can only be guaranteed for 30 days. *Please, therefore, enter all your choices by number on the Request Form—and mail without delay.*



PLEASE ORDER BY NUMBER

The GERMAN "CATCH-22"

☐ **181. THE OFFICER FACTORY** *by Hans Hellmut Kirst.* Revolving around a mysterious murder in a Nazi officers' training school in 1944, this great new novel presents an intimate picture of the behind-the-scenes chaos of Hitler's Third Reich in a series of gripping events that range from nerve-tearing tragedy to high comedy. (502 pp.) *Retail $6.50.*

☐ **224. WRITERS IN REVOLT,** *edited by Richard Seaver, Terry Southern & Alexander Trocchi.* An outstanding collection of the constructively shocking writing of avant garde authors of today and yesterday, among them: *de Sade, Baudelaire, Henry Miller, Lawrence Durrell, Sartre, Allen Ginsberg. Retail $7.50.*

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORDS

☐ **53. ORIGINS by Eric Partridge.** The most comprehensive encyclopedia-dictionary in 53 years of words and their origins. Covers words—common and uncommon—including many popularly supposed to be slang or vulgar. For example: "the only two words forbidden to be printed in full everywhere in the British Commonwealth" are revealed to be "superbluebloods" whose origins even antedate ancient Latin! 12,000 alphabetized sections [including definitions and foreign equivalents] in 1,300,000 words; 970 pages. *Retail $16.00.*

☐ **233. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD.** The "insider's" guide to all the world — 9700 provinces, states and municipalities of all 133 nations. 1700 pp., 1,000,000 words; full-color maps; charts; extensive and comprehensive index. *Retail $10.00.*

☐ **149. A WORLD ON THE WANE.** This exploration of humanity at its most basic is perhaps the most remarkable work ever published on a sexually uninhibited primitive culture. 116 revealing photographs and drawings. *Retail $12.50.*

☐ **933. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY: A Modern Selection** from the most famous and most wickedly personal dictionary of all time. A delight to read and browse. *Retail $6.50.*

☐ **238. A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE** *by Bergen & Cornelia Evans.* Complete, up-to-date dictionary of usage . . . style, punctuation, idioms, etc. *Retail $6.95.*

☐ **223. MEMOIRS OF HADRIAN** *by Yourcenar. Profuse Illus. Ret. $7.00.*

☐ **252. J.F.K.** *by Victor Lasky. Retail $7.95.*

☐ **908. THE DOUGHBOYS: The Story of The AEF [1917-18]** *by L. Stallings. 101 B&W and 124 full color illus. Retail $5.95*

☐ **242. THE POOH PERPLEX** *by F. C. Crews* and **THE ELEPHANT** *by S. Mrosek:* (2-bk. set). *Both illus. Comb. Retail $6.00.*

☐ **800. ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE** *by Ian Fleming. Ret. $4.50.*

☐ **915. THE LAST OF THE INCAS** *by Hyams & Ordish. Illus. Retail $6.00.*

☐ **966. LORD OF THE FLIES** *by W. Golding* and **THE PETTY DEMON** *by F. Sologub.* [2-bk. set]. *Comb. Retail $9.95.*

☐ **998. THE FIRST WORLD WAR. A PHOTO HISTORY** *by L. Stallings. Retail $7.50.*

☐ **106. THE DELIGHTS OF DETECTION** *ed. by J. Barzun. Retail $5.95.*

☐ **161. THE DECLINE OF THE WEST** *by Spengler. Retail $6.95.*

☐ **125E. GREAT ENGLISH SHORT NOVELS** *ed. by C. Connolly. Retail $7.50.*

☐ **125F. GREAT FRENCH SHORT NOVELS** *ed. by F. Dupee. Retail $7.50.*

☐ **125R. GREAT RUSSIAN SHORT NOVELS** *ed. by P. Rahv. Ret. $7.50.*

☐ **162. CAUTIONARY VERSES** *by Hilaire Belloc. Retail $6.00.*

FREE
if payment is enclosed with order

FOUR SCREENPLAYS OF INGMAR BERGMAN, one of the greatest film-makers of our time. Here are included *all* the situations "cut" from the screen versions—plus every delightful subtlety of dialogue. The Screenplays: *Smiles of A Summer Night, Wild Strawberries, The Seventh Seal* and *The Magician.*
Pub. Ed. $6.00

REQUEST FORM

C-13

Mail to: THE MID-CENTURY BOOK SOCIETY, 115 East 31st Street, N. Y. 16, N. Y.

Enroll me as a trial member and send me the 3 FREE BOOKS indicated below—charging me only for the one or more other books ordered at the *special new-member price* of only $2.95 each.

My only obligation is to buy two future selections during the coming year from the 100 or more to be offered at average savings of 50% under the publishers' retail prices. Over and above outright *Discounts,* I am to receive at least one *$2.50 Bonus Book Voucher* with each book purchased.

[PLEASE INDICATE YOUR CHOICES BELOW BY NUMBER.]

I. SEND THE FOLLOWING SELECTIONS FREE — with New-Member Purchase(s) at right.

II. SEND THE FOLLOWING SELECTION(S) AT SPECIAL NEW-MEMBER'S PRICE ($2.95).

Name _____

Address _____ City _____ Zone _____ State _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hot tea or iced champagne

Or both. That's the delightful duality of the new Shalom. A friendly ship designed for friendly people, the Shalom has warmth built in. It took a very special nation to create a ship as light-hearted and lavish as this one. A nation young in heart, joyful in spirit, adventurous in outlook. The minute you step aboard, you'll warm to the instinctive Israeli courtesy and friendliness that comes only from people with a centuries-old heritage of hospitality—from people who care for people. And this spirit is contagious.

Just follow your impulses—unexpected contrasts greet you at every turn. The joyful strains of the hora mingle with the romantic beat of the merengue. A quiet game of pinochle takes place in sight of young divers splashing into one of the Shalom's three pools. Exciting lounges tempt you to dance the night away, while secluded spots on sun-swept decks invite you to do nothing at all. The Shalom is an adventure in life the way you like it—easy-going, elegant, or both.

The Shalom is coming in the spring of 1964. She will leave New York o May 8 on her maiden voyage to Europe and Israel. It will be a speci 34-day adventure to eight sun-drenched ports with a four day stay in picturesque Haifa. After that, she will sail monthly from New York to Malaga, Marseilles, Naples and Haifa. Plan to sail with her. Just see your travel agent and say, "Shalom".

And don't forget Zim's other fine transatlantic liners.
One leaves New York for Haifa every third Friday throughout the year.



BE A "GUEST"...G
ZIM
LINES

OWNER'S REPRESENTATIVE: AMERICAN ISRAELI SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., 42 BROADWAY, NEW YORK 4, N.Y., MIDTOWN OFFICE: 580 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y., DI 4-7600; OTHER OFFICES: CHICAGO, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI BEACH, MONTREAL, TORON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED